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This chapter addresses the relationship between foreign interventions and the democracy of the intervened country. In other words, I discuss how foreign interventions have affected the quality of the democratic institutions of the country that is being intervened. Latin America has been chosen for this endeavour, and more specifically, three countries have been chosen as case studies: Nicaragua, Cuba and Brazil. Furthermore, I analyze two types of foreign interventions: military and economic interventions. Nicaragua, Cuba and Brazil have experienced both types of interventions. In order to do this comparison, I look at the predominant interventionists in Latin America: the United States and China.

What is the historical, normative and institutional setting that helps leading Latin American and Eurasian countries to implement a post-hegemonic agenda and contribute to the multipolarization of global politics? Post-hegemony describes a situation in which the unipolar organization of the world political economy is challenged by a plurality of alternative projects, without however being entirely replaced by another system. Emblematic of post-hegemonic initiatives is the rise of the Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa countries who have taken the lead in creating alternative institutions that constrain US global hegemony, while however failing to spearhead a coherent, uniform and confrontational opposition movement. Regarding post-hegemonic regionalism, Latin American regionalism – as represented by Bolivarian Alliance for Our America (ALBA) – is characterized by a social justice-driven agenda that refutes US neoliberal hegemony, whereas the peculiarity of Eurasian regionalism – as represented by Shanghai Cooperation Organization – lies in its security-oriented focus that confronts US interventionism and international terrorism. An underlying commonality of both Latin American and Eurasian experiences is that they constitute a multi-front struggle centered on four main areas: culture, economy, financial cooperation, and regional defense. They both hinge on a strong normative framework and firm commitment in the regionalization of an endogenous culture, educational cooperation, and defense system. They all accord primary importance to social, financial, and infrastructural development. Overall, these experiences suffer from unresolved tensions between national sovereignty and supranationalism alongside the predominance of charismatic leaders inhibiting institutionalization. The limitations and contradictions of post-hegemonic transformations also include Latin America’s inability to resolve the question of extractivism, Eurasia’s neglect of the question of democratic participation, and both regionalism’s failure to offer a coherent alternative model of economic development to US hegemonism.

Relations between the People's Republic of China and Latin America have gradually expanded from commerce and finance to cover different aspects of security. The purpose of this article is to provide an overview over security cooperation between China and South America. Specifically, it analyses the motivations for security cooperation on both sides and its value added for Sino–South American relations.

The article describes four dimensions of security cooperation between China and South America: functional cooperation, defence diplomacy, long-term cooperation initiatives and arms sales. For each dimension of security cooperation, the main motivations on the two sides are discussed, together with the value added of security cooperation to the “comprehensive and cooperative partnership” China's policy papers on Latin America and the Caribbean have called for.

Security and defence considerations have not caused the development of Sino–South American security cooperation. Instead, it were the rapidly growing economic links from the 2000s on that facilitated China's broader political engagement with South America, including in the field of security. There are a number of important motivations that indicate security cooperation between China and South American states will further expand in the future.

Security cooperation should not only be practiced as an end in itself but also serve tangible outcomes to reduce insecurity.

In the context of Sino–Latin American relations, security cooperation has received relatively little attention beyond a comparatively small group of pundits despite the fact that military diplomacy has become increasingly important in bolstering China's growing international profile. This article makes an original contribution in discussing four dimensions of security cooperation between China and South America.

This paper enquires into general trends of China's International Development Cooperation over the past decade in Latin America and provides insights into the challenges with the Belt and Road Initiative.

This paper analyses quantitative data for Chinese Official Development Assistance (ODA) and Other Official Flows (OOF) for projects in Latin America based on recent data contributions including Bluhm et al. (2018) and Gallagher & Myers (2019).

Based on the data available, it can be concluded that the cooperation between China and Latin America has been increasing. For instance, the value of China's cooperation increased by 4.5% per year on average from 2000 to 2014. Moreover, China's economic and political motivations in the region indicate that the cooperative relationship has been changing from a South–South to a North–South framework. Two main factors are involved in this transition: the evolution of China from a developing country to a global emerging power and the implementation of the Belt and Road Initiative to strengthen political and economic ties with the governments of the region.

This investigation suggests that the increasing number of loans in the region and Beijing's growing interest in trade and natural resources are structural factors that guide the Chinese foreign policy.

There are few analyses of China's cooperation for development in Latin America that involve the evaluation of concessional and non-concessional loans for projects in the region in the last decade. This paper also analyses the challenges and opportunities that the implementation of the Belt and Road Initiative represents for the region.

The purpose of this article is to discuss the characteristics of China’s strategic partners in Latin America, emphasizing the foreign policy orientations of these nations towards China.

