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This study aims to examine the nexus of the US rebalance strategy to Asia and the US–China rivalry in the South China Sea (SCS) from the perspective of the offensive realism theory.

The study depends on the descriptive approach that deals with the analysis and description of the phenomenon. Also, the study uses the qualitative method to analyze the primary sources concerning the rebalance.

The study has found four results: first, the rebalance strategy to Asia is a comprehensive strategy to contain China’s rise. Second, China’s offensive strategy in the SCS since 2008 has been the main driver of launching the rebalance. Third, offensive realism presents a convenient analysis to understand the rebalance, China’s offensive strategy in the SCS, and the US–China rivalry in the SCS. Forth, SCS is one of the most important venues of the US–China rivalry for global hegemony.

Limited to the period from 2009 to 2016. The Obama Era.

This study highlights the centrality of the SCS in the US–China global rivalry that has not been yet well researched.

This paper attempts to critically question present IPE approaches and analyses that aim at assessing China’s role within the international political economy. Thus, unlike common theorizations that see the country as being integrated within US hegemony (Panitch and Gindin) or those accounts that claim that we are already witnessing the “terminal crisis” of US hegemony accompanied by a hegemonic transition toward China (Arrighi), the paper will argue that China was able to gain “relative geopolitical autonomy” as a result of the revolutionary processes it went through and eventually assert itself as a contender state, now just in the process of challenging US hegemony. Dissatisfied with existent theorizations of hegemony, I will be drawing on the critical edition of Gramsci’s Quaderni and attempt to offer a new perspective regarding the conceptualization thereof. Thus applying the elaborated framework of analysis to the current situation, I argue that unlike the US’s ability to counter the challenge of its traditional imperial rivals Germany and Japan as they developed under the grip of US hegemony, the country is facing difficulties in countering China’s ascent. However, while maintaining that China does indeed represent a challenge to US hegemony, particularly in East Asia, I will argue that the idea of a “crisis of US hegemony” is premature as China remains distant from fully realizing hegemonic relations, even at the regional level.

The main purpose of paper is to analyse the political, military and strategic significance of China’s rising power and its influence on Sino-Indian relations, while addressing the question as to why India has not been able to develop a long-term, stable and friendly relationship with China.

The paper is structured as follows: historical overview of India-China relations; various tools of China’s policy in Indian sub-continent; and India’s response. The paper employs a qualitative analysis of secondary literature, with media reports, official documents and public statements providing important sources for understanding the dynamics underlying bilateral relationship.

India needs to be prepared to face challenges as China’s charm offensive in India’s neighbourhood is primarily aimed at establishing a new Asian order in which Beijing would play the leading role. As China institutionalizes its military presence in South Asia and the Indian Ocean, India should adopt an innovative response mechanism, also involving counter-presence in areas considered China’s traditional sphere of influence.

The primary value of the paper lies in the fact that it covers most of the key dimensions of bilateral ties that impair a stable relationship between India and China. A proper understanding of the dynamics underlying bilateral ties may help the policymakers, scholars and academics to suggest ways to reduce sources of tensions, while also helping the Indian Government to prepare effective countermeasures.

China’s unprecedented emergence as an economic and political power has created a new geopolitical economy for semi-industrialised and developing economies in Southeast Asia. This paper examines China’s trade relationships with Thailand and Indonesia using the concepts of uneven and combined development (UCD) and unequal exchange. The mass of surplus value obtained through China’s trade with the developed economies has flowed into the considerable expansion in China’s imports from developing countries since 2000. China has maintained a consistent trade deficit with the latter. While the developing countries concerned have benefitted from this set of relationships, the extent to which they have done so has been determined by national strategies. In countries like Thailand – where manufacturing capital and a significant working class has emerged – exports expanded on the basis of mutually advantageous technologically and skills intensive goods. These are produced with a similar organic composition of capital as in China. The result has been a further consolidation of the hegemony of manufacturing capital. Indonesia, however, has a political system and economy long dominated by resource exploitation linked fractions of capital. The result has been a surge in primary goods exports. The current commodity price cycle has meant these goods exchange at prices above their value. The current looming price correction, however, may have negative repercussions. In the meantime, the concentration in raw materials exports is helping to prevent the emergence of a circuit of productive capital in manufacturing. The evidence from these contrasting cases suggests that the degree to which developing economies can benefit from China’s own historically unparalleled combined development remains highly contingent on the strength of the combined development possibilities and efforts within these other national social formations. Above all, there is the degree to which manufacturing sectors of capital can obtain hegemony.

