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This study examines the performance of both open‐ended and closed‐end mutual funds – as fixed income securities and vehicles for capital gains. A determination will be made of which categories one group was able to outperform the other and to recognize why a group performs better or worse over time.

We assess whether smaller investors are more likely to hold shares of closed-end funds that invest more heavily in illiquid securities. We also examine the relationship between the liquidity of the securities held in the portfolios of closed-end mutual funds (portfolio liquidity) and the liquidity of the closed-end funds’ shares (fund-share liquidity). Using a sample of 1,619 fund-years from 2010 to 2012, we find that smaller investors are more likely than institutional investors to own closed-end funds. We also find that the liquidity of closed-end funds’ portfolios is positively associated with the liquidity of the funds’ shares. Our findings are consistent with the “liquidity benefits” notion that closed-end funds are a means for smaller investors to invest in less liquid securities. In addition, our findings are consistent with the “valuation skepticism” notion which indicates that, due to the difficulty of objectively valuing illiquid securities, different perceptions of the value of illiquid securities held in funds’ portfolios may result in greater fund-share liquidity.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the conditions under which discount risk leads to closed‐end funds trading at a discount.

A model of investor portfolio choice is developed in which investors face proportional fees for holding managed funds but fixed transaction fees for purchasing other risky assets. The conditions under which investors will hold shares in closed‐end funds are derived.

It is shown that, with fixed transaction costs in the market for risky assets, investors with wealth below a certain threshold will hold pooled index funds that charge a proportional fee, rather than the market portfolio chosen by wealthier investors. If a portfolio of closed‐end index funds yields greater volatility of returns to investors than open‐end index funds (i.e. displays “excess volatility”), and charges the same fees, the closed‐end funds need to trade at a discount in equilibrium to attract buyers. The same applies to actively managed funds if higher fees fully reflect extra expected returns from the managers' skill.

A primary determinant of closed‐end fund discounts is discount volatility and co‐movement across funds.

Until now it has been argued that discount risk needs to be systematic (correlated with market returns) to be priced. The evidence that discount risk is systematic is weak. There is strong empirical evidence of excess volatility and co‐movement of discounts across closed‐end funds, which in our model are a sufficient condition for funds to trade at a discount, under plausible assumptions. This model thus provides a stronger argument that discount risk explains why discounts exist.

This study examines the long-term link between fair valuation uncertainty and discounts/premia in closed-end funds. This study argues that, in exploring the close-end funds puzzle, prior research generally omits to consider the uncertainty surrounding the measurement of funds' financial disclosure, as reflected in the fair value hierarchy, when investment specialty differs across funds.

Regressions were employed to explore how the fair value hierarchy affects closed-end funds' discounts/premia when investment specialty differs. The authors also examine the effects pre- and post-2012 to explore if that relationship changes due to the additional disclosure requirements enacted at the end of 2011.

The authors find that the three levels of the fair value hierarchy have effects that vary according to a fund's specialty. For equity specialized funds, Level 3 significantly increases discounts and decreases premia, suggesting the impact of valuation uncertainty that underlies Level 3 estimates; this relationship disappears (decreases in severity) for premia (discount) experiencing funds post-2012. In contrast, Level 1 and Level 2 do not have any significant effect on discounts or premia except that post-2012, Level 2 begins to display discount decreasing effects. For bond specialized funds, no significant association was noted between premia and any of the fair value levels except that post-2012, Level 3 begins to display premium increasing effects. However, results are different for discounts. The authors note that Level 1 valuations significantly increase discounts, but only post-2012; Level 2 valuations significantly decrease discounts (pre- and post-2012), consistent with such estimates incorporating unique and relevant information; and Level 3 valuations do not have a significant effect on discounts.

The results of this study revisit prior evidence and indicate that results about the effects of fair value measurement and the closed-end funds' puzzle are sensitive to the period length being considered and the investment specialty of the fund. The authors also note that additional disclosure regarding Level 3 valuation inputs decreases market concern for valuation uncertainty and increases the liquidity benefits of investing in Level 3 carrying funds.

Summarizes three explanations put forward in previous research for the deviation of closed‐end fund (CEF) share prices from their net asset values and tests the theories based on market sentiment (noise trading) and market segmentation (market frictions). Analyses 1991‐1997 data on 18 UK CEFs (13 investing in the UK and 5 in the USA) to explore the pattern of cointegration and error corrected Granger causality between the fund discounts and indices which proxy for UK and US investor sentiment. Discusses the results, which support both theories for UK CEFs and show some evidence of cointegration and information transmission. Briefly considers consistency with other research and the implications of the findings.

