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This study examines the performance of both open‐ended and closed‐end mutual funds – as fixed income securities and vehicles for capital gains. A determination will be made of which categories one group was able to outperform the other and to recognize why a group performs better or worse over time.

We assess whether smaller investors are more likely to hold shares of closed-end funds that invest more heavily in illiquid securities. We also examine the relationship between the liquidity of the securities held in the portfolios of closed-end mutual funds (portfolio liquidity) and the liquidity of the closed-end funds’ shares (fund-share liquidity). Using a sample of 1,619 fund-years from 2010 to 2012, we find that smaller investors are more likely than institutional investors to own closed-end funds. We also find that the liquidity of closed-end funds’ portfolios is positively associated with the liquidity of the funds’ shares. Our findings are consistent with the “liquidity benefits” notion that closed-end funds are a means for smaller investors to invest in less liquid securities. In addition, our findings are consistent with the “valuation skepticism” notion which indicates that, due to the difficulty of objectively valuing illiquid securities, different perceptions of the value of illiquid securities held in funds’ portfolios may result in greater fund-share liquidity.

To introduce the concepts of interval funds and tender offer funds and compare them to other pooled investment vehicles.

This article provides an overview of the interval fund and tender offer fund structures, including the law, regulations and market practices regarding redemptions, liquidity, fees and expenses and other key terms.

Interval funds and tender offer funds should be considered by alternative investment managers seeking to expand into public markets or traditional fund managers that seek additional portfolio flexibility.

In addition to a plain English analysis of the rules and regulations applicable to interval funds and tender offer funds, the article analyzes market practices regarding redemption frequency and amount.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the conditions under which discount risk leads to closed‐end funds trading at a discount.

A model of investor portfolio choice is developed in which investors face proportional fees for holding managed funds but fixed transaction fees for purchasing other risky assets. The conditions under which investors will hold shares in closed‐end funds are derived.

It is shown that, with fixed transaction costs in the market for risky assets, investors with wealth below a certain threshold will hold pooled index funds that charge a proportional fee, rather than the market portfolio chosen by wealthier investors. If a portfolio of closed‐end index funds yields greater volatility of returns to investors than open‐end index funds (i.e. displays “excess volatility”), and charges the same fees, the closed‐end funds need to trade at a discount in equilibrium to attract buyers. The same applies to actively managed funds if higher fees fully reflect extra expected returns from the managers' skill.

A primary determinant of closed‐end fund discounts is discount volatility and co‐movement across funds.

Until now it has been argued that discount risk needs to be systematic (correlated with market returns) to be priced. The evidence that discount risk is systematic is weak. There is strong empirical evidence of excess volatility and co‐movement of discounts across closed‐end funds, which in our model are a sufficient condition for funds to trade at a discount, under plausible assumptions. This model thus provides a stronger argument that discount risk explains why discounts exist.

This study examines the long-term link between fair valuation uncertainty and discounts/premia in closed-end funds. This study argues that, in exploring the close-end funds puzzle, prior research generally omits to consider the uncertainty surrounding the measurement of funds' financial disclosure, as reflected in the fair value hierarchy, when investment specialty differs across funds.

Regressions were employed to explore how the fair value hierarchy affects closed-end funds' discounts/premia when investment specialty differs. The authors also examine the effects pre- and post-2012 to explore if that relationship changes due to the additional disclosure requirements enacted at the end of 2011.

The authors find that the three levels of the fair value hierarchy have effects that vary according to a fund's specialty. For equity specialized funds, Level 3 significantly increases discounts and decreases premia, suggesting the impact of valuation uncertainty that underlies Level 3 estimates; this relationship disappears (decreases in severity) for premia (discount) experiencing funds post-2012. In contrast, Level 1 and Level 2 do not have any significant effect on discounts or premia except that post-2012, Level 2 begins to display discount decreasing effects. For bond specialized funds, no significant association was noted between premia and any of the fair value levels except that post-2012, Level 3 begins to display premium increasing effects. However, results are different for discounts. The authors note that Level 1 valuations significantly increase discounts, but only post-2012; Level 2 valuations significantly decrease discounts (pre- and post-2012), consistent with such estimates incorporating unique and relevant information; and Level 3 valuations do not have a significant effect on discounts.

