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This contribution argues that there is a fundamental problem for the multi-level governance (MLG) approach in that what the approach is trying to explain has never been fully agreed by the vast group of scholarship that references it. The chapter then examines and proposes that ideas and concepts from network governance, principal–agent (PA) and learning can provide the necessary micro foundations for the MLG approach.

The chapter examines and critiques the original MLG formulations and the later efforts at elaboration. It then reviews the literature and concepts for three public policy approaches that have been associated with European governance to see how core explanations can be elaborated upon in a multi-level context: network governance, principal–agent (PA) and learning.

This contribution suggests that co-ordination, and the resources that help maintain this co-ordination, is the key dependent variable that underpins the MLG approach. With multiple principals and multiple agents, operating at a number of levels of analysis, direct authority and control is harder to evoke. The key explanatory variable underpinning this MLG co-ordination is learning by the participants.

Researchers need to concentrate both their theoretical and empirical efforts in understanding the conditions that support multi-level governance and that sustain its effort.

The contribution outlines some of the key practical questions that policy-makers must face. Can they manage resources and induce learning from all the relevant public and private stakeholders to engage in the MLG effort?

Not only does an effective MLG process involve engaging a wide range of societal stakeholders, these stakeholders have to be persuaded to invest effort in learning about the nature of the governance system, the challenges of the policy problem and the implications of the efforts to resolve these problems.

This chapter isolates the fundamental lacuna at the heart of the MLG project and offers academics and practitioners a conceptual lens for building a clearer analytical structure for studying MLG.

Networks are by now popular inter-organizational coordination modes. However, there is still much to know regarding how networks are governed and how their governance develops and changes through time.

This paper addresses the research question how does the governance form of networks develops over time by empirically studying the European telecommunications regulatory network using a case study approach.

We find that the network’s governance system is determined by the dialectical tension between network members (National Regulatory Agencies) and an external very influential body (the European Commission).

This tension unifies the group in the classic external conflict–internal cohesion fashion. We also identify a second dialectical tension internal to the network among its members. The tensions are triggered by evaluations carried out by an external actor (the European Commission). In general, the process observed confirms the propositions that predict a formalizing of the governance as the network grows older.

This research is based on a single case, a broader analysis of other regulatory networks among network industries at the European Union level will help researchers to establish a more comprehensive picture on the development of the governance form of this specific subset of goal-directed networks.

The chapter presents a historical and economic analysis of Nordic wage formation, with a special focus on how collective agreements really work. A stereotypical interpretation of the evolution of Nordic wage bargaining systems is that a centralised setting of wages has gradually been substituted with more decentralised pay bargaining. This overlooks the fact that central organisations could never really control wage levels, even in the golden age of centralised bargaining. Instead, central pay bargains defined minimum wage changes that ensured that local conflicts would be ruled out. Moreover, the central stipulations could often be overruled or adjusted at the local level. Following insights of Teulings and Hartog, we argue that the main function of Nordic collective agreements has always been to rule out local conflicts that would otherwise be initiated to seek local rents. Thus, collective agreements combine macroeconomic flexibility with adequate investment incentives at the local level. In this crucial sense, Nordic collective agreements are a completely stable institution. The most important transformation that has taken place is that formal peak bargaining on mean pay increases has been substituted with pattern bargaining where the manufacturing industry acts as a wage leader. Economic theory suggests that this almost amounts to centralised pay setting.

This chapter introduces the concept of the Shared Mobility Services Agency for the planning and managing of collective transport services at urban and regional level.

Building on previous work which established the concept of the Flexible Transport Service (FTS) Agency as a single co-ordination centre for different flexible services, this chapter extends the concept to consolidate the role of the Agency as a Shared Mobility Centre, including the integration of different on-demand or New Mobility Services and the co-ordination of different key actors in a co-modal approach. Specific attention is given to the enabling information and communication technology (ICT) architecture and standards and to the actions needed for consolidating the Agency’s role.

Findings indicate the fundamental role of the Public Transport Authority (local or regional) to enable the implementation of the concept. Priorities include: recognizing the Agency as an added value service for the area; supporting possible interaction/synergy among different Dispatch Centres and/or with other paratransit services; and defining a specific set of indicators measuring the quality and quantitative of service that are different from those of the conventional transport service.

In a time when household and public expenditure are under pressure, coupled with rapid technology progress (especially enhanced connectivity) the shared mobility services Agency offers a co-ordinated solution to planning and managing collective transport services, including New Mobility Services (represented by recent solutions like Uber, Sidecar, Lyft and BlaBlaCar) which are not yet integrated with traditional transport services.

This chapter presents a review of community transport in Australia with the aim of providing material for comparative research in flexible transport.

Research on Australian community transport has been brought together to present an analysis of the key features of the industry: history; geography; funding; regulation and the use of volunteers.

Each key feature has led to the current strong state/territory basis for service organisation and delivery, despite the federal responsibility for supplying most of the funding and ensuring equity and standards. Varying approaches to regulation and supply have also been driven by remoteness and the prevalence of large pockets of entrenched social disadvantage in some regions.

The chapter summarises research findings including hitherto unpublished research on an application of flexible transport services outside mainstream public transport operations in Australia.

This paper is ambitious. Its central purpose is to examine how a number of developed economies, plus the largest developing economy, vary in terms of corporate governance: USA, Japan, Germany, UK, France, Italy, South Korea, Taiwan, Sweden, Switzerland and mainland China. We understand corporate governance in a very broad sense, descriptive not prescriptive: as who controls and influences firms, and how. We are thus dealing very much with varieties of capitalism. In a sense, we shall be seeking to characterise national systems of corporate governance, but we must stress that our concern is always with the situation of the individual firm. We shall find it convenient most of the time to give one label to a country's whole economy, but this will always be an approximation, which conceals variations among that country's firms. At other points, we shall distinguish types of firm and indicate the rough proportions of each type in a particular economy.