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The family, as the most basic social institution, serves as the bedrock of any society. Family structures worldwide have undergone various changes in their forms, nature, and functioning, including Abia state, Nigeria. The Nigeria Civil war is one of the symbolic events attributable to changes in the Abia family structure. Changes in the family structure could influence conjugal relationships. The study explored the dynamism and changes in the family structure and conjugal relationships at different eras of the family life cycle in Abia society. A qualitative research method was used in this study. Twenty-two participants (4 life history and 18 in-depth interview participants) were recruited in this study with purposive sampling techniques. Using an archival checklist, life histories, and an in-depth guide, information was elicited on family structure and conjugal relationships. The study was subjected to thematic analysis. The findings revealed dynamism and changes in family structure, with polygyny being most prevalent prior to the civil war, the emergence of step-parent and single-parent families during the civil war, and monogamy being most prevalent, with increasing single-parent and step-parent families contemporaneously. The conjugal relationship shifted from having concubines (acceptable and practised covertly) to having side chicks (been practised covertly). The Nigerian civil war had an impact on the observed dynamics in family structure during the civil war and immediate post-civil war. Other factors such as religion, education, civilization, and migration, among others, influenced the contemporary Abia family structure. Understanding family structure dynamics could be useful in solving issues regarding family and conjugal trajectories.

What kinds of support do interstate rivals provide to domestic actors in ongoing civil wars? And how do domestic actors utilize the support they receive? This chapter answers these questions by comparing Iranian and Saudi military and non-military (mediation, foreign aid and religious soft-power promotion) support to the Houthis and to the Government of Yemen (GoY) during the Saada wars (2004–2010) and the internationalized civil war (2015–2018). It also focuses on the processes through which the GoY and the Houthis have utilized this support for their own strategic purposes. This chapter applies a structured, focused comparison methodology and relies on data from a review of both primary and secondary sources complemented by 14 interviews. This chapter finds that there were less external interventions in the conflict in Saada than in the internationalized civil war. During the latter, a broader set of intervention strategies enabled further instrumentalization by domestic actors, which in turn contributed to the protracted nature of the conflict. This chapter contributes to the literature on interstate rivalry and third-party intervention. The framework of analysis is applicable to civil wars that experience intervention by rivals, such as Syria or Libya.

The purpuse of this study is to answer the following two questions. Do conflict management efforts mitigate the recurrence and severity of civil conflict? If so, how? Do some conflict management strategies fare better than others in these tasks? This study theorizes about the connection between the costliness of a conflict management strategy – with respect to both the disputants and third parties – and civil conflict outcomes. This theory produces two contradictory predictions: that more costly strategies either increase or decrease violence. This study not only adjudicates between these two possibilities but also incorporates the role of timing. The early use of more costly strategies, for example, may encourage disputants to reduce violence in civil conflicts.

To evaluate the predications that the authors derive from their theoretical argument, the authors quantitatively analyze the effect of conflict management strategies’ relative cost on various measures of civil conflict recurrence and severity. The authors first identify the set of international–civil militarized conflicts (I-CMCs) during the period 1946–2010. I-CMCs contain two dimensions – interstate and intrastate – making them the most complex and dangerous form of militarized conflict. To each I-CMC, the authors then link all third-party attempts to manage the I-CMC’s civil conflict dimension. Finally, after developing quantitative indicators, a series of regression equations explore the relationships of primary interest.

Two main findings emerge. First, when third parties use a relatively more costly conflict management strategy to manage a civil conflict (e.g. a peace operation or military intervention, as opposed to mediation), the severity of the conflict increases, while conflict recurrence rates remain unchanged. Second, this study uncovers a trade-off. The early use of a relatively more costly management strategy lowers a civil conflict’s severity in the short-term. It also, however, increases the likelihood – and speed with which – civil conflict recurs. The timing of certain conflict management strategies matters.

Scholars typically isolate conflict management strategies in number (i.e. consider efforts as independent of one another, even those within the same conflict) and kind (i.e. examine mediation but not peace operations). This study, in contrast, includes the following: the full menu of conflict management strategies available to third parties – negotiation, mediation, adjudication/arbitration, peace operations, sanctions and military intervention – over a lengthy time period (1946–2010); theorizes about the relative merits of these strategies; and considers the timing of certain conflict management efforts. In so doing, it highlights a policy trade-off and proposes promising areas for future research.

This study aims to explore the role of rebel group legitimacy and ideology in durable peace (DP) following peace agreements to end civil wars. It builds on earlier research showing that justice and civil society involvement are critical in achieving DP. This study adds the impacts of rebel group activities and support on DP. Activities include service delivery and mobilization. Support is gauged with outcomes of presidential and parliamentary elections held following peace agreements.

Five data sets were used to measure the key variables: DP, inclusive commissions (IC), legitimacy symmetry (electoral outcomes), service delivery and ideological mobilization. A measure of rebel group integration in the political system was also constructed. Impacts of the integration, legitimacy and ideology variables were assessed with a hierarchical regression model (HRM). This study begins with a base model drawn from earlier research showing the key predictors were procedural justice (PJ) and IC. The authors ask about the extent to which the rebel group variables contribute additional variance to the prediction of DP.

The main contributors to the prediction of DP were PJ, IC and integration in the political system. None of the legitimacy or mobilization variables added significant variance to the prediction. Only one of the mobilization variables, forced recruitment, was significant. The decision to integrate into the political system following the agreement did not mediate the relationship between PJ in the negotiation process and DP. Results of a factor analysis showed that DP, PJ, IC and integration formed a cluster with strong loadings on the first factor.