China has showed its eagerness in using its economic strength in the very recent years. Is China going to be a major sanctioning state like the United States or the European Union? This chapter argues that although there have been an increasing number of economic sanctions imposed by China with its expanding national interests and growing diplomatic problems, China will still keep a low profile in using economic sanctions because of the restraining factors such as the WTO rules, inherent problems in its economy, the pursuit of a good reputation and its strategy of peaceful development. Thus the frequency and tactics of using economic sanctions may vary according to its rising economy and changing international situation, but that will go in a very limited way.

China’s swift economic rise, as symbolized by the first Chinese Olympics and by surpassing Japan to become the world’s second largest economy despite the recent global financial meltdown, has been accompanied by a transformation of Chinese foreign policy behavior. After spending the last decade emphasizing China’s “peaceful rise” or “peaceful development,” Beijing has begun to expound its policy preferences and territorial claims more forthrightly, even assertively. The purpose of this chapter will be to consider the origins, consequences, and likely future of the new Chinese foreign policy in the wake of the leadership transition at the 18th Party Congress in 2012 and the 12th National People’s Congress in 2013.

Since the 1970s, many global political economists have been seeing the US as a declining hegemon. After four decades into this hegemonic decline, performance of economies having been regarded as candidates for new hegemons such as Germany/Europe and Japan fell far short of these expectations, while US share of the global economy and its military supremacy remained stable. This staying power of the US stems from the “dollar standard,” under which the US dollar is the dominant foreign reserve currency and international transaction medium in the world economy. The dollar standard originated in the Cold War era when all major capitalist powers relied on the US for military protection. It persisted after the end of Cold War, thanks to the continuous mutual reinforcement of the dollar standard and the global domination of the US military. The recent rise of China, which is the first major capitalist power outside the orbit of US military protection, poses a serious dilemma to the US. On the one hand, China’s export-oriented development drives China to purchase US Treasuries on a massive scale, hence lending support to the short-term viability of the dollar. On the other hand, US’s skyrocketing current account deficit, much attributable to China, precipitates a crisis of confidence over the dollar’s long-term prospects. China is likewise caught in a dilemma between sustaining its export-driven growth and shifting to a domestic-consumption-driven economy. The development of the US–China currency conflict, together with the transformation of the Chinese developmental model, will be the most important determinant shaping the future of the dollar standard and US global power in the years to come.

According to the conventional wisdom, trade is not a zero-sum game, but a positive-sum game. By allowing countries to focus on producing the goods that they can produce relatively efficiently, free trade is largely beneficial for everyone involved. Then, why are the world’s two largest economies (i.e. the USA and China) currently engaged in a trade war, which is likely to hurt their own economies? What is the driving force for the trade war between the two economic giants? The purpose of this paper is to offer an explanation of the underlying cause of the US–China trade war.

In an effort to make sense of the trade war between the USA and China, the paper draws the insights from the two international relations theories – i.e. hegemonic stability theory and power transition theory.

As China continues to threaten US hegemony in the world in general and East Asia in particular, the Sino–US competition for hegemony will intensify over time. As a result, the trade war between the two countries may persist longer than many anticipate. Further, even if the trade war between the two superpowers ends soon, a similar type of conflict is likely to occur later as long as the Sino–US hegemonic rivalry continues.

The central thesis of this paper is that “US fear” about its declining hegemony and China’s rapid rise as a challenger of US hegemony is driving a US-launched trade war with China. Since the underlying cause of the trade war between the world’s two largest economies is political (i.e. the Sino–US hegemonic rivalry) rather than economic (e.g. US attempts to improve the trade balance with China by imposing tariffs on Chinese goods), the paper contends that the full understanding of the trade war requires close attention to the importance of power competition between the two superpowers.

The study aims to examine the geoeconomic significance of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries to China’s global geopolitical ends. In this vein, the paper also seeks to explore the interplay between China’s grand geoeconomic strategy and China’s geopolitical ends from a realist perspective.

The study uses the realism theory to explore the interplay between China’s geoeconomic presence in the GCC countries and its geopolitical global ends.

The study concludes that China under President Xi Jinping has geopolitical ends, and they are the regional and global leadership. To achieve them, President Xi has formulated a grand geoeconomic strategy consisting of four strategies: going out strategy, periphery strategy, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. These strategies will maximize China’s economic power and presence around the world. From a realist perspective, this presence and its evolving consequences such as the balance of dependence will enable China to achieve its geopolitical ends. In this vein, China’s geoeconomic strategy in the GCC countries has largely maximized China’s economic presence in the Gulf. This presence highly serving China’s geopolitical global ends for two reasons: the economic weight of the GCC countries and their strategic location within BRI.

The study can prove the realistic dimension of geoeconomics in the neoliberal era on the application to China’s geoeconomic strategy.