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Based on dual information asymmetry, the two-stage segmented compensation mechanism for technological innovation of civilian enterprises’ participation in military (CEPIM) has been discussed.

On the basis of the traditional principal-agent problems, the incentive compatibility condition is introduced as well as the hybrid incentive compensation model is established, to solve optimal solution of the compensation parameters under the dynamic contract condition and the validity is verified by numerical simulation.

The results show that: (1) The two-stage segmented compensation mechanism has the functions of “self-selection” and “stimulus to the strong”, (2) It promotes the civilian enterprises to obtain more innovation benefit compensation through the second stage, (3) There is an inverted U-shaped relationship between government compensation effectiveness and the innovation ability of compensation objects and (4) The “compensable threshold” and “optimal compensation threshold” should be set, respectively, to assess the applicability and priority of compensation.

In this paper, through numerical simulation, the optimal solution for two-stage segmented compensation, segmented compensation coefficient, expected returns for all parties and excess expected returns have been verified under various information asymmetry. The results show that the mechanism of two-stage segmented compensation can improve the expected returns for both civilian enterprises and the government. However, under dual information asymmetry, for innovation ability of the intended compensation candidates, a “compensation threshold” should be set to determine whether the compensation should be carried out, furthermore an “optimal compensation threshold” should be set to determine the compensation priority.

In the context of constructing an integrated national strategic system, collaborative innovation among enterprises is the current social focus. Therefore, in order to find the interest relationship between multiple game subjects, to explore the influencing factors of collaborative innovation of civil-military integration enterprises. This paper constructs a collaborative innovation mechanism for military–civilian integration involving four game subjects (military enterprises, private enterprises, local governments, and science and technology intermediaries). It aims to solve and reveal the evolutionary game relationship among the four parties.

To explore the mechanism of military–civilian collaborative innovation involving four players, this study employs game theory and constructs an evolutionary game model for collaborative innovation with the participation of military enterprises, civilian enterprises, local governments, and technology intermediaries. The model reveals the evolutionary game patterns among these four entities, analyzes the impact of various parameters on the evolutionary process of the game system, and numerical simulation is used to show these changes more specifically.

The research findings demonstrate that active government subsidies promote cooperation throughout the system. Moreover, increasing the input-output ratio of research and development (R&D), the rate of technological spillovers, and the R&D investment of civilian enterprises all facilitate the tendency toward cooperation within the system. However, when the government chooses to actively provide subsidies, increasing R&D investment in military enterprises may hinder the tendency toward cooperation. Furthermore, central transfer payments, government punishment from the central government, and an increase in the information conversion rate of technology intermediaries may suppress the rate of cooperation within the system.

Most of the previous studies on the collaborative innovation of military–civilian integration have been tripartite game models between military enterprises, private enterprises, and local governments. In contrast, this study adds science and technology intermediaries on this basis, reveals the evolution mechanism of collaborative innovation of civil-military integration enterprises from the perspective of four-party participation, and analyzes the factors influencing the cooperation of the whole system. The conclusion of this study not only enriches the collaborative innovation evolution mechanism of military–civilian integration enterprises from the perspective of multiple agents but also provides practical guidance for the innovation-driven development of military–civilian integration enterprises.

This paper serves to present the Swiss data in the framework of the international project “Civil–Military Gap” of ERGOMAS Working Group “Military Profession”. Its theoretical basis has been developed in a common working paper (Jelusic, Caforio, Haltiner, Moelker, & Szvircsev Tresch, 2003) and will be presented in a more detailed way in a forthcoming common cross-national analysis. The main research hypothesis and its implied research questions refer to the existence of a growing cultural gap between the military and its parent democratic society: Is there such a gap between the armed forces, mainly its professional bodies and democratic society? If yes, what is the nature of that gap? According to the planning of the research project, the following research steps are carried on in the participating countries: (1) investigate the political culture of future (civilian and military) elites by simultaneously surveying cadets at military academies and students at civilian universities; (2) carry out semi-structured interviews with present elites (an expert survey) in order to assess changes in civil–military relations over time; and (3) elaborate and compare results at cross-national level and compare and contrast them with data from the American (Feaver, Kohn, & Cohn, 2001) research. This paper first outlines some peculiarities of the Swiss military system, considering them as somewhat important for the question of the nature of a possible civil–military gap. It then presents the methodological procedure and the main findings of Switzerland.

Romania has experienced a dramatic transition, after 1989, starting from one of the fiercest communist regimes and trying to build a democratic regime and to join the Western institutions, such as NATO and EU. The issue of democratisation of civil–military relations ranked high on the reform agenda of both Romanian policymakers and international donors that offered assistance for transition. The main reason was – for the Romanian public – the concern that the military could seize the power and institute dictatorship, while – for the Western countries – it was the perception that the military was a pillar of a socialist state and the neo-Kantian assumption that democracies do not fight each other, so a civilian control over the military is desirable to be instituted in Eastern Europe. However, the relations between the Romanian military and its parent society present some particular features that should be acknowledged before the presentation of research results.

