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This chapter investigates and explores the array of political and social factors which influence the Chinese system of environmental protection, shedding light on the Chinese political and juridical process in constructing a stricter and more incisive legal framework.

Starting by observing national macroeconomic data, this chapter explores how the Chinese governance system affects the implementation of the legal framework of environmental protection. In addition, it also traces a brief panorama of the most important laws framing environmental protection in China.

Over the years, the Chinese environmental protection system has been strongly affected by the national multilayered governance system. Nevertheless, the initiative launched by China (more intensively starting from the 11th five-year plan) to build a more virtuous environmental protection system now seems to be returning positive results, in both the renewed legal framework and – even more so – in the attempt (through addressing environmental issues) to reform the entire apparatus of national governance.

The multi-structured national system, which hides conflicting political and economic interests at central and local levels, represents one of the biggest problems for China. This chapter argues that only through a deep reform of the national management scheme can China really guarantee a better future for its environment.

Literature on Chinese environmental protection tends more often to investigate the legal aspect when edifying its environmental legal framework. Very few studies combine economic data and political analysis when studying the Chinese legal framework and its implementation.

We aim to comb the current policies that have been developed to promote the environmental industries in China and analyze them in a comparative manner.

We mainly use the method of text study to study the existing policies that Chinese central government published to promote the development of environmental industry. We built a database of policies and regulations from 1979 to 2015 by searching the official website of the Ministry of Environmental Protection of China.

We find that the existing policies focus on command and control approaches. Policies are more oriented to the stage of production instead of stages of investment and consumption. They rely more on negative incentive when stimulating supply and positive incentive when encouraging demand. Based on existing academic wisdom, we suggest that Chinese government should pay more attention to environmental economic policy and to stimulating demand for environmental products.

Few studies provide a systematic overview of the policy systems that have been developed to promote environmental industry in China in a systematic manner.

This study aims to deem the new policy – talk for environmental protection – promoted in the second half of 2014 to be the exogenous event and adopts PSM and DID to verify whether and how the central government’s mechanism of supervision of environmental enforcement improves firm environmental performance and reveals the micro effect and working mechanism of the supervision of environmental enforcement.

The researchers first select reasonable control groups for target districts by means of PSM, then apply DID to compare corporations in the treatment group with those in the control group for the change of environmental performance before and after the talk for environmental protection, so as to evaluate the micro-level effect of such talks on corporate environmental performance; after that, the research examines the working mechanism of such talks on corporate environmental performance; then, it goes a step further to find out the environmental impact of such talks on corporations of different natures of property right.

It is found from the research that the talk for environmental protection will effectively improve the environmental performance of corporations in the target districts, and the improvement of environmental performance in state-owned corporations in the target districts will be more evident. However, such improvements, to a certain extent, are achieved by reducing the output value, and corporations do not increase environmental investments from a long-term perspective.

First, the targets of the talk for environmental protection are mainly principals of municipal governments, but the research expands the scope to the whole province due to the small sample at the municipal level. Despite evidences showing that such a pressure of supervision impacts the whole province, the results obtained based on the data at the municipal level will be accurate. Second, the research selects a relatively short research period. Third, due to the limited data on corporate environmental performance in China, the research selects only listed companies from key monitored and controlled firms by state.

First, for the central government, environmental policy making is not the end of its job; it shall also supervise local governments’ work at environmental governance and properly handle its relationship with local governments. Second, for the local governments, in the course of implementing environmental policies, they should not only strengthen law enforcement but keep the continuity of law enforcement to avoid moving law enforcement. Third, in the long run, corporations must start from the source of production to enhance environmental governance and make cleaner production, so as to keep boosting corporate competitiveness and their ability of fighting risks.

First, the research innovatively provides empirical evidence about the effect of China’s supervision of environmental enforcement. Previous studies on this topic are mostly theoretical discussions only, while this research makes the talk for environmental protection the exogenous event about the supervision of law enforcement and achieves breakthroughs in empirical studies of administrative enforcement supervision. Second, the research pushes the studies on the implementation effect of environmental policies from a medium level to a micro level. Third, the research achieves some breakthroughs in the data for measuring corporate environmental performance.

Institutional actors are critical allies for grassroots movements, but few studies have examined their effects and variations within the non-democratic context. This chapter argues that while institutional allies are heavily constrained and unlikely to give open endorsement to grassroot activists, some institutional activists indirectly facilitate movement mobilization and favorable outcomes in the process of advancing their own political agendas. Drawing upon in-depth interviews conducted in 2008 and 2012, I illustrate this argument by examining the Anti-PX Movement – a landmark grassroots environmental movement against a chemical plant – in Xiamen, China. I find that the environmental institutional actors were constrained and divided, yet some still fostered opportunities for movement mobilization and in turn exploited the opportunity created by the protesters to pursue their policy interests, thus facilitating positive movement outcomes. As long as the claims are not politically subversive to the authoritarian rule, this type of tacit and tactical interaction between institutional activists within the state and grassroot activists on the street is conducive to promoting progressive policy changes.

