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In this article we shall argue that the Keynesian revolution was a revolution in the sense of Kuhn and that Kuhn's conceptual framework provides a better understanding of the convulsive changes that took place in macro‐economics in the twenties and thirties than alternative growth of knowledge theories that are being discussed in the economics literature at the present time. In the last ten years or so economists have become increasingly interested in the various growth of knowledge theories that have been developed by philosophers of science such as Kuhn, Popper, Lakatos and others. This heightened interest on the part of economists is to be explained by the fact that these new theories are based on the actual behaviour of scientists. The new philosophers of science devote their attention not to “correct scientific method” but to the actual behaviour of scientists. It is because of this revolution in the historiography of science that economists have been able to relate these new theories to their own work and to the development of economic theories in the past.

These two books reflect very different attitudes to classical economics: O'Brien writes from a neoclassical standpoint, Napoleoni from a Marxist one. Two questions deserve consideration. Is anything worthwhile to be gained by devoting attention to the works of the classical economists (and of Marx)? Where, if we do turn to the classics, do they lead us?

The rise of the regulatory state during the Gilded Age was closely associated with the development of institutionalist ideas in American academia. In their analysis of the emergent regulatory environment, institutionalists like John Commons operated with a fundamentally marginalist theory of value and distribution. This engagement is a central explanation for the ultimate ascendancy of neoclassical economics, and the limitations of the regulatory environment that emerged in the Progressive Era. The eventual rise of the Chicago School and its deregulatory ambitions did constitute a rupture, but one achieved without rejecting preceding conceptions of competition and value. The substantial compatibility of the view of markets underlying both the regulatory and deregulatory periods is stressed, casting doubt about the transformative potential of the resurgent regulatory impulse in the New Gilded Age.

In this monograph the author discusses the problems in constructing a logical and ethical‐empirical foundation so that relevant social values may be studied by the scientific method. Part One is concerned with the difficulties posed by the prevailing methodology. Part Two presents a new research programme based on the simultaneous equilibrium versus disequilibrium approach in conjunction with Wittgenstein's logic and the current research in ethics.

The economic science is again in a crisis and a new solution prolegomena to any future study in economics, finance and other social sciences has just been published by the International Institute of Social Economics in care of the MCB University Press in England. The roots of the major financial and economic problems of our time lie in an open conflict between theory and practice. In the 1930s and before the conflict was between classical theory and given realities. In the 1990s the conflict appears between the now prevailing modern, Keynesian theory and the actual realities. In addition during the twentieth century a great argument developed between the two schools of thought, argument which is not yet settled. In one sentence, the prolegomena tried and was successful to solve the conflict between theory and practice and the big doctrinal dispute of the twentieth century. It was a struggle of research and observation over half a century between 1947 and 1997.

Introduction It has been said that the word imperialism is no word for scholars. It is too value‐laden and uncertain in its meaning, a meaning which has altered with the passage of time. Nevertheless, taking account of its current use, the definition given by Benjamin Cohen (1974, p. 16) seems to be relevant. He defines imperialism as “any relationship of effective combination or control, political or economic, direct or indirect, of one nation over another”. This definition covers old and new imperialism and neo‐colonialism or neo‐imperialism even though it can be charged that it is too wide to be helpful (Mommsen, 1981) especially bearing in mind that the political or economic dependence of one state or set of states on another is relative (Barratt Brown, 1974). Indeed, unequal economic and political relations between nation states appear to be normal or usual, some might even say inescapable, no matter what is the economic system of the day and it is debatable whether all international political and economic relationships involving some degree of one‐way dependence should be described as involving imperialism.

The rediscovery and analytical reconstitution are present tendencies in much of social science, especially economics and sociology. The emergence and expansion of the so‐called new institutional economics exemplify these tendencies as do attempts at revival and rehabilitation of the old institutional economics. Analogous tendencies have been manifested in sociology by the further development of economic sociology, especially by various reformulations of its classical premise of institutional structuration and embeddedness of economic behavior. Nevertheless, much of mainstream economics tends to neglect or play down certain salient divergences between the latter's neoclassical or orthodox institutionalism, and heterodox or critical institutionalism advanced by the old institutional economics as well as by economic sociology. Identifies and elaborates such divergences between these seemingly homologous varieties of institutionalism. Since institutionalist varieties and tendencies in both economics and sociology are considered, represents a contribution to an interdisciplinary treatment of social institutions, a treatment originally proposed by the old institutional economics of Veblen et al., the German historical school as well as by Weberian‐Durkheimian classical economic sociology.

Considers the reasons for the lack of consensus among the member states of the European Union (EU) on both the scope and extent of an ageism policy. The EU has become increasingly concerned with the problems that are raised by the ageing of the European population. In response to these concerns the EU has began to develop a policy towards older employees. The expectation of the EU is that this policy will help the member states effectively to adjust to the demographic challenge of an ageing population. Assessment of the effectiveness of the approach taken by the EU is made by utilizing economic theories that have been devised by neo‐classical and equal opportunities economists. The prospects for the development of a common EU policy on ageism is discussed and its possible impact on companies operating in the EU is explored.

Henry George's fame in the fields of economics, politics and literature rests largely on his powerful book, Progress and Poverty, first published in 1879. The centenary of this event sparked a modest revival of interest in George's work among academic economists, including a special session devoted to him at the December 1979 American Economics Association meetings in Atlanta. Generally, however, his work has been neglected by twentieth‐century economists and, as Robert Heilbroner (1969) remarked, he is cast as a member of the economics “underworld”. If any economics undergraduate has heard his name it is usually through a passing reference in a first‐year textbook to the Single Tax Movement. The impression is then given by the text that George was a single‐issue fanatic. The student is told that a tax on land rents is theoretically interesting and that it would have no disincentive effects but that it is either impractical to separate land from improvements or that rents are not sufficiently important to warrant much attention to them as a major source of government finance.

Streissler considers Roscher′s theory of crisis to be highly original and important. Schumpeter, on the other hand, considers it only a rehash of the ideas of others. Examines this contradiction, beginning with a reflection on the essential elements of the debates on Keynes, Say′s law and classical economics. Continues by analysing the statements of German economists before Roscher on the issues of the general glut controversy. Ends with a closer inspection of Roscher′s own theory of crisis.