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This viewpoint aims to highlight the necessarily technical nature of ethics in software development, propose a label (ethical bypassing) for ethical analysis that does not lead to ethical action and introduce a philosophical foundation for technical analysis that leads to ethical software development.

The methodological approach is one of technical analysis that is aware of social science and philosophical knowledge bases.

The findings establish a clear technical foundation that is crucial to ethical analysis that will actually inform software development.

The idea that beginning with technical expertise is the best way to begin ethical reflection on a technical implementation has been often suggested, but not really empircally tested. Research using cases or other qualitative approaches would need to be done to add credibility to the claim.

This approach suggests that collaboration between technically informed ethicists and ethically informed technical experts should begin with the exploration of the technical questions rather than with ethical speculation.

A common approach to ethical education is to concentrate on ethical theory and its application in technical contexts. This approach suggests that this may lead to ethical bypassing by the student, the avoidance of the making technical decisions by extensive ethical reflection.

This paper introduces a new term, ethical bypassing, to the literature on the ethics of software development.

The purpose of this paper is to ask whether ethics can be taught? Can we teach how to make decisions in issues involving ethics? Preliminary results suggest we can.

The paper describes how managerial ethical decision making is taught using a tool called the JUSTICE framework. Each letter introduces a decision making criterion: J for Justice, U for Utilitarian, S for Spiritual Values, T for TV Rule, I for Influence, C for Core Values, and E for Emergency.

It is not known if ethics can be taught, but we now believed we can teach our students learn ways to face managerial ethical decisions. What the JUSTICE model lacks in theoretical underpinning it makes up for in pragmatic results. Students learned (memorized) all seven criteria, and learned to select their three favorites, and then to use the model to decide in numerous cases. It works.

The paper introduces the JUSTICE approach.

The purpose of this paper is to present a four component model of ethical behavior (PRIMES) that integrates literature in moral psychology, computing ethics, and virtue ethics as informed by research on moral exemplars in computing. This is part 1 of a two‐part contribution.

This psychologically based and philosophically informed model argues that moral action is: grounded in relatively stable PeRsonality characteristics (PR); guided by integration of morality into the self‐system; shaped by the context of the surrounding moral ecology; and facilitated by morally relevant skills and knowledge (S).

The model seeks to explain the daily successful (and unsuccessful) performance of moral action by computing professionals and to provide groundwork for a pedagogy that emphasizes ethically effective performance.

The model has significant implications for how ethical action might be taught to computer professionals and other design professionals. It also makes recommendations about what is needed to measure to construct a complete picture of sustained ethical action in a profession.

Most accepted models of ethical behavior are unidimensional, emphasizing either principled reasoning or a simplistic model of integrity/character. This model brings together a variety of disparate literatures in the light of its emphasis on sustained moral action in the profession. It thereby provides researchers and educators with a picture of what is needed to construct a complete understanding of moral action in the profession.

The purpose of this paper is to present a four component model of ethical behavior that integrates literature in moral psychology, computing ethics, and virtue ethics as informed by research on moral exemplars in computing. This is part 2 of a two part contribution, part 1 having appeared in Vol. 6 No. 3.

This psychologically based and philosophically informed model argues that moral action is grounded in relatively stable personality characteristics, guided by integration of morality into the self‐system, shaped by the context of the surrounding moral ecology, and facilitated by morally relevant skills and knowledge.

The model seeks to explain the daily successful (and unsuccessful) performance of moral action by computing professionals and to provide groundwork for a pedagogy that emphasizes ethically effective performance.

The model has significant implications for how ethical action to computer professionals and other design professionals might be taught. It also makes recommendations about what need to be measured to construct a complete picture of sustained ethical action in a profession.

Most accepted models of ethical behavior are unidimensional, emphasizing either principled reasoning or a simplistic model of integrity/character. This model brings together a variety of disparate literatures in the light of its emphasis on sustained moral action in the profession. It thereby provides researchers and educators with a picture of what is needed to construct a complete understanding of moral action in the profession.

This paper aims to evaluate the contribution of Christiansen attempting to reintegrate ethics into the process of design.

It situates her attempt in the context of the history of the participatory design movement, and the way ethical concern has been jettisoned leaving only a pragmatic toolbox of techniques.

