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Organizational buying decisions are characterized by conflict which can be studied through the use of coalition theory. It appears, however, that conceptual and methodological problems with coalition theory based on game theory and social psychology have limited its usefulness in helping us understand how such conflict can be managed. This paper proposes the group influence approach to conflict management in organizational buying. The main contribution of this approach is that by treating individuals as representatives of coalitions, sellers and buyers can focus on coalition leaders rather than focus on individuals who, in any case, have to conform to group expectations. Theoretically, the group influence approach recognizes that power and politics are basic forces that affect most spheres of organizational activity. Within such a framework purchase decisions are shown to be politically negotiated settlements between those coalitions involved in making the buying decision.

This article applies the theory of coalition formation in triads to channels of distribution. The theory explains alternative power strategies of weaker (smaller) channel members to dominance by more powerful channel entities. Six pre‐coalition situations are examined to aid in predicting the possible conditions that may form, given an uneven distribution of power in the channel system. This type of analysis could be used to predict disadvantageous power combinations in the channels of distribution to the overall macro effectiveness of the channel system.

Reviews theory on coalition formation and what it might mean to a manager in an organization. Defines coalition, for the purpose of the discussion, as a means‐oriented alliance among groups or individuals who differ in goals. Proposes that a theoretic understanding of coalitions, coupled with communications network analysis, would be a useful tool for discerning particular types of organizational coalitions and a guide to who might coalesce with whom for a detrimental result.

Multi-robot coalition formation (MRCF) refers to the formation of robot coalitions against complex tasks requiring multiple robots for execution. Situations, where the robots have to participate in multiple coalitions over time due to a large number of tasks, are called Time-extended MRCF. While being NP-hard, time-extended MRCF also holds the possibility of resource deadlocks due to any cyclic hold-and-wait conditions among the coalitions. Existing schemes compromise on solution quality to form workable, deadlock-free coalitions through instantaneous or incremental allocations.

This paper presents an evolutionary algorithm (EA)-based task allocation framework for improved, deadlock-free solutions against time-extended MRCF. The framework simultaneously allocates multiple tasks, allowing the robots to participate in multiple coalitions within their schedule. A directed acyclic graph–based representation of robot plans is used for deadlock detection and avoidance.

Allowing the robots to participate in multiple coalitions within their schedule, significantly improves the allocation quality. The improved allocation quality of the EA is validated against two auction schemes inspired by the literature.

To the best of the author's knowledge, this is the first framework which simultaneously considers multiple MR tasks for deadlock-free allocation while allowing the robots to participate in multiple coalitions within their plans.

Social movements are made up of organized groups and individuals working together to accomplish shared objectives. Under what circumstances do active groups build and break their coalitions? Five conditions have been identified in the literature as influencing coalition formation: common identity, resources, organizational structure, historical connection, and institutional setting. Whereas coalition dynamics within a movement wave are best understood in terms of institutional opportunities and threats, further research is needed to determine how and to what extent these contextual elements influence coalitions. This chapter examines how threats posed by indiscriminate and selective repression affect the shape and structure of interorganizational coalitions during the 2019 Anti-Extradition Law Amendment Bill (Anti-ELAB) protests in Hong Kong. The analysis relies on an original political event dataset and an organization-event network dataset. These datasets were produced utilizing syntactic event coding techniques based on Telegram posts, which Hong Kong protesters used to distribute information, plan future actions, and crowdsource news. Furthermore, Telegram provides detailed information about state activities, event-level coalitions, and violent groups, which is difficult to access from other sources. This study investigates the coalition networks across the movement's four stages, each of which was marked by a particular type and degree of repression. The findings indicate that indiscriminate and selective repression have varied effects on coalition networks. A wide coalition disintegrates as a result of indiscriminate repression. Selective repression, however, leads to the formation of coalitions around activist groups targeted by repression.

Coalitions are informal and interdependent groups of actors operating within organizations, yet their effects in organizations are not widely understood. In this paper, we develop a model of coalition formation and functioning inside organizations. By extrapolating the behavioral intentions (i.e., altruistic or antagonistic) and compositional differences (i.e., supplementary or complementary) among these informal group structures, we classify coalitions into four forms (i.e., lobby, cartel, circle, and alliance), theorizing how each coalition form affects work role innovation, resource allocations, and work performance. Our conceptualization helps clarify previous theoretical inconsistencies and establish an agenda for the study of coalitions at work. Furthermore, this paper provides insights into the ways that coalitions support or impede the organization’s objectives.

