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As the capital market in China is still developing, several constraints on a Chinese-listed firm’s financing strategy have a direct impact on its financial flexibility. The purpose of this paper is to reconstruct traditional financial flexibility index (FFI) derived from the western context, provide empirical evidence within eastern context by modified FFI and examine how the managerial efficiency of Chinese-listed firms is demonstrated with modified FFI to escort corporate life cycle hypothesis.

By tailored FFI to fit the contemporary operations of Chinese-listed firms, this study investigates how managerial efficiency varies across different life stages to demonstrate the moderating power in the firm performance of financially flexible firm.

It is found that financially flexible firms in the Chinese stock market generally experience good firm performance, yet the managerial efficiency could gradually be diminishing at their mature stage even firms’ financial flexibility remains consistent with the agency theory. This paper sheds light on the necessity to reexamine the components in financial flexibility based on the eastern context, and provides avenue to further understand the managerial behavior of Chinese listed firms when considering firm life cycles.

Although it is difficult for this current study to offer the precise weights on each factor in calculating financial flexibility, the judgment matrix method is adopted to at least provide reliable estimates in accordance with Chinese business contexts with less than 10 percent errors in contrast to the actual weights.

This modified FFI is particularly suitable for Chinese-listed firms under certain unique financial reporting regulations by adjusting a number of weights and factors. This study may help practitioners understand the managerial conduct of publicly listed firms in China.

The paper constructs a modified FFI with Chinese stock market characteristics embedded, and provides insightful evidence to explain the new pecking order theory by considering the life cycle stage of Chinese-listed companies.

The main objective of this study is to examine the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on earnings management practices in China using a sample of family and non-family enterprises. More specifically, this study aims to examine whether the COVID-19 pandemic causes variation in Chinese listed family and non-family enterprises' operations, as reflected in the level of real earnings management (REM).

This study uses three standardised REM indicators, namely, the abnormal level of cash flows from operations, the abnormal level of production costs and the abnormal level of discretionary expenses. Ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions are applied to compare the earnings management of Chinese family and non-family enterprises during the pre-pandemic period (2017–2019) and the pandemic period (2020).

The authors find that Chinese listed non-family enterprises tend to participate in more REM activities than family enterprises before the COVID-19 outbreak. However, the opposite is true during the pandemic. The authors also find that COVID-19 has increased the involvement of family and non-family enterprises in REM activities.

The results of previous studies based on REM using Chinese listed firms may not be applicable under the new social background of COVID-19. As the period after the COVID-19 outbreak is relatively recent, Chinese researchers have yet to study it comprehensively. The present study is amongst the first empirical attempts investigating the effect of a pandemic financial reporting by investigating whether and how the burst of the COVID-19 crisis affected financial reporting through the earnings management practices of listed Chinese family and non-family enterprises. Such information is crucial because it can provide analysis for all stakeholders to make better decisions.

This study aims to examine the determinants of the female representations on Chinese listed firm’s boards. This study also investigates the effect of gender diversity on corporate social responsibility activities.

The Tobit regression model is used because the data is censored and using ordinary least square regression can give spurious results. For robust check, the authors also used Heckman’s (1979) two-stage self-selection model to remove the sample self-selection bias.

The authors find that the female representations on the corporate board are positively associated with firm age, firm performance, corporate governance, family ownership, institutional ownership and managerial ownership while negatively related to firm size and state ownership. This study also incorporates predictors of the critical mass of women on the Chinese listed firm’s board. The study also tests the female-led hypothesis and concludes that the female representation increases in firms with female chief executive officer (CEO) or female chairpersons. The Chinese listed firms with gender-diverse board are socially responsible.

The importance of diversity in corporate boards has been demonstrated in light of the agency theory and the resource dependence framework. The results contribute to the previous literature by documenting the determinants of female representations on board, robust by alternative measures of gender diversity, firm size, corporate governance and estimation techniques.

