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Shareholder dividends are “rents”: they are paid out of a producer's surplus that, in a fully competitive market, would not exist. In any market system, no one has a right to rents. Why, then, do shareholders receive dividends? Most likely, share gains have been the result of the usefulness of the share-centered ideologies in justifying a tremendous shift of corporate wealth from employees to an alliance of top managers and shareholders. This alliance now shows signs of breaking down, as the managers learn they no longer need the ideological cover. Standard accounts conceal the struggle over corporate surplus and the weakness of shareholder claims to appropriate it. Recognizing that distribution of corporate surplus is a political struggle is the first step towards a less ideologically blindered discussion of how that struggle ought to be structured.

Reasonable compensation is a highly scrutinized area of taxation by the Internal Revenue Service because of the tax impact on both corporations and employees. The guidance provided via statutory and administrative authority does not fully address this issue. Specifically, there is a lack of clarity and consistency in this arena of tax. Our study examines reasonable compensation in closely held corporations and the impact of gender, political affiliation, and family makeup on decisions made in the US Tax Court. The time frame of judicial decisions covers 1983 through 2014. We use regression models and chi-square tests to analyze the effect of gender, political affiliation, and family composition on US Tax Court decisions in reasonable compensation cases. We find that the judge’s gender and tenure/experience are significant. Our results also suggest a relationship between the duration of the case and the judge’s decision. Our significant variables include judge’s gender, number of tax years covered by the case, taxpayer’s gender, and tenure/experience of the judge.

Punitive damages is a controversial topic in the legal profession and in the field of economics. This chapter explores the economics of punitive damages as they relates to corporate defendants. The economic difference between large corporations and other potential defendants, such as individuals or smaller closely held companies, causes the effects of a punitive award to be different. In some circumstances, these differences raise significant questions as to the appropriateness of punitive damages when imposed on large corporations.

This viewpoint will present some statistical information about employee ownership in the US and interpret and analyze this information in order to address the barriers question using material from qualitative interviews that the authors have conducted over the last ten years with practitioners in the field. There have been few actual empirical studies that sort out the different barriers to employee ownership. The authors have chosen to focus on employee stock ownership plan (ESOP) in the US because this is the principal example from which people could learn from, and the high prevalence of ESOPs plays an important role in the US. This overview will present interpretations of these interviews with conceptual arguments that cannot always be supported with either overwhelming empirical studies or arguments that conclusively eliminate one or other explanation. This is an initial attempt to bring some comprehensive treatment and data to this incipient discussion. This is based on an interpretive analysis of qualitative interviews without quantification or social survey methods used for measurement. The advantage of this approach is that it lays out a completely different level of analysis of the barriers to employee ownership in the US that is “closer to the ground” and more based in the views of front-line practitioners who are actually implementing it.

Analysis and interpretation of qualitative interviews.

The list of barriers that has been identified is not exhaustive. The preliminary conclusions are that (not necessarily in this order) limitations of investment banking models, poor supportive infrastructure, complexity and cost and regulatory issues, the lack of support by political parties and social movements, the sale of companies due to financial considerations and legal complexities and lack of clarity and resistance by Federal agencies are major barriers in the US. Various sectors of Wall Street has been amenable to employee ownership with the proper government and private sector support. What is needed now is a series of quantitative surveys and qualitative interviews of retiring business owners in closely held companies and of CEOs and CFOs in stock market companies in order to gauge the barriers that they believe are blocking their own action in the employee share ownership area. The Rutgers Institute for the Study of Employee Ownership and Profit Sharing is working on such a research agenda at this time. In addition, with the future size of the US employee ownership sector at stake, a more intensive one-year interview project would make sense in order to present these different explanations to key actors and practitioners and ask them to provide evidence to prove or disprove the relevance of the different barriers.

Empirical research which can resolve which barriers are more important than others is presented, when possible; however, studies that provide metrics to compare different barriers are not available and need to be carried out.

Other countries considering employee ownership policies can learn from the US experience. US policymakers and legislators can learn from an original, recent discussion of barriers.

If employee ownership sectors are to be developed, a careful discussion of barriers is most relevant.

Original document by the authors based on original interviews.

In order to allow flexibility in the enforcement of the tax law, the language used is often intentionally vague and ambiguous. This enables the government to implement the intent of the lawmakers in administering that law. However, interpreting these vague and ambiguous laws requires tax professionals to face planning situations that are complex and uncertain. Due to an increase in civil litigation, the importance of tax professionals making defensible decisions has been magnified in recent years. Carnes, et al. (1994) report that tax partners with Big‐Six accounting firms spend about 30 to 45 percent of their time resolving ambiguous tax questions. Therefore, tax professionals could benefit from models or systems (i.e., decision support systems, expert systems, artificial intelligence) that provide decision direction when facing ambiguous tax situations. One such area in which tax professionals must assist their clients is the determination of what levels of compensation are reasonable for owner‐employees of closely‐held corporations (Hagan, et al. 1995).

This study aims to investigate the relationship between boardroom gender diversity (BoGD) and risk-taking by property-liability (P-L) stock insurers from an analytical framework that control for organizational form and ownership structure. It relies on the behavioral agency model, the resource dependency theory and the concept of socioemotional wealth (SEW).

This study builds on an unbalanced panel of 2,285 firm-year observations from 232 European and US P-L stock insurers covering the period 2010–2019 and measure risk-taking by using four proxies: total risk (TR), upside risk (UpR), downside risk (DwR) and default risk (DR). Reverse causality and endogeneity concerns are treated by applying different approaches.

