Search results

The Coase theorem is associated with Stigler because Stigler coined the term. The object of this paper is to show that Stigler’s Coase theorem is Stiglerian for deeper – namely, methodological – reasons. We argue that, convinced as he was by the importance of Coase’s message, Stigler also believed that this message – such as presented in “The Federal Communications Commission” (1959) or “The Problem of Social Cost” (1962) – was not scientific. Hence, he had to transform it into a theorem to give it a scientific dimension. This is what we try to show by presenting Stigler’s methodology and by confronting it to the methodology used in Coase’s articles.

This paper aims to take a step in this direction and use the high dimensional fixed effects and quantile regression discontinuity design to test the managerial Coase theorem, which provides an institutional perspective for us to gauge the impact of private property rights on firm performance and the effect of management costs on intermediate inputs.

This study first uses high dimensional regression discontinuity designs to examine the impact of privatization on firm performance in China between 1998 and 2013.

Results indicate that privatization effects increase average outputs of the firm by around 10% given lower management costs, and management costs increase intermediate inputs by more than 50% points. Using data from annual surveys to test managerial Coase theorem, the authors show that management costs negatively affect the marginal effect of privatization on the average outputs of the firm. The positive impact on the investment in intermediate goods and services is larger in magnitude under higher management costs.

The authors develop the managerial Coase theorem. Today, given lower management costs, private property rights provide an incentive structure for a firm to maximize the value of the assets and expand the boundaries.

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the efficiency of the internal control reporting (ICR) requirements imposed by Sections 302 and 404 of the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX). The lessons learned are then applied to the current financial crisis.

The Coase Theorem is applied to the events leading up to the collapse of Enron and the enactment of SOX. The paper then analyzes the efficacy of the various examples of ICR regulation, both pre‐ and post‐SOX, noting the ways in which they effectively mitigate transaction costs and the ways in which they over‐regulate.

US investors continue to invest in foreign markets despite the fact that those markets maintain less demanding ICR requirements than those required by Section 404. Moreover, investors do not respond negatively to Section 404 disclosures. The research demonstrates that Section 404 does not provide useful information in the minds of investors. Considering Section 404's ineffectiveness and the burdensome costs it imposes on reporting companies, it is clear that Section 404 is an example of over‐regulation and should be repealed.

The transaction costs that caused the collapse of Enron and the enactment of SOX bear strong similarities to those causing the more recent subprime mortgage crisis. The lessons learned from the enactment of SOX Section 404 are directly applicable to the current financial crisis and should be noted moving forward.

By utilizing a law and economics perspective, the paper more clearly demonstrates how Section 404 is an example of over‐regulation and draws links to the current economic crisis.

X = multiple interpretations

The purpose of this paper is to analyze a recent proposal by the State of New York that would subject a large portion of the credit default swap (CDS) market to state‐based insurance regulatory oversight.

Using the collapse of AIG as an example of the systemic risk inherent in unregulated CDS transacting, the Coase Theorem is then applied to determine the optimal level of CDS regulatory oversight.

Although CDSs resemble insurance contracts in many respects, they are also uniquely complex financial instruments that are continually changing and thus not well suited for the antiquated state‐based model of insurance regulation. Furthermore, the external forces that influence state‐based regulatory decision‐making are likely to produce inefficient regulation.

The Coase Theorem states that the optimal level of regulatory oversight is the one that causes market participants to internalize the risk inherent in transacting and does so at the lowest cost. Because of the complexity of CDS contracts and the unique forces that guide state‐based regulatory decision‐making, the State of New York's proposal is ill advised.

By utilizing a law and economics perspective, it becomes clear that although a state‐based model of regulatory oversight may force market participants to internalize systemic risk, it is nevertheless suboptimal because it does not do so at the lowest cost.

During recent years, financial economists have made a significant contribution to the rapid development of a vibrant and growing literature on organization structure and corporate governance. In reviewing the development of this literature, it becomes easy to see how the seminal contributions of Ronald Coase (awarded the Nobel Prize in Economics in 1991) have become the cornerstone of a new institutional economics. In particular, researchers following in Coase’s footsteps have clarified the conditions under which voluntary contracts between private agents can resolve a wide variety of so-called “agency problems.” More than just representing an important discovery of the significance of transaction costs and property rights for the institutional structure and functioning of the economy, Coase’s work has become an important foundation for the theory of contracts and for the whole field of “organization economics.”