The economic significance of gender diversity stirred the firms to increase female representation. The policymakers can understand the reasons for female underrepresentation in Chinese boards and can reform the regulation to enhance governance quality, non-state ownership and risk aversion among the listed firms.

This study contributes to the literature by providing empirical evidence on the key predictor of the world’s largest emerging economy, specifically the study focuses on the firm specific determinants, different governance attributes, ownership structure and firm risk measures. This study also seeks to answer if the presence of a female in the Chairperson or CEO position encourages the firms to hire more female directors or not?

The paper aims to provide a comprehensive investigation of the relationship between corporate governance (CG) structure and firm performance in Chinese listed firms from 2001 to 2015. The authors’ motivation derives from the fact that the CG system in China is different from those in the US, the UK, Germany, Japan and other countries.

A large unbalanced sample, covering more than 22,700 observations in Chinese listed firms, was used to explore, by means of a system-generalized method-of-moments (GMM) estimator, the relationship between CG structure and firm performance to remove potential sources of endogeneity.

Results show that Chinese CG structure is endogenously determined by the CG mechanisms investigated: there is no relationship between board size (including independent directors) and firm performance; CEO duality has a significantly negative effect on firm performance; concentration of ownership has a significantly positive influence on firm performance; managerial ownership is negatively correlated with firm performance; state ownership has a significantly positive effect on firm performance; and a supervisory board is positively correlated with firm performance.

The findings provide policymakers and firm managers with useful empirical guidance concerning CG in China.

Few integrative studies have examined the impact of CG structure on firm performance in China. This study adds new empirical evidence that the relation between CG structure and performance in China is endogenous and dynamic when controlling for unobserved heterogeneity, simultaneity, and dynamic endogeneity.

This paper aims to propose a strategy to analyze management governance in China.

This paper incorporates data on 989 Chinese listed firms over 2006 to 2016. A fixed effects model with panel data and an F-test are applied to exploit the relationship between management ownership and firm performance. A threshold model is introduced to explore the impacts of other governance mechanisms on management governance.

This paper finds an inverted U-shaped relationship between management ownership and firm performance. Furthermore, the threshold model demonstrates that large shareholders strengthen the positive effects of management governance and attenuate its negative effects; board size strengthens the positive effects of management governance but cannot attenuate its negative effects; and independent directors attenuate the negative effects of management governance.

This paper indicates that increasing management ownership could motivate managers to ameliorate the agent’s moral hazard problem which link the firm value premium when management ownership is less than 20.286 per cent. However, equity incentives are very rare in China. Thus, the authors expect that equity incentives will be a common phenomenon in Chinese listed firms.

This paper contributes to corporate governance literature by shedding some light on management ownership to explore the effects of management ownership. Specifically, this paper explores the effects of management ownership on firm performance and the impacts of other governance mechanisms on management governance to shape the management governance in China.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the association between firm performance and product market competition (PMC), and then examine the mitigation effect of corporate governance and/or state-ownership (SOEs) in the association between PMC and firm performance using Chinese listed firms.

The authors consider three determinants of the PMC that affect the nature of competition, and use market concentration, product substitutability and market size as proxies for PMC. The authors construct a corporate governance index which measures the extent of board independence, monitoring strength of supervisory board over board of directors, and monitoring strength of board of directors over CEO. The authors use Tobin’s Q as a proxy for firm performance. The authors use a sample of 20,706 firm-year observations listed on the Chinese stock market between 2001 and 2016 to empirically investigate the research questions proposed in the paper.

The authors find that higher PMC is associated with lower firm performance. The authors find that good corporate governance practices moderate the negative effect of higher PMC on firm performance. The association between higher PMC and lower performance is weaker for firms controlled by SOEs compared to non-SOEs. Further, the moderation effect of SOEs on the association between higher PMC and lower performance is more pronounced for firms with good corporate governance practices compared to firms with weak corporate governance practices.