Recent research has drawn attention to the tension between the Central and local governments in China regarding their roles in environmental protection. This paper aims to explore this tension and examine the extent to which local/provincial government’s environmental oversight has influenced the quality of corporate environmental disclosure in China.

A sample of 198 listed companies in heavily polluting industries were selected to examine the relationship between their environmental disclosure quality and the respective local government’s environmental oversight level.

The results provide evidence that local/provincial government’s environmental oversight significantly influences environmental disclosure in China. Despite the coercive pressure from the powerful Central government on corporate environmental disclosure, local/provincial governments are able to buffer the pressure and adjust the intensity of their environmental oversight on companies during the implementation of central policies to retain local economic and political interests. This may partially explain the persistent issue of low environmental disclosure quality in China.

This study enriches our understanding of the significant role of local governments in China in enhancing or sometimes discounting the regulatory enforcement of the Central government on corporate environmental disclosure, pointing to the need for concerted efforts by both local and Central governments to advance environmental disclosure development.

Research on environmental disclosure in developed countries has been well established in the literature. However, such research in developing nations is still limited, especially in China, the world largest developing country. The existing literature on environmental disclosure in China links it with either market demands, or regulatory enforcement from the Central government. The importance of local/provincial governments and their environmental oversight has long been ignored, which motivates this research.

The purpose of this study is to better understand the nexus between environmental taxes and other environmental management systems (EMSs) and to propose an alternative framework for implementing environmental protection tax (EPT) in China.

The study uses a multimethod approach encompassing document analysis and comparative analysis. The archival data covers laws, reports, regulations, guidelines and standards related to the EPT and EMS sub-systems in China.

The study identifies several institutional features of environmental taxes that have not been fully explored in past tax research. In addition, the study reveals that information-sharing mechanisms are key to addressing the risks and uncertainties associated with the implementation of an environmental tax and that the mechanisms are grounded in the nexus among EPT and two EMS sub-systems.

The findings of this study have implications for the understanding of China’s environmental tax system, the Environmental Impact Assessment system and the pollutants discharge permit (PDP) system. The construction of an alternative framework provides insights for approaches to environmental taxation. A limitation of this study is that the application of the framework might be undermined by the inaccurate manual sampling, as some pollutants may be non-replicable.

The findings of this study are relevant to policymakers who are designing, improving or abandoning environmental taxes for alternate solutions to environmental issues.

The insights gained from this study may be of assistance to lower the risks and uncertainties associated with the implementation of an environmental tax.

The study contributes to approaches to environmental taxes by constructing an alternative framework that connects an environmental tax system with two EMSs. The framework lays the groundwork for some promising research opportunities. Additionally, the study extends the tax accounting literature (Hanlon and Heitzman, 2010) by connecting accounting and environmental knowledge and developing a transdisciplinary approach. The study also contributes to the emerging body of literature that addresses the challenges in implementing environmental taxes in China.

In this paper, the authors take the central environmental protection inspection (CEPI) as an exogenous shock to study the reaction of the stock market in China. Using the event study method, the authors check how the first round of the first batch of CEPI supervision affects the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) of the listed firms on the Shenzhen or Shanghai stock exchange. This paper aims to discuss the aforementioned objective.

In this paper, the authors take the first round of the first batch of CEPI supervision as a clean exogenous shock to study its effects on the capital market. The authors collect daily trading data from the China stock market and accounting research (CSMAR) database, with the sample containing 1,950 Chinese firms listed on either the Shenzhen or Shanghai stock exchanges. And detailed information on CEPI supervision is obtained from the official website of the Ministry of Ecology and Environment of the People's Republic of China. The event study method is adopted to analyze the reaction of the stock market under CEPI supervision. Specifically, the authors constructed the cumulative abnormal return of each firm around the event day of CEPI. To capture the deterrent effects of CEPI supervision, the authors examine the situation of polluting and non-polluting firms in the supervised provinces, adjacent provinces and provinces that are not supervised or close to the supervised provinces, respectively.

This paper throws light on the following: (1) the polluting firms in the supervised provinces were negatively impacted by CEPI within 20 trading days of the event day, and its effects spread to the polluting firms in the neighboring provinces; (2) CEPI had a favorable impact on the non-polluting businesses in the provinces that are neither supervised nor close to the supervised provinces. The authors contend that it is because the investment is being forced out of the polluting sector and into the non-polluting sector, which is more pronounced in the provinces not directly or indirectly targeted by CEPI; (3) by comparison, the “looking back monitoring of the first round” has had no discernible detrimental impact on the firms' CAR, indicating an important role of psychology anticipation of investors in the stock market performance; (4) although not physically located in the supervised provinces, the downstream enterprises of the polluting firms suffer significantly from CEPI shock; (5) the effectiveness of CEPI supervision in the supervised provinces depends on the level of local environmental regulation and the ownership structure of the company. Private firms in the provinces with stronger environmental regulations suffer more from the CEPI shock; (6) the multivariate analysis shows that while enterprises with high ROE and financial leverage may be at risk of CAR loss, older, larger firms are less likely to experience CEPI shock; (7) the study of persistent effect reveals that the strike of CEPI supervision can last for at least 10 months after the event day and deterrent effect can be spread within the whole polluting industry.

