Search results

In addition to increased regulation and platform co-operatives, this paper proposes a third option to address the problem posed by the labor-based platform (LBP) companies and companies' treatment of de facto employees as “independent contractors,” thus avoiding the usual employee benefits.

The paper outlines the history and structure of Employee Stock Ownership Plans (ESOPs) as a mechanism to achieve partial worker ownership of companies.

The possibility of establishing ESOPs in the local subsidiaries of platform companies is outlined as the third option to reform LBPs.

Whether this option is available in the United States of America is not clear without new litigation or legislation since the existing USA ESOP is for “employees” and the problem is that the LBPs do not classify these platforms' full-time workers as “employees.” Hence, this third option may be mainly relevant to other countries for LBPs that are not already established.

The ESOP approach to changing LBPs is a new suggestion in addition to the usual approaches of increased public regulation and establishing new worker-owned platform co-operatives. The ESOP is a new tool in the hands of municipal and national governments to require in order for the LBPs to be able to operate.

Unions and worker cooperatives have long represented distinct approaches to building worker voice. This paper draws from observations of the work of the “Co-op Exploratory Committee” of 1199SEIU, the nation’s largest union local, which is seeking to expand the development of unionized worker cooperatives. Described by Martin Luther King, Jr, as his “favorite” union, 1199SEIU has a storied history of organizing frontline healthcare workers and includes large numbers of women of color and immigrant workers among its membership. Since 2003, it has also represented workers at Cooperative Home Care Associates, the nation’s largest worker cooperative. Drawing from discussions among union officials, co-op leaders, and rank-and-file union members about the potential role of unionized worker cooperatives within the labor movement, the paper examines the creative tension between stakeholder and democratic logics in efforts to expand this model. It argues that continued union decline, heightened interest in economic alternatives, and systemic frailties exposed by Covid-19 may create new opportunities for building unionized worker co-ops at scale.

This chapter maps existing patterns of broad-based worker ownership and control in contemporary advanced capitalism and considers future possibilities for expanding democracy within firms. Section one discusses worker ownership and control arrangements in relation to different theories of the firm and shows how these arrangements map onto different national systems. Section two compares Germany, which is characterized by worker control without ownership, and the United States, which is marked by worker ownership without control. Section three explores three pathways through which broad-based worker ownership and control might be deepened and more strongly coupled in the future.

In light of the faster than expected take up of the community interest company (CIC) in the UK, the purpose of this paper is to revisit findings from a study undertaken in 2000 on the impact of asset‐locks on the longevity, growth and management styles in co‐operative social enterprises.

This paper is both conceptual and empirical. It examines different worker co‐operative traditions and develops a meta‐theory that explains underlying assumptions in different forms of co‐operative social enterprise. Using empirical data from five common ownership co‐operatives and five equity‐based co‐operatives, this exploratory study finds differences in management style, access to finance and growth prospects both within and between the two groups.

Devolution of management responsibilities is more prevalent in co‐operatives permitting both individual and collective ownership, as opposed to common ownership. Access to external finance is less problematic for organisations where individuals have made investments. Despite this, it is not established that organisations with external equity or loan finance grow quicker or fare better over the longer term.

The value of the paper lies both in the development of a meta‐theoretical framework for differentiating forms of worker co‐operative, as well as empirical evidence on the impact of asset‐locks in the management and development of social enterprises. The study suggests that the companies limited by share (CLS) version of the CIC, or abandonment of the CIC in favour of an appropriately structured CLS or Industrial and Provident Society model, may be appropriate for social enterprises wishing to grow, but makes little difference in small service oriented social enterprises.

The purpose of this paper is to review and analyze policies where employee share ownership might be relevant to the inequality debate in the USA.

Description and analysis of policy alternatives designed to increase the prevalence of employee ownership in the USA economy.

Since 1974, Congress has passed many provisions to encourage employee ownership, all with widespread bipartisan support. Additional policies would have an even greater impact. Congress could “level the playing field” for corporate divestitures and sales of companies by private equity firms; create Employee Ownership Investment Corporations, modeled after Small Business Investment Corporations, to provide capital for sales to employees; and create an Employee Equity Loan Program to guarantee loans for employee-ownership transactions. Such measures would have no budgetary impact. It could also create tax incentives to encourage corporate and private-equity sales to employees and establish regulations to ensure that employee-owned companies are eligible for the full benefit of recent opportunity zone legislation. Legislation could also encourage publicly traded companies to offer stock to employees at a discount and require companies that receive various forms of special treatment from the government to establish employee stock-ownership programs.

The academic journal literature has virtually no policy analyses on employee share ownership.

To examine how different types of ownership, including investor-owned, employee-owned, and mixed models, affect the dynamics of participatory practices in the workplace, and the broader social effects of these differences.

Brings together literature from democratic theory and empirical research in workplace participation and employee ownership. The first step is to articulate the range of democratic practices from nondemocratic to strongly democratic. The essay then discusses the different forms that participation can take and the threshold for what can be considered democratic participation. It then considers different models of ownership and the impact of ownership type on participatory practices.

It is found that investor-owned firms cannot be considered strongly democratic and that worker cooperatives are more likely to be strongly democratic and cannot fall below the threshold of weak democracy. However, strong democracy is not necessarily a feature of worker cooperatives.

Little work has been done to consider the way the type of ownership affects the kind or degree of democratic practices that may be present in an enterprise.

The purpose of this paper is to give an updated overview over the development of employee-ownership in Italy, France, Spain including Mondragon, the UK and the US with relatively many employee-owned firms. How have the barriers for employee-ownership been overcome in these countries?

The overview is based on updated descriptions of the development of employee-ownership included in this special issue. The analysis follows the structure of overcoming five barriers: the organization problem; the problem of entry and exit of employee-owners; the startup and takeover problem; the capital- and the risk problem.

Italy, France and Spain have overcome the barriers by specific legislation for worker cooperatives, this includes rules for entry and exit of employee members. Cooperative support organizations play an important role for monitoring and managing the startup problem and for access to capital. The Mondragon model includes individual ownership elements and a group structure of cooperatives. The EOT and ESOP models are well suited for employee takeovers, financing are eased by tax advantages and they are all-employee schemes. While the EOT has no individual risks, the ESOP model has the possibility for capital gains for employees but also the risk of losing these gains.

Comprehensive and updated overview of the development in employee-ownership in the five countries to identify successful formats of employee-ownership for implementation in countries with few employee-owned firms.

The Mondragon cooperatives are the most thoroughly studied and well-known example of worker cooperatives in the world. Yet while there has been much discussion and wide recognition of the empirical growth of the Mondragon co-ops, there is substantial confusion about the lessons we can draw from this case in thinking about workplace democracy more broadly.

The normative and empirical literature on Mondragon is carefully analyzed to draw out the main implications from this case study for the broader issue of workplace democracy.

I contend that Mondragon teaches us two main lessons. First, that workplace democracy can indeed operate in a way that is economically sustainable and socially superior to conventional firms. Second, Mondragon sheds light on the question of whether co-ops are doomed to degenerate.

This paper advances our understanding and conceptualization of workplace democracy.

This paper provides practitioners with an up-to-date and comprehensive analysis of the world’s most successful cooperative network.

This paper provides insight into the practical feasibility and normative desirability of alternative organizations of workplaces in the form of worker cooperatives.

This paper will be of particular interest to scholars and activists interested in democratic alternatives to conventional hierarchical firms by illustrating the strengths and weaknesses of the Mondragon cooperatives and drawing out the lessons that this specific yet influential example has for issues of workplace democracy more broadly.