Christiansen is successful in finding ethical encounter residing of necessity at the heart of design. Design imposes a vision or narrative on the world and participatory design makes that narrative negotiable.

All design is of necessity ethical endeavor, and Christiansen helps us to understand why.

This response situates Christiansen's approach within the Heideggerian understanding of the “ready to hand” assumptions that lie in the ways we approach objects in our world. This language may help provide a structured way to talk about the encounter.

During the past decade, a fairly extensive literature on the digital divide has emerged. Many reports and studies have provided statistical data (Digital Divide Network, 2002; NTIA, 1995, 1998, 1999, 2000) pertaining to sociological aspects of ‘the divide,’ while some studies have examined policy issues involving universal service (Camp and Tsong, 2001) and universal access (Brewer and Chuter, 2002). Other studies have suggested ways in which the digital divide could be better understood if it were ‘reconceptualized’ in terms of an alternative metaphor, e.g. a ‘divide’ having to do with literacy (Warschauer, 2002), power (Moss, 2002), content (Carvin, 2000), or the (information) environment (Floridi, 2001). However, with the exception of Johnson (2001) and Koehler (2002), authors have tended not to question ‐ at least not directly ‐ whether the digital divide is, at bottom, an ethical issue. Many authors seem to assume that because disparities involving access to computing technology exist, issues underlying the digital divide are necessarily moral in nature. Many further assume that because this particular ‘divide’ has to do with something that is digital or technological in nature, it is best understood as a computer ethical issue. The present study, which examines both assumptions, considers four questions: (1) What exactly is the digital divide? (2) Is this ‘divide’ ultimately an ethical issue? (3) Assuming that the answer to (2) is ‘yes,’ is the digital divide necessarily an issue for computer ethics? (4) If the answer to (3) is ‘yes,’ what can/should computer professionals do bridge the digital divide?

Increasing the ethicality of a project and the usefulness of the data enhances the probability that social good will result from the research; a combination of ethical and methodological soundness is therefore crucial. From 1999‐2002 I conducted a qualitative study of women’s, men’s, and mixed Internet chat room conversations. In this article, I discuss the particular ethical issues that arose, outlining my ethical decision‐making process within the context of current debates. I also describe the methodological concerns, demonstrating why a synthesized method responsive to the advantages and disadvantages of cyberspace was necessary, and how the data were enhanced by this choice of method and by certain characteristics of cyberspace. In discussing the details of my study, my overall goal is to provide an assessment of the social good of the project with a view to increasing the probability of more ethical and useful Internet‐based research outcomes more generally.

The purpose of this paper is to review the world of information and communications technology (ICT) from its early days to the near future. The aim is to consider how successfully academia, industry and government have worked together in delivering ethically acceptable ICT which is accessible to those who might benefit from such advances. The paper concludes with suggestions of a fresh approach for the future.

The paper draws upon evidence from the history of computers, funded research projects, professional bodies in the field, the ETHICOMP conference series and reported ICT disasters. The author uses his experience as both an ICT practitioner and an academic in the ICT ethics field to synthesise the evidence so providing a foundation on which to build an outline global action plan.

The paper lays out the findings that there has been much detailed observation and analysis of the ethical challenges surrounding ICT but the transformation of this into widespread practical positive action remains elusive. It explores why progress has been difficult.

This review of the interconnecting landscapes of practical ICT, funded research and the ICT ethics community is new. The attempt to demonstrate what progress has been made and to identify the underlying factors which influence progress are valuable to future generations working in this area. The concluding suggestions for action offer a starting point for entering the next phase of ICT ethics.

I ATTENDED the Famous Extra‐ordinary General Meeting of the la on January 6 as an ‘observer’ (which is all they would allow, shoving me in the back row next to Charles Ellis, to whom I made indecorous remarks as the proceedings unfolded). Few of the speeches bore much relationship to the motions and amendments under debate, the prize for irrelevance going to a smarmy young woman who droned on interminably about the unfairness of not doubling staff pay‐packets every five weeks or so; but this didn't much matter, as the audience had clearly arrived with the intention of passing the motion calling for more information about the financial crisis, and chucking out the ones aimed at personalities.