Extant studies investigating the relationship between PMC and corporate governance suggest an either complementary or substitution relationship in developed economies. Our study highlights the interactive role played by SOEs and good corporate governance practices in firm performance in highly competitive product markets in an emerging economy. The findings provide insightful information to regulators of other emerging countries that SOEs with good corporate governance practices can play an important role in the economy by mitigating the negative effect of higher PMC on firm performance.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the effect of institutional environment and inside ownership on the tax reporting practices of Chinese listed firms.

It is an empirical study using a sample of Chinese listed firms for eight years of time periods between 1998 and 2005.

This study finds that in Chinese provinces with more developed institutions, firms have higher effective tax rates; however, firms with inside ownership in these regions have lower effective tax rates. Further analysis shows that the above results hold only for non‐state‐owned firms.

The paper presents the first study of the impact of inside ownership and institutional environment on corporate effective tax rate in China.

This paper aims to examine corporate social responsibility (CSR) in the context of listed Chinese firms. In particular, it examines the relationships between CSR and profitability, state ownership and tax reporting behavior.

The paper is an empirical study using CSR reports published by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and financial data collected from the China Stock Market Financial Statement Database (CSMAR).

The paper finds that state ownership is positively associated with CSR and its three components including the governance, social and environmental scores; firm profitability is positively associated with CSR and its market score; and tax reporting behavior is negatively associated with the environmental score. But the result is weak.

The results in this study should be treated with some caution as the sample size of 85 observations represents only a small fraction of China’s listed firms. A larger sample size is desirable and may affect our results.

This paper is of interest to policy-makers, corporate management and academics who wish to explore the relationship between CSR and other firm characteristics.

This paper is the first study which provides a comprehensive examination of CSR and its four components in connection with Chinese firms. In particular, it examines the relationship between CSR and profitability and state ownership.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the relationship between international expansion and firm performance in an emerging market.

The paper firstly explores the relationship between internationalization and firm performance, then investigates the roles of diversification, and examines how diversification moderates the relationship between internationalization and firm performance. For this purpose, panel data on 318 Chinese listed manufacturing firms during the period 1999‐2008 were utilized. Three groups of samples of high, medium and low levels of diversified manufacturing firms were obtained. Statistical techniques of fixed‐effects panel data model yielded an interesting pattern of findings. On the basis of these results, the paper then discusses the implications for the international expansion of Chinese firms.

At high and low levels of internationalization, internationalization is negatively associated with firm performance, but at medium levels of internationalization, greater internationalization is accompanied by higher performance. Product diversification negatively moderates the relationship between internationalization and performance. As product diversification increases, the relationship between internationalization and performance changes from a horizontal S‐curve in firms with low levels of diversification to a U‐curve in moderately diversified firms and eventually to an equilibrium level in highly diversified firms. The initial stage of the horizontal S‐curve of internationalization and performance declines markedly in Chinese manufacturing firms as a whole, therefore it is by no means easy for Chinese firms to undertake internationalization.

These findings do suggest that managers need to take a long‐term view of internationalization and make a commitment to internationalization.

This is the first paper of its kind to empirically validate the relationship between internationalization, firm performance and diversification in China. It is intended to make a contribution to theoretical research on international business in an emerging market.

The purpose of this paper is to explore the effects of large shareholdings from the agency problem perspective of overinvestment, and re‐test the role of board independence in the context of concentrated ownership.

Using a five‐year panel data of Chinese non‐financial listed companies between 2001 and 2005, the paper estimates both a fixed‐effects model and a random‐effects model.

The paper finds evidence of a significant non‐monotonic relationship between large shareholdings and firm level overinvestment. It also finds that state‐owned firms and firms with more independent directors experience lower level of overinvestment. However, firms with more frequent meetings experience a higher level of overinvestment.

The paper's findings indicate that concentrated ownership is not always a bad thing. The crux of the matter is how to induce large shareholders' incentive to monitor managers' opportunistic behaviors and restrict their motivation to expropriate minority shareholders.

In the context of concentrated ownership, the key to improve corporate governance is to strengthen board independence.

The paper provides useful information on non‐monotonic governance effects of large shareholdings in Chinese listed companies and overinvestment.