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Large foreign direct investment (FDI) inflow is one of the most important features of China's economic reform and opening up to the outside world. Over the past 30 years, China has attracted over US$940 billion FDI inflows, making it the largest FDI recipient among the all developing countries. This chapter argues that FDI inflows into China have mostly come from developing economies, concentrated in China's east and southeast coastal regions, and biased toward the manufacturing sector. The large FDI inflows have greatly contributed to China's economic development. FDI has been playing an increasingly important role in China's economy in terms of capital formation, employment creation, export promotion, and integrating with the world economy. The global financial and economic crisis has had negative impact on FDI inflows into China. However, as compared to the large decline in FDI globally, FDI inflows into China have been resilient. China will continue to be one of the most attractive destinations for FDI in the future.

Bertrand Candelon is a professor in International Monetary Economics. He received a PhD from Universite Catholique de Louvain. After a postdoctoral fellowship at the Humboldt Universität zu Berlin, he joined University Maastricht, School of Business and Economics in 2001. He has written extensive works in the area of international finance, in particular on contagion and on the analysis of financial market co-movements. He is one of the founders of the Methods in International Finance Network.

We investigate the interaction of debt covenants and tax accounting on the adoption of Financial Interpretation No. 48 (FIN 48). We examine how firms respond to the potential tightening of covenant slack upon FIN 48 adoption and whether these actions are penalized by creditors and anticipated by equity markets. We find that upon FIN 48 adoption, the majority of sample corporate borrowers increase their tax reserves and reduce equity. Firms close to debt covenant violation were even more likely to increase tax reserves upon FIN 48 adoption; however, the size of the adjustment was relatively smaller, suggesting that the FIN 48 standards limited, but did not eliminate, firms use of discretion in reporting uncertain tax positions to avoid costly covenant violations. For firms near net worth debt covenant violation, the act of decreasing equity upon FIN 48 adoption imposes real economic costs, as the average cost of debt increased by 43 basis points. Finally, we extend prior research on the market response to FIN 48 by showing how the market response to FIN 48 adoption is a function of debt covenant slack and tax aggressiveness. Specifically, the cumulative abnormal return at the FIN 48 exposure draft release date is negative only for tax aggressive firms that are close to debt covenant violation.