Subjects participated in a three‐person negotiation exercise, in which they had to form two‐ or three‐way coalitions to receive resources. The effects of power position (high, medium, low), distribution norms (contribution, need), and task meeting structure (caucus, joint) on the distribution of resources were examined. Most coalition theories assume that the power position of the players calls into play different levels of entitlement which will determine the allocation of resources. There has, however, been little attempt to manipulate entitlement, in the form of distribution norms, separately from power structure. In the research reported here, three‐person groups contained a high, medium, and low power player. The dominant group distribution norm was manipulated as either contribution‐based or need‐based. Task meeting structure was manipulated by beginning each group meeting with either a three‐way meeting between all players (joint) or a series of one‐on‐one meetings (caucus). As predicted, groups that began by caucusing had a higher incidence of two‐way agreements than groups that began with joint meetings. The task meeting structure interacted with power position such that caucusing increased the high power player's outcome, while the joint meeting structure increased the low power player's outcome. In addition, the distribution norm interacted with power position such that the contribution‐based norm increased the outcomes of high power players, while the need‐based norm increased the outcomes of the low power players.

Different housing development stakeholders need to cooperate and collaborate to perform various project activities. Housing development requires infrastructure development, which includes preparation of sand material embankment as much as ± 200,000 m³. The objectives are to find a model for agreement options and coalition, to validate the algorithms of the best fit for material locations and to determine how much the proposed agreement option was achieved. This study provides a structured methodology that can lead to systematic support system and automated negotiation for decision-making on housing development process.

Agreement option on group decision techniques was applied to determine the relative value of the alternative solutions for performing the function of project solutions. Analytical hierarchy process based on satisficing option was applied for decision process and game theory-based agent system for coalition formation. It is conducted in two stages that determine the decision preference and decision process consisting of four steps. The steps are constructing decision hierarchy, making judgment and synthesis, determining payoff optimum and analyzing the best fit option for all decision-makers.

The proposed model enables each decision-maker to select individually its coalition. It will improve the value of strategic decision. All solutions are chosen by more than one decision-maker and coalitions, where all decision-makers agree with the result. It becomes possible location for the material of a housing development. A support model enables negotiation process in group decision. Decision algorithms are based on the cooperative game theory to develop the agreement options and coalition formation. Similar research studies were carried out in this area, but this research is – to the knowledge of the authors – the first to apply the satisficing of value-based on desirable and considerable.

The result is limited to the first-round negotiation of collaborative decision. A trade-off algorithm among decision-maker preference is needed for negotiation process. Future research is to continue working on multi-attribute decision-making, specifically on the process of eliciting user preference models such as neural network application and value function, and on establishing expert quantitative data from qualitative description of the feature of the alternative solution. It will need the development of trade-off algorithms to analyze value of technical solution in real time.

The support model can be extended to an automated negotiation and in different strategic decision on all stages of housing development.

The satisficing algorithm of the coalition will satisfy all stakeholders. This will reduce any potential conflict.

Combination of value-based decision, group decision and collaborative support. Application of coalition formation for agreement options is used to select the best fit material location. It is based on satisficing game theory rather than optimization.

Professionals are often seen as an implementation barrier to change in public organisations. Although their commitment is judged to be crucial, they often behave rather reservedly and may even oppose change. The power models and micro‐political theories of change both conceptualise this resistance as a defence of their professional interests, their benefits and their power status. Acknowledging that political strategies, tactics and games played have a crucial role in the implement of change in public organisations, this paper expands this perspective by dealing with issues related to professional identity. Identity‐related conflicts often go beyond the issues of protecting and enhancing benefits and power. Therefore, this paper focuses on the central characteristics of identity and examines the identity‐related aspects of the political perspective of change management.

The purpose of this paper is to build theory and present a model of the development of conflicts in teams.

The paper develops a conceptual model based on past theory and research.

The model brings a multi-level perspective to the process of intragroup conflict by showing the mechanisms by which an interpersonal, dyadic conflict can spread to other team members over time through a process of conflict contagion.

This study provides a new model for conflict escalation and it sheds light on factors which can either ameliorate or exacerbate the speed and extent of conflict contagion. The repercussions of different degrees of conflict involvement within a team are discussed.