This chapter attempts to explore the convergence and divergence on perceptions of security issues by military professionals and civilians and then to portray its implications for civil–military relations in South Korea.

Since the 1990s, South Korea has experienced the development of political democracy and the improvement of the relationship between South Korea and North Korea. Although South Korea suffered from serious economic crisis in the late 1990s, it soon restored its economic basis to the earlier level. However, the country has become to encounter ideological cleavage and cultural diversity among people. Traditional views on national security and international relations, which were based on national consensus in the past, have been replaced by a new conception of diversification, heterogeneity, and even sharp opposition. Thus, we examine the consensus or dissension between military and civilian sectors on various issues related to national security, the role of the armed forces, and South–North relations.

This chapter reports that there are similarities on some issues (e.g., security situation assessment, attitudes toward neighbor countries, and trust in the military), while substantial differences are found on others (e.g., threats to national security, Korea–US relations, and threats from North Korea) between the military and the civilian society. These findings suggest that overall the views of military professionals are not so different from civilians on security issues in Korea even though divergences emerge on some other issues. This chapter concludes by stating that civilian society and the military are “different, but not separate.” This statement renders implications for civil–military relations in South Korea.

In the 21st century, disputes between military and civilians are to occur in the arena of security or defense policies. The civil–military relations of Korea might be shifted from the political conflicts between political elites and military leaders to the democratic governances of the military sector.

This chapter examines the existence of civil–military gap in the perceptions or attitudes on the security or defense issues. The samples are classified into six subgroups. The military is classified into “commissioned officers (COs) and non-commissioned officers (NCOs)” and “conscripted soldiers,” and the civilians into four subgroups according to sex and age. There is not much acute or urgent, serious civil–military gap in the analysis. Sometimes the perceptional gap rather resides between the male and the female or between the youth and the elder generation than in between the military and the civilian. But there are some differences in perceptions and attitudes between the military and civilians. These are related to the interests of national security affairs, to the military threat from North Korea, and to the confidence in the defense management. Owing to their different life conditions, the perceptional differences between civilians and military are inevitable to some degree. But to develop better civil–military relations and to enhance the consensus in the national security issues in the 21st century, institutionalizing the democratic governance might be necessary. It is recommended to have more discussions between the military and civilians, to share more information about the security issues, to increase transparency in the defense management, and to have more participation of the civilians in the security sector.

Post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) affects both civilian and military populations following wartime experiences. However, despite an abundance of research investigating civilian and military populations separately, much less focus has been given to synthesizing and integrating findings to describe how civilian and military war survivors are comparatively affected by PTSD. This review is broken down into three sections covering (1) risk factors associated with PTSD, (2) relationships between PTSD and mental health outcomes, and (3) protective factors that can attenuate PTSD and its effects. Each section covers findings for civilians and military personnel and highlights similarities and differences between groups.

This chapter examines the considerations weighed by armed actors in responding to civilian demands in three Colombian peace territories, where residents have engaged in civil resistance against armed violence and negotiated with armed actors to reduce such violence. It does so mainly on the basis of data from fieldwork, including interviews with former or current members of armed groups who operated in the areas under study, and other actors. We find that armed actors weighed political, security, economic and normative considerations when faced with civilian demands and that the armed actors’ relative dependence on civilians regarding these four aspects influenced these actors’ responses.

The dominant military professional undergoes a shift in order to exercise the most effective leadership in a new threat environment. Moskos et al. identified how the focus of the dominant military professional changed from the modern period from one of a combat leader proficient in the art of war and in exercising effective leadership under combat conditions, to a more managerial role in the late modern military, and thence to a skill set heavy on diplomacy and scholarship in the postmodern era. Most examinations of civilian employees in the military are focused on civilian (i.e., ministerial) control, but the issue goes much deeper, and includes among other things the need to hire technologists and technicians for today’s modern electronic weapons systems, laborers to free up conscripts for training, and civilian contractors at all levels. Until Taiwan’s democratization, the degree of civilian employment in the armed forces was negligible. Those that did operate in conjunction with serving members were very much divided along the same lines as officers and men; with two types of civilian contractors: officer-type and soldier-type. Thus, the pattern of civilian employees in the ROC military appears to be concentrated at the high end and the low end – the high end being the planning and decision-making within the defense organization, and at the low end with clerks and other soldier-type employees. The ROC military’s limited budget makes service members a more viable option, keeping the penetration of civilian employees into the operational side of military operations down to a minor component.