The results of this study revisit prior evidence and indicate that results about the effects of fair value measurement and the closed-end funds' puzzle are sensitive to the period length being considered and the investment specialty of the fund. The authors also note that additional disclosure regarding Level 3 valuation inputs decreases market concern for valuation uncertainty and increases the liquidity benefits of investing in Level 3 carrying funds.

This paper examines the relationship between accounting outsourcing and audit lag. Accounting outsourcing may reduce misstatement risk, reducing the amount of audit effort necessary and thereby decrease audit lag. Alternatively, outsourcing may increase the amount of coordination necessary between the auditor, client management and the outside accounting service provider and thereby increase audit lag.

The accounting outsourcing/audit lag relationship is examined among closed-end mutual funds. These funds often outsource their accounting functions and disclose the names and services provided by any company providing services to the fund. These disclosures permit a consistent measurement of whether the fund outsources their accounting functions or performs them in-house.

This paper finds a positive relationship between accounting outsourcing and audit lag; outsourcing funds have audit lags that are two to three days longer than those not outsourcing their accounting. The results are robust to different specifications, controls for the distinctive characteristics of closed-end funds and consideration of endogeneity.

Closed-end funds could consider the increased time necessary to complete the audit when deciding whether to outsource their accounting functions.

By identifying a unique setting in which outsourcing data can be consistently obtained and analyzed (i.e. closed-end funds), this is the first study to empirically evaluate the relationship between accounting outsourcing and audit lag.

We examine the stability of market prices for 35 technology and 35 industrial stocks for the period December 31, 1993 to October 31, 2002. A phase portrait plot of the detrended log prices and de‐meaned returns of the two sectors shows a chaotic pattern in the stock prices indicating the presence of nonlinearity. However, when we compute the Lyapunov exponents, negative values are obtained. This shows that the price fluctuations for the 70 stocks result primarily from diffusion processes rather than from nonlinear dynamics. We evaluate forecast errors from a naïve model, a neural network, and ARMA models and find that the forecast errors are correlated with average changes in closed‐end fund discounts and other sentiment indexes. These results support an investor sentiment explanation for the closed‐end fund puzzle and behavioral theories of investor overreaction.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the effect of international financial reporting standards (IFRS) on the performance of UK investment closed-end trust funds with domestic equity focus using Carhart’s Four-Factor model.

The paper is based on the Efficient Market Hypothesis, which argues that all available information is already included in the price of assets, and therefore, investors cannot beat the market or generate abnormal returns.

The results show that on average, UK investment trusts neither do generate abnormal returns, nor is their performance persistent. This paper provides empirical evidence to support the efficient market hypotheses and provides proof that the adoption of IFRS has, on average, a decreasing impact on the excess returns generated by UK investment trusts.

The findings of this paper have business policy implications for investment trust in the UK.

The purpose of this paper is to portray the valuation of financial investments as mental time travel.

In a series of thought investments, $1 invested in an investment fund is mentally projected forward in time and then discounted back to the present – with no objective time passing. The thought investments feature symmetric valuation (in which discount rates exactly match projection rates) and asymmetric valuation (in which discount rates and projection rates happen to differ). They show how asymmetric valuation can result in differences between the current personal value and market value of an investment and, by way of real-world illustration, between a closed-end investment fund's net asset value and its market value. The authors explore possible reasons for asymmetric valuation.

Thought investments illustrating mental time travel can be used to help understand both financial investment valuation generally and, more specifically, established explanations of the closed-end investment fund puzzle. The authors show how different expectations, different perceptions of time and risk and different risk and time preferences might help determine value.

There are vast literatures on prospection, discounting and future-orientated or intertemporal decision-making. The authors’ innovation is to illustrate how these mental activities might combine to facilitate financial investment valuation. In particular, the authors show that a low personal discount rate could be a consequence of a shortened perception of future time and vice versa.

This study examines the behaviors of eight Asian emerging market Single Country‐Closed End Funds’ (SCCEFs) market prices, net asset values (NAV) and price to net asset value ratios from January 5, 1996 to February 25, 2000, bracketing the period of the Asian currency crisis. The purpose of the study is to discern the degree of change of SCCEFs’ market prices and net asset values (NAV) in conjunction with changes in certain objective economic factors as explanatory variables, particularly changes in exchange rates, that may shed light on the probable reasons for the stickiness of market prices and yet speedy adjustment of NAVs. Results of statistical analysis suggest asymmetric information holding explanation to be the major reason for the observed phenomenon that can be exploited for profitable SCCEF investment decisions.