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In this paper, we present a critical survey of experiments on political clientelism and vote-buying. We claim that through randomization and control, field experiments represent an important tool for answering causal questions, whereas list experiments provide useful methods that improve the hard task of measuring clientelism. We show that existing experimental research gives answers to the questions of why clientelism is effective for getting votes and winning elections, who relies more on this strategy – incumbents or challengers – how much clientelism takes place, and who tend to be the favorite targets of clientelistic politicians. The relationship between clientelism and other illicit strategies for getting votes, such as electoral violence and fraud, has also been analyzed through experimental interventions. Experiments have also studied mechanisms and policies for overcoming clientelism. Finally, we show that external validity is a major source of concern that affects this burgeoning literature.

The purpose of this paper is to explore the relationship between clientelist relationships and economics in public relations practice in European Mediterranean countries and Latin America. It considers the cases of Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico.

This paper uses a critical-conceptual method through a re-conceptualization of themes from secondary qualitative analyses of existing qualitative data sets and reviews of published qualitative papers.

The public relations practice in these two regions is similar. The characteristics of the public relations landscape in these countries must be understood in relation to a broader history of clientelism and economics emphasizing government relationships at the expense of other publics, as well as the lack of scale economies. Persuasive models are prevalent, although a number of forces – including integration in supranational organizations, democratization, and globalization – have strengthened the use of symmetrical models.

This is not an empirical survey, there is a need of quantitative studies among practitioners and government officials that can measure empirically the nature of their relationships in a number of countries. This essay opens a door for future studies and cross-cultural comparisons about the role that clientelism plays in the PR practice of cultures and countries.

The paper offers useful background information, such as the primacy that media relations still have in the public relations practice, for foreign public relations executives, agency heads, and managers of public relations who are directly involved with or managing international public relations campaigns in these countries.

Clientelism is a cultural concept that translates to the work of organizations and consequently public relations as a form of organizational behavior.

This paper brings to the table the importance of the concept of clientelism in the PR practice as well as the existence of a similar PR culture between countries that are on different continents.

This paper argues that decentralization reforms in Colombia, implemented since the 1980s, have led to the decentralization of political clientelism rather than its demise. Clientelism is a system of political and economic institutions that turns every local democracy into an extractive political institution. The authors theoretically demonstrate that an increase in public resources will increase corruption.

The authors develop and test a subnational public choice model, where clientelism in elections and corruption in public administration constitute a stable long-term institutional equilibrium. The model comprises two linked subgames: electoral tournament and corruption in public policy. The model makes two predictions that currently oppose predominant approaches: (1) increasing the severity of jail sentences to electoral crimes increases their price and the predominance of machine politics, instead of improving the quality of electoral tournaments and (2) increasing local governments' public finance increases clientelism in elections and corruption in public administration.

The authors find evidence in favor of the theoretical model of curse of public resources, using difference-in-differences estimation with a database 2016–17 of Colombia's 1,034 municipalities. This country is well-suited for our analysis because it has a long-term commitment to formal democratic processes (since 1958), while plagued by endemic corruption and clientelism problems.

(1) The theoretical approach is innovative and disruptive of current models on the problem, (2) the model builds upon the Colombian situation, a country with prominent corruption and political violence problems regardless of its relatively long-term commitment with free elections (since 1958) and (3) the theoretical discussion is tested using a comprehensive set of difference-in-differences estimations.

Political corruption takes many forms across different countries and regions. The types of corruption that occur in American politics are drastically different from the clientelism, nepotism, and corrupt electoral practices that are seen in the developing world. This chapter will analyze three distinct cases of political corruption in Southeast Asian politics: clientelism in Cambodia, nepotism in Thailand, and the 2021 coup d'état in Myanmar. All three cases highlight the unique challenges facing developing democracies and reveal that, while political corruption affects all countries to a degree, distinct regional and cultural differences produce different forms of corruption in Southeast Asia than in the United States.

Purpose – This chapter describes how radical aims for community-owned broadband became compromised by the consequences of clientelism and elite patronage as some campaigners engaged in lobbying government.

Design/methodology/approach – Five years of participant observation and an auto-ethnographic methodology richly describe the author's involvement in a community broadband co-operative, various regional and national support groups and finally with a national group conducting campaigning, research and co-ordination activities for community ownership of Next Generation Access broadband.