The first part is a theoretical analysis of the foreign economic policy orientations of the Chinese strategic partners in South America. In the second part, attention is paid to the empirical regularities of economic cooperation between China and its South American strategic partners.

China seeks to diversify the profile of its strategic partnerships, as long as they increase Chinas complexity in the orientation of cooperation, using a multidimensional approach, based on three strategic cooperation networks (partners based on ideological affinities, geo-economic partners and trade partners).

This article increases the understanding of how new strategic partnerships take a more active position in the new great geo-economic game in which China is involved. China increases its facilitation role in Latin American Pacific rim countries, as well as its influence in countries historically close to the USA.

The purpose of this paper is to propose a framework for evaluating the relationship between China and Peru, drawing on dependency theory, against the backdrop of China’s explicit policies towards foreign direct investment. It seeks to transcend traditional interpretations of this relationship in the literature that focuses on China as either hegemon or a South–South partner to Latin American countries to highlight a more nuanced relationship.

The paper adopts a case study approach, focusing on China in Peru. The authors examine three areas of traditional, strategic and emerging industries drawing from Chinese national policies, reviewing these against characteristics of dependency: control of production, heterogeneity of actors, transfer of knowledge and delinking.

The authors find that Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) in Peru demonstrates mixed motives and collectively operates as an ambiguous player. Chinese firms appear to be willing to work with various actors, but this engagement does not translate into a decolonial development alternative in the absence of a Peruvian political will to delink and Chinese willingness to actively transfer control of production and knowledge.

This paper contributes to existing literature on China in Latin America by evaluating Chinese outward FDI in Peru against China’s strategic aims in terms of a re-evaluation of dependency theory.

This paper attempts to critically question present IPE approaches and analyses that aim at assessing China’s role within the international political economy. Thus, unlike common theorizations that see the country as being integrated within US hegemony (Panitch and Gindin) or those accounts that claim that we are already witnessing the “terminal crisis” of US hegemony accompanied by a hegemonic transition toward China (Arrighi), the paper will argue that China was able to gain “relative geopolitical autonomy” as a result of the revolutionary processes it went through and eventually assert itself as a contender state, now just in the process of challenging US hegemony. Dissatisfied with existent theorizations of hegemony, I will be drawing on the critical edition of Gramsci’s Quaderni and attempt to offer a new perspective regarding the conceptualization thereof. Thus applying the elaborated framework of analysis to the current situation, I argue that unlike the US’s ability to counter the challenge of its traditional imperial rivals Germany and Japan as they developed under the grip of US hegemony, the country is facing difficulties in countering China’s ascent. However, while maintaining that China does indeed represent a challenge to US hegemony, particularly in East Asia, I will argue that the idea of a “crisis of US hegemony” is premature as China remains distant from fully realizing hegemonic relations, even at the regional level.

According to official statements, BRI is a Chinese call for global cooperation, based on five priorities: policy coordination, facilities connectivity, unimpeded trade, financial integration and people-to-people bonds. The purpose of this paper is, primarily, to describe and contextualize the official discourse of China's foreign policy toward Latin America, emphasizing on BRI. On that basis, the author aims to contrast official rhetoric with real facts, bringing problematic cases associated with implementing BRI in Asian and African developing countries, so as to discuss possible challenges that Latin America can encounter when implementing the initiative. Finally, the author evaluates potential implications of resembling the Chinese three-level scheme of development in the region and make suggestions on this subject.

In an effort to evaluate possible implications of BRI in Latin America, the paper describes and contextualizes Chinese foreign policy official rhetoric toward the region's countries. Based on that, the author brings to discussion Asian and African experiences in the implementation of the initiative and raise questions on controversial issues that Latin America could meet when enforcing BRI-related projects.

As a part of its new foreign and economic policies, China continues to strengthen its engagement with Latin American countries, enlarging its strategy though the promotion of BRI. If Latin American countries, through BRI, seek to replicate the Chinese three-level of development scheme, including domestic, regional and global scopes, certain controversial issues cannot be ignored in the design and implementation processes. Also, equal participation of Chinese and Latin American governments, societies and enterprises is decisive if the goal is to settle a long-term development scenario for the region.

The central thesis of this paper is that the implementation of BRI in Latin American countries could potentially replicate the Chinese three-level development proposal. To achieve such an ambitious goal, much depends on how Latin American countries define and enforce BRI projects. Full understanding of those challenges requires close attention to what the Chinese official rhetoric claims and what actually puts into practice in other developing countries already involved in BRI, so as to anticipate possible consequences for the region.