Findings suggest that BoGD mitigates the TR, DwR and DR but does not interfere with the UpR, which conceptualizes firm expectations to enhance patrimony and safeguard SEW for heirs, especially in family-owned insurers. The findings hold in various robustness checks including endogeneity and alternative specifications of BoGD and risk-taking.

This study contributes to practice by contrasting the role of female directors’ bevahior when assuming risk, which seems significantly different depending on the risk-taking specification and the organizational form. The author advises policyholders and policymakers to look at closely on BoGD and ownership structure as they affect insurance company risk-taking.

This study takes a more direct approach to highlight the BoGD’s effect on corporate risk-taking by focusing on the insurance sector which is characterized by risk and uncertainty bearing. To the best of the author’s knowledge, this is the first study to consider the full range of the stock organizational forms and the degree of family control in displaying this effect in both widely traded and closely traded insurers and to assess risk-taking from both market-based and accounting-based aspects.

To analyse the net present value (NPV) rule for corporate investments incorporating shareholder personal taxes, under the classical system of taxing corporate profits.

The after‐tax payoffs to shareholders are calculated, comparing immediate distribution as dividends of corporate funds available for investment with future after‐tax dividend distributions if corporate funds are invested.

Shareholders will disagree on the optimal corporate NPV rule. If, as in widely held public companies, corporate management are unaware of the marginal personal tax rate of shareholders, then the only rule which will accept investment projects that no shareholder would want the company to reject, is the rule which discounts after‐corporate‐tax cash flows at a before‐tax discount rate.

The analysis is based on the classical system of taxing corporate profits. A number of countries have adopted an integrated system of corporate taxation. The analysis may or may not extend to such alternative systems.

Simplifies the choice of NPV rules for corporate management, under a classical tax system.

The widely held view that after‐corporate‐tax discount rates should be used in discounting after‐corporate‐tax cash flows is shown to be inadequate.

This paper aims to investigate the motivations behind the publication of corporate social responsibility (CSR) reports, and particularly the effect of information asymmetry between firms and their owners.

A natural experiment contrasting the CSR reporting of private vs public firms is used to test whether the degree of information asymmetry is a significant factor in the decision to publish CSR reports. Using a hand-collected sample of the 239 largest US private companies matched with publicly-traded firms, the effect of these inherently different information environments on CSR reporting is tested through logistic regression. Factors suggested by stakeholder and legitimacy theories are tested for their differential impact on private vs public firms’ decisions to publish a CSR report.

Results indicate that private firms are less likely to publish a CSR report than similar public firms. Public firms also follow Global Reporting Initiative guidelines more frequently, consistent with signaling report quality to dispersed investors. A subsample of private companies facing greater information asymmetry is found to be similar to public firms in their reporting behavior, reinforcing the link between information asymmetry and CSR disclosure. Further analysis suggests that non-owner stakeholders play an important role in private companies’ CSR reporting decisions.

In addition to accounting and governance scholars, the findings should interest private firm managers preparing for an initial public offering (IPO), as the evidence suggests that CSR reporting is used to communicate information to dispersed investors. The insight into reporting motivations should be useful to accountants engaged in CSR consultation and assurance.

With the growing attention paid to the CSR performance of firms, demonstrated by the growth in socially responsible investing, the study provides evidence that effective communication of CSR information to investors may play a key role in CSR-engaged firms’ disclosure strategies.

To the best of the author’s knowledge, this study is the first to analyze the CSR reporting decisions of a large sample of publicly-traded and privately-held firms. The results add to our understanding of what motivates firms to publish CSR reports, highlighting the importance of information asymmetry between the firm and its owners.

Concentrated ownership implies greater alignment between ownership and control, mitigating the agency problem. However, it may also engender governance challenges such as funds appropriation through related party transactions and the oppression of minority shareholders, especially in the context of weak legal systems. We draw from legal theory (the tradeoff controlling shareholder model and private benefits of control) and from organization theory (socioemotional wealth), to suggest that concentrated ownership can be beneficial in both robust and weak legal systems for different reasons. We advance theory on the effects of controlling shareholders and suggest that the longer-term outlook associated with engaged concentrated ownership can aid the shift of the corporation toward Berle and Means' (1932, p. 355) “third possibility” of corporations serving the interests of not just the stockholders or management but also of society.

This paper discusses a pedagogical approach that incorporates multiple critical topics in the accounting curriculum using an integrated tax research case. Our approach is designed to develop students research, data management and analysis, critical thinking, decision-making, and professional communication skills. These goals are achieved through the use of an integrated assignment requiring students to conduct research, decide how to use an assortment of information sources, conduct analysis of data and business documents, and arrive at and communicate a conclusion. The key issue is reasonable compensation, a highly litigated tax issue which requires students to identify relevant authority found across many court cases. The use of a closely held business with multiple family members with different fact patterns exposes students to different outcomes with a varying degree of complexity. Students must analyze business documents and firm- and industry-level data to determine the appropriate tax treatment. Further, the case scenario exploits the fact that reasonable compensation is a tax issue in which circuit courts have ruled differently on the same issue, requiring in-depth research and interpretation of primary authority. Students are also exposed to differing outcomes based on entity type. We provide discussion of our multiple implementations and student questionnaire results to support the efficacy of our approach. We have prepared resources to help instructors implement this pedagogical approach, including a completed data analysis, supporting summary tables, and an in-depth discussion of the primary authority related to reasonable compensation.