Findings – This illustrates the difficulties faced by Third Sector and Civil Society organisations attempting to engage in lobbying activities in the same manner as conventional commercial lobbyists. In particular, it describes how lobbying necessitates a complex interlocking of activities, such as research, consultancy, conference organisation and other such forms of networking; and it describes how all of these activities can become subordinated to the interests of political patrons. It also suggests that the uncertainty around the meanings and relevance of the Third Sector/Civil Society has allowed the entry of older forms of exerting power such as clientelism and patronage.

Research limitations/implications – Further research is needed into a much larger group of organisations to examine the processes by which Third Sector and Civil Society groups engage with government.

Originality/value – The chapter uniquely applies Critical Management Studies and a political studies perspective on clientelism and patronage to the analysis of Third Sector and Civil Society organisations.

This paper aims to contribute to the understanding of the effects of active political engagement in port-of-entry jobs and employment pathways for graduate students in a post-communist context which is characterized by clientelism. The data are derived from a structured survey of a small local labour market where political clientelism is pronounced due to the strong network ties. Controlling for both demand and supply factors, the authors identify a profile for those who are more prone to engage politically in exchange for public sector jobs, which are in turn vulnerable to regime changes.

The authors use data from a sample of 191 students that records month-to-month employment states for three consecutive years (2012–2014). The method attempts to replicate an experimental design with repeated measures before and after the June 2013 government elections. The data is analysed using sequence analysis with optimal matching and difference-in-difference methods.

The analysis provides evidence of links between political engagement and selection onto different employment pathways under conditions of political clientelism. The pathways themselves are also shown to be differentially impacted by the 2013 election (positively or negatively). Together, these results are supportive of claims that jobs in Albania, particularly those in the public sector, are linked to the short-term presence of vote-buying. This is shown to be the case even for this sample of educated members of the labour force (i.e. university graduates). The analysis also finds evidence of accumulative disadvantages over time, in relation to subjective perceptions of life satisfaction, migration intentions, employability and success in life, as a result of active political engagement.

The study uses a unique data set and a novel methodological approach, sequence analysis. Occupational history calendars were used to capture quantitative information recording detailed work histories. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this innovative method has not been used before to measure the temporal effects of political engagement on employment pathways.

Does civic participation, especially in the arts, increase democracy? This chapter extends this neo-Tocquevillian question in three ways. First, to capture broader political and economic transformations, we consider different types of participation; results change by separate participation arenas. Some are declining, but a dramatic finding is the rise of arts and culture. Second, to assess impacts of participation, we include multiple dimensions of democratic politics, including distinct norms of citizenship and their associated political repertoires. Third, by analyzing global International Social Survey Program and World Values Survey data, we identify dramatic subcultural differences: the Tocquevillian model is positive, negative, or zero in seven different subcultures and contexts that we explicate, from class politics and clientelism to Protestant and Orthodox Christian civilizational traditions.

This study examines how resource dependency affects municipal budgetary process; specifically, it investigates how politically aligned resource sharing between different levels of government along with clientelism interferes with the budgetary process of municipal organizations in developing countries.

The paper adopts a qualitative approach to study two municipal organizations in Bangladesh. The qualitative data are collected from semi-structured interviews with key organizational members. Besides, the study also relies on various publicly available documents and the Local Government Acts to complement the interview data.

The findings of the study divulge dependence on partisan aligned nonprogrammable government funds poses significant problems for municipal organizations in carrying out their budgetary process. Clientelism and informal negotiations of incumbent political leaders are found to play a vital role in such resource sharing decisions. The consequent uncertainties in getting funds have the potentials of interrupting the budgetary process at the organizational level. In some cases, budgets do not appear to be useful as a management tool for guiding organizational activities.

Like other qualitative studies, the results of these case studies are not generalizable because their interpretations are highly dependent on the context of the research sites.

Despite the limitation of a case study research, the results of this study are useful to deepen our understanding of how uncertainty in resource sharing creates clientele behavior and interferes with the organizational budget. Such an understanding helps practitioners and policymakers devise a sound resource sharing mechanism for effective delivery of municipal services on a sustainable basis.

This study provides insight into how precarious central government transfers and clientelism interfere with local governments' budgetary process.

In this chapter, we describe the formal features of recent reforms in Thailand's public administration. While it remains premature to attempt definitive assessments of the impact of those reforms, we deduce grounds for concern. In particular, we suggest that successful public management reforms must rest on a reasonable degree of congruence between the reforms' implicit assumptions on the one hand and Thai political and social conditions on the other. And we suggest that such a match is not evident in the case of Thailand's most recent administrative reforms.