The negative results for the legitimacy and mobilization variables may not be the last word on rebel group influences. Lack of support for the key hypotheses spurs attempts to discover other sources that contribute to the survival of rebel group actors in the political system and, in turn, to DP.

The issues raised by this study contribute to debates about ways to attain peaceful relations among competing groups following a civil war. It appears that attention to factors inside and around the negotiation process (PJ, ICs and conversion) may be more important than rebel group activities outside of these processes. The results call attention, in particular, to the important role played by political integration. From a policy perspective, it would be useful to develop levers for encouraging rebel groups to emerge as political actors in the post-agreement environment.

Developing measures of the symmetry of rebel group legitimacy and integration in the context of a comparative case study are the primary original contributions of this study. Furthermore, the mode of analysis (HRM) is novel in this literature. This approach builds on and extends the earlier research on factors influencing DP.

This paper aims to study recent approaches to peacemaking, particularly by Turkey and Russia, in a changing world and their implications for UN-led peace processes. The authors analyze the factors that allow parallel processes to UN mediation to emerge and discuss their influence.

The paper presents two in-depth case studies of mediation in Syria and Libya, where the UN, as well as Russia and Turkey, were actively involved in peacemaking.

The authors find that parallel processes to UN mediation emerge if the UN process does not show progress toward a negotiated settlement and other third parties have leverage over the conflict parties. However, whether these parallel processes pose a fundamental challenge to the UN-led process depends on how sustained the third parties’ leverage over the conflict parties is. If it lasts, it puts the UN in a difficult position to either participate in the parallel process and contain it but thereby also legitimizing it, or to abstain from participating but thereby risking to lose control over the mediation process.

Analyzing different approaches to mediation helps to better understand current dynamics of multiparty mediation, including an increased questioning of the effectiveness of UN mediation, and provides insights on how the UN may adapt to keep its relevance in a changing world.

The paper is based on original first-hand data gathered between 2018 and 2022 through more than 50 interviews with UN officials, negotiation team members, political and civil society actors from Syria and Libya, (former) state officials and experts from Russia and Turkey, as well as external observers.

This study aims to examine the impact of the beginning of the Russia–Ukraine war and the Wagner Group’s attempted military coup against Putin’s regime on the European defense sector, consisting of weapons manufacturers.

The authors use the event study methodology to quantify the impact. That is, the authors assume that markets are efficient, and abnormal stock returns around the event dates capture the magnitudes of the impacts of the two events studied on European defense sector companies. The authors use the capital asset pricing model and two different multifactor models to estimate expected stock returns, which serve as the benchmark necessary to obtain abnormal returns.

The start of the war on February 24, 2022, when the Russian forces invaded Ukraine, was followed by high positive abnormal returns of up to 12% in the next few days. The results are particularly strong if multiple factors are used to control for the risk of the defense stocks. Conversely, the authors find a negative impact of the rebellion initiated by the mercenary Wagner Group’s chief, Yevgeny Prigozhin, on June 23, 2023, on the abnormal returns of defense industry stocks on the first trading day after the event.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first study of the impact of the Russia–Ukraine war on the defense sector. Furthermore, this is the first study to measure the financial implications of the military coup initiated by the Wagner Group. The findings contribute to a rapidly growing literature on the financial implications of military conflicts around the world.

Wars, and violent conflicts generally, can generate significant institutional dynamics and new legitimacy pressures for multinational enterprises (MNEs). The purpose of this paper is to understand the nature or source of institutional pressures facing MNEs in war and to examine how MNEs respond and navigate these institutional pressures.

This is a conceptual paper.

Through the theoretical lens of institutional theory and drawing on insights from the devastating Russian–Ukrainian war in Europe, the study provides a framework that explains the nature of institutional pressures impacting MNEs in a major war conflict and how MNEs respond to these pressures. Central to the framework is the impact of formal and informal institutions on MNEs during war. As a result of regulatory and social pressures, MNEs have to make important strategic decisions either to protect their legitimacy or to defend their economic objectives against institutional demands.

As the paper situates the pressures of war for MNEs in a formal and informal institutional context, this offers a new approach to understanding the costs and pressures of war on MNEs.

Granting ‘sanctuary’ in the United States to those fleeing poverty and violence is rooted in a deep history of hospitality and compassion. As we are witnessing a rise in xenophobia accompanied by policies of exclusion, we also see a rising number of ‘sanctuary jurisdictions’ limiting their cooperation with immigration authorities that many communities consider are using extremely harsh and punitive measures to detain and deport irregular migrants. As this chapter will demonstrate, there has been a dramatic increase through ‘immigration federalism’ of the number of these jurisdictions in cities, states and municipalities since the first practices of ‘sanctuary’ in the 1980s as result of the waves of forced migration due to the civil wars in Central America. The author also proposes that those entities granting ‘sanctuary’ to irregular migrants should also apply practices of ‘compassionate migration’ as described in the chapter to expand their protections further and include them in their communities.

This chapter takes a closer look at the integration process of the Western Balkan states. At first we will look at the procedures to join the EU, followed by some general information about the countries of the Western Balkans. Building on this, the path and the current results of the individual countries towards EU membership are reviewed. At the end, a closer look at the Berlin Process shows a concrete example how the individual Western Balkan states work with the EU. This allows an outlook how the enlargement process might continue in the coming years.