In this paper, the authors only concentrate on the market reaction within 20 trading days after the event day. An analysis of long-term effects should be valuable to get a deeper knowledge of the capital market reaction to the CEPI policy. In addition, the paper only focuses on the first round of the first batch of CEPI. Since CEPI has been built as a constant regulation of local environmental performance, further study may need to track both the reaction of listed firms and investment behavior in the capital market.

Policy implications of the paper are as follows: First, for the policymakers, it is important to construct a constant environmental regulation system instead of a campaign movement. Second, for investors, as environmental issues are receiving increasing attention from both the government and the public, investment decisions should take into account firms' environmental performance, which can help reduce the risk from environmental regulations. Third, the firms in the polluting industry should take more action to reduce pollutant releases and adopt green technology, which is essential for sustainable development under environmental protection.

This paper contributes to the existing literature in the following aspects. First, the authors provide new evidence on the effects of environmental regulations as a shock to the stock market, which has been wildly concentrated in the literature about environmental policies evaluation and capital market reaction. Second, the authors supplement the literature on green finance and sustainability transformation, which has got increasing attention in recent years. Theoretically, by guiding investment and affecting the stock market performance, environmental regulations are considered to be an efficient way to stimulate polluting firms to transform into green development. The results of the paper support this intuition by showing that the CAR of the non-polluting firms in non-supervised provinces in fact benefit from the CEPI supervision.

This chapter presents a review about the history of how China’s environmental legal framework was built up.

The chapter explores environmental legal framework development through two paths: political path and the associated judicial path. It tries to connect the political slogans of China, under each leadership since the “Opening Up” in 1978, to the legislative development on environmental issues.

Regardless of each leadership’s political slogans, China’s economic reform and legislative development had always revolved around the objective – “revive China and its economy in the world,” which had been set by Deng Xiaoping. The “sustainable development,” that as a guiding principle, has already been incorporated into Five-Year Plans as well as China’s environmental legislation since economic reform.

Compared with previous research on this area, the pragmatical approach of this investigation confirms the originality of the research. Literature on this topic, in fact, hardly investigates China’s environmental issue by combining the analysis of the political and the legal perspectives.

Due to environmental externalities, micro-enterprises with profit-seeking features do not develop sufficient motivation for environmental governance. In a fiscally decentralized system, local environmental protection authorities perform environmental supervision, and the intensity of the regulations that they implement has an important influence on corporate environmental governance. Based on the promotion tournament framework, this paper aims to discuss the driving mechanism of corporate environmental governance using turnover of environmental protection department directors (EPDDs) as an indicator.

Using samples of A-share companies listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen exchanges from 2007 to 2014, this paper examines the impact of EPDD turnover on corporate environmental governance and its underlying mechanism.

The results show that corporate environmental governance exhibits a political periodicity that changes with the turnover of the EPDD, and the periodicity remains after controlling for the influence of changes in provincial party secretary and governor. Internal mechanisms analysis indicates that, without financial independence, local environmental protection departments rely on increasing sewage charges, not environmental protection subsidies, to promote corporate environmental governance. Further, considering heterogeneity among officials, it finds that the younger a new EPDD is, the more pronounced the periodicity of corporate environmental governance. However, there is no significant difference between in-system and out-system turnover.

In general, this paper describes the mechanisms of corporate environmental governance from the perspective of political economics, and the results have implications for the potential improvement of the government’s environmental supervision functions and the development of ecological civilization in China.

In a state capitalist country such as China, an important influence on company reporting is the government, which can influence company decision-making. The nature and impact of how the Chinese government uses its symbolic power to promote corporate environmental reporting (CER) have been under-studied, and therefore, this paper aims to address this gap in the literature by investigating the various strategies the Chinese government uses to influence CER and how political ideology plays a key role.

This study uses discourse analysis to examine the annual reports and corporate social responsibility (CSR) reports from seven Chinese companies between 2007 and 2011. And the data analysis presented is informed by Bourdieu's conceptualisation of symbolic power.

The Chinese government, through exercising the symbolic power, manages to build consensus, so that the Chinese government's political ideology becomes the habitus which is deeply embedded in the companies' perception of practices. In China, the government dominates the field and owns the economic capital. In order to accumulate symbolic capital, companies must adhere to political ideology, which helps them maintain and improve their social position and ultimately reward them with more economic capital. The findings show that the CER provided by Chinese companies is a symbolic product of this process.

The paper provides contributions around the themes of symbolic power wielded by the government that influence not only state-owned enterprises (SOEs) but also firms in the private sector. This paper also provides an important contribution to understanding, in the context of a strong ideologically based political system (such as China), how political ideology influences companies' decision-making in the field of CER.