The purpose of this paper is to portray the valuation of financial investments as mental time travel.

In a series of thought investments, $1 invested in an investment fund is mentally projected forward in time and then discounted back to the present – with no objective time passing. The thought investments feature symmetric valuation (in which discount rates exactly match projection rates) and asymmetric valuation (in which discount rates and projection rates happen to differ). They show how asymmetric valuation can result in differences between the current personal value and market value of an investment and, by way of real-world illustration, between a closed-end investment fund's net asset value and its market value. The authors explore possible reasons for asymmetric valuation.

Thought investments illustrating mental time travel can be used to help understand both financial investment valuation generally and, more specifically, established explanations of the closed-end investment fund puzzle. The authors show how different expectations, different perceptions of time and risk and different risk and time preferences might help determine value.

There are vast literatures on prospection, discounting and future-orientated or intertemporal decision-making. The authors’ innovation is to illustrate how these mental activities might combine to facilitate financial investment valuation. In particular, the authors show that a low personal discount rate could be a consequence of a shortened perception of future time and vice versa.

This article examines whether deviations from fundamental value or closed-end country fund's discounts or premiums forecast future share price returns or net asset returns.

The main empirical (econometric) tool is a vector autoregressive (VAR) model. The authors model share price returns and net asset returns as a function of their lagged values, the discounts or premiums, and a control variable for local market returns. The authors also conduct Dickey Fuller and Granger causality tests as well as impulse response functions.

It was found that deviations from fundamental value do predict share price returns. This predictability is contrary to weak-form market efficiency. Premiums or discounts predict net asset returns but weakly.

The findings point to the idea that the closed-end fund market is somewhat predictable and inefficient (in its weak form) since the market appears to be able to anticipate a fund's future returns using information contained in the premiums (or discounts). In particular, the market has the ability to anticipate future behaviour because growing premiums forecast declining share price returns for one or two periods ahead.

This study examines the behaviors of eight Asian emerging market Single Country‐Closed End Funds’ (SCCEFs) market prices, net asset values (NAV) and price to net asset value ratios from January 5, 1996 to February 25, 2000, bracketing the period of the Asian currency crisis. The purpose of the study is to discern the degree of change of SCCEFs’ market prices and net asset values (NAV) in conjunction with changes in certain objective economic factors as explanatory variables, particularly changes in exchange rates, that may shed light on the probable reasons for the stickiness of market prices and yet speedy adjustment of NAVs. Results of statistical analysis suggest asymmetric information holding explanation to be the major reason for the observed phenomenon that can be exploited for profitable SCCEF investment decisions.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the shifts in investor sentiment around the last seven US presidential elections (1988 through 2012).

Investor sentiment is measured by changes in closed-end funds discounts, and the results are corroborated with three robustness tests, including an alternate measure of investor sentiment obtained from the survey conducted by the American Association of Individual Investors.

Closed­end funds discounts are significantly diminished from two weeks before a US presidential election to a week before the election, and persist until the week after the election, suggesting an increase in investors’ optimism during that period, particularly when a Democrat is elected president. More than the particular party prevailing, however, investors appear to be more interested in avoiding the entrenchment of power since the results suggest that they become optimistic when a change in the ruling party takes place, but become pessimistic when there is power continuity in the White House. The increase in investor optimism that is observed around the time of US presidential elections is not replicated during non-election years, which seems to corroborate that the elections are indeed driving the results.

This paper is the first to formally examine the relation between investor sentiment and US presidential elections using closed-end funds discounts as the measure for sentiment.

We examine the stability of market prices for 35 technology and 35 industrial stocks for the period December 31, 1993 to October 31, 2002. A phase portrait plot of the detrended log prices and de‐meaned returns of the two sectors shows a chaotic pattern in the stock prices indicating the presence of nonlinearity. However, when we compute the Lyapunov exponents, negative values are obtained. This shows that the price fluctuations for the 70 stocks result primarily from diffusion processes rather than from nonlinear dynamics. We evaluate forecast errors from a naïve model, a neural network, and ARMA models and find that the forecast errors are correlated with average changes in closed‐end fund discounts and other sentiment indexes. These results support an investor sentiment explanation for the closed‐end fund puzzle and behavioral theories of investor overreaction.