Recent research and market effects within the European Union (EU) show a rising concern toward the de-risking of certain sectors/actors owing to the increased anti-money laundering regulation. Because of the enhanced due diligence and monitoring costs related to anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing regulation by the AMLD4 and AMLD5, several financial institutions now turn to de-risking their corporate client base to minimize not only costs from monitoring and onboarding but also the risks of sanctions and reputation. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the incentives behind de-risking and the relevant solution models to the de-risking “crisis.” Overall, to find, to what extend de-risking is efficient and when it is not and how to mitigate the concept.

This paper applies a functional approach to law and economics with the aim of reaching a higher level of efficiency in combatting money laundering through analyzing present regulatory and economic conditions.

It is found that de-risking within the EU opposes the aim of the present regulatory scheme regarding anti-money laundering. The paper finds that it is needed to divide the analysis of de-risking to a national and regional/union level. In addition, this paper establishes that the present strategy of de-risking at national level eventually will result in enhanced regulation to fulfill the aim of the present regulatory framework, which is why a proactive approach by recontracting the client base is recommended. At a regional level, it is found that de-risking is valid, why a solution needs to come from the EU enhancing control, monitoring and sanctions to establish trust and the possibility for financial inclusion.

Most of the recent research within the field highlights the problem of de-risking and therefore presents a range of initiatives to regulators and financial institutions at a global level. This paper solely focuses on the EU and shows that the de-risking dilemma demands financial institutions to take a proactive approach to contracting if unnecessary regulation is to be hindered. Furthermore, this paper shows that the concept of de-risking cannot be analyzed nor mitigated as one singular concept, but it needs to be addressed according to different levels of activity and geography.

The purpose of this paper is to discuss incentive mechanisms and procedures for cost internalization by both potential defendants and plaintiffs.

The approach taken is to rely on the concepts of liability, negligence, precaution and methodologies for estimation of compensatory damages in conjunction with the Coase theorem.

The paper finds that the decision to internalize and minimize cost depends upon marginal precautionary costs and marginal expected harms.

Research needs to be conducted from a law and economic perspective on developing procedures for estimating precautionary costs and expected harms.

This paper calls upon business firms and their stakeholders (primarily employees and customers) to use and pro‐actively manage their precautionary responsibilities and further refine the existing formulas. More specifically, it aims to help law and economics students as well as practitioners in law and regulation to better understand the implications of marginal precautionary costs and marginal expected harms in the process of cost internalization.

In exploring the precautionary responsibilities of firms and their stakeholders, this paper contributes to a better understanding of liability and negligence issues and, as a result, to the important intersection of law and microeconomics.

Recent research shows that because of money-laundering risks, there has been an increase in the off-boarding of certain types of corporate clients in the financial sector. This phenomenon known as “de-risking” has been argued to have a negative impact on society, because it increases the possible risk of money laundering. The purpose of this paper is to analyze whether the de-risking strategy of financial institutions results in an expansion of the regulatory framework concerning anti-money laundering focusing on off-boarding of clients and, if so, is there a way to avoid further regulation by changing present behavior.

This paper applies functional methods to law and economics to achieve higher efficiency in combating money laundering.

In this paper, it is found that the continuing of de-risking by financial institutions because of the avoidance strategy of money-laundering risks will inevitably result in further regulatory demands regarding the off-boarding process of clients. The legal basis for the introduction of further regulatory intervention is that some of the de-risking constitutes a direct contradiction to the aim of the present regulatory framework, making the behavior non-compliant to the regulation.

There has been very little research concerning de-risking related to money laundering. The present research has focused on the effect on society and not the relationship between the financial institutions and the regulator. This paper raises an important and present problem, as the behavior of the financial institutions constitute a response from the regulator that is contradicting the thoughts behind the behavior of the financial institutions. It is found that the paper is highly relevant if an expansion of regulation is to be hindered.