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The research interest in this paper is primarily in the question of how important changes in corporate-level strategy affect firm performance. This paper aims to explore the relationship between strategic change and performance, illustrate the frequency patterns of major strategic changes and assess the multi-period performance implications of major strategic changes.

This paper defines strategic change by combining contingency theory and resource-based view. The panel data from 1973 listed firms of China’s A-share market that reported data between the years 2004 and 2015 are selected as the sample to test various relationships and effects between performance and strategic change.

This paper empirically shows that change in strategies benefits subsequent firm performance, specifically resources re-allocation among existing businesses will result better performance, and successful firms exhibit less strategic change than those performing poorly. It also demonstrates that, in China, the effects of a major strategic change on subsequent performance peaks after one year, but starts to decline thereafter.

This paper explores whether changes, especially important changes, in corporate-level strategy influence subsequent firm performance, and illustrates how frequently a listed firm in China makes decisions about corporate-level strategy. It contributes empirically to the literature by providing one of the first empirical evidence on assessing the effects of important changes in corporate-level strategy on performance.

Drawing on the premise that the media play a vital corporate governance role, this paper aims to investigate the association between media coverage and financial report restatements.

Based on a sample of Chinese listed companies over the period 2011–2015, the authors use ordinary least squares regression as well as a number of additional tests. To mitigate the endogeneity issue, the authors use a two-stage Heckman test and a propensity score matching model.

The authors document a negative and significant association between media coverage and restatements, suggesting that firms with high media coverage engage less in financial restatements. The authors further explore the moderating effects of internal control quality and state ownership on the association between media coverage and restatements. Regression results reveal that the governance role of the media is more pronounced for state-owned enterprises than for private firms. However, no significant difference in the disciplining effect of media coverage is found for firms with high, versus low, internal control quality.

The role of the media in corporate governance and financial reporting quality has been well documented. In emerging economies, such a role has been overlooked. As a result, the purpose of this study is to fill that void. Furthermore, prior research ignores the impacts of state ownership and the internal control environment on the media's governance role.

This chapter examines China’s corporate governance and accounting environment that shapes the adoption of internationally acceptable principles and standards. Specifically, it examines international influences, including supranational organizations; foreign investors and international accounting firms; domestic institutional influences, including the political system, economic system, legal system, and cultural system; and accounting infrastructure. China’s convergence is driven by desired efficiency of the corporate sector and legitimacy of participating in the global market. Influenced heavily by international forces in the context of globalization, corporate governance and accounting practices are increasingly becoming in line with internationally acceptable standards and codes. While convergence assists China in obtaining legitimacy, improving efficiency is likely to be adversely affected given that corporate governance and accounting in China operate in an environment that differs considerably from those of Anglo-American countries. An examination of the corporate governance and accounting environment in China suggests heavy government involvement within underdeveloped institutions. While the Chinese government has made impressive progress in developing the corporate governance and accounting environment for the market economy, China’s unique institutional setting is likely to affect how the imported concepts are interpreted and implemented.

To examine whether and how the different levels of regional economic incentives would have an effect on underwriters' market share in general.

Drawing on Chinese IPO firms during the period 2006-2016, this study examines the impact of different levels of regional economic incentives on underwriters' market share.

The authors find that regional economic incentives have a positive impact on underwriters' market share and that local economic incentives have a significantly stronger impact than central economic incentives. Furthermore, the authors find that IPO firms with underwriters driven by regional economic incentives experience worse post-IPO performance than firms with underwriters driven by central economic incentives, which do not experience a significant decline in post-IPO performance.

Taken together, the authors’ findings are consistent with the notion that performance assessment motivates officials at various levels of government to bring companies in their jurisdiction to the IPO market prematurely. In addition, the results indicate that central economic incentives play a significant role in driving China's macroeconomic development and market-oriented system reforms. As such, they are one of the major driving forces behind China's market-oriented system reforms.

This paper investigates the relationship of ownership structure and corporate performance of China’s listed property companies. Data from all the listed property companies on China’s stock market from 2000 to 2002 were used to study ownership concentration, type of controlling shares and their relation to corporate performance. The methodology applied is the conventional ordinary least square (OLS) model which is widely used in empirical studies on corporate governance. The study shows that ownership concentration has a positive association with corporate performance. Also that state shareholding is positively related to corporate performance; this is inconsistent with other empirical studies on the ownership structure and corporate performance of China’s listed companies and rflects the industry’s characteristics.

The paper's aim is to analyze changes in the relative importance of Canada as a supplier for its home markets; and, the rising importance of China versus other Canadian trading partners.

The market overlap measure (MOM) statistic, developed by Sawchuk and Yerger is used to analyze the Canadian home market shares for Canada and every other nation with sales in the Canadian market for each of 61 different NAIC sectors (56 at the four‐digit NAIC level and five at the three‐digit NAIC level).

The USA remains the most important foreign supplier to Canadian markets with a weighted average 23.6 percent market share as of 2003 (Canadian‐based production having a 63.0 percent market share). US market share, however, has been declining by nearly a percentage point per year since 2000. Approximately, half of the lost US' market share has been captured by Canadian‐based firms and approximately a quarter has been captured by Chinese production. China's growth in Canadian market share places it second behind only the USA in terms of Canadian‐based firms' home market competitive exposure.

The work does not include an analysis of service sector trade flows due to inadequate data.

The MOM statistic is shown to be a useful diagnostic tool for analyzing the level of, trends in, and industries driving the competitive exposure a nation's firms have on sales in a specified market.

The MOM statistic is shown to yield better insights regarding the actual degree of competitive exposure than does the more commonly used similarity indices such as Finger‐Kreinen.

Purpose – The purpose of this study is to empirically evaluate the effectiveness of China's 2005 shareholding reform and investigate the relationship of the changes of state-owned shareholdings and the largest shareholdings with corporate performance.

Methodology/approach – This study uses a sample of 470 listed firms that were subject to China's 2005 shareholding reform with data from 2004 and 2006. First, we examine whether the reform has reduced state-owned shareholdings measured by ownership concentration and the largest shareholdings through comparing shareholder structures of the reformed listed companies prior to and after the reform. Second, regression analysis was used to explore the relationship between the change of ownership concentration and largest shareholdings and corporate performance of Chinese listed firms.

Findings – This study reveals the effectiveness of the shareholding reform as both ownership concentration and largest shareholdings decrease. This study presents evidence suggesting a positive impact of China's 2005 shareholding reform on corporate performance and endorsing the notion that state-owned shareholdings are detrimental to corporate performance.

Research limitations – ROE is used as a measure of corporate performance, which is influenced by the rules of accounting standards and corporate behavior.

Originality/value – This study provides empirical evidence on the effectiveness of China's shareholding reform and shows a positive relation between the reduction of ownership concentration and corporate performance. This is the first study to examine this relation using the cases of Chinese listed companies. The findings have implications to regulatory bodies, public listed firms and investors in China in terms of corporate governance and shareholding configuration.

This paper seeks to understand the evolution of financial intermediation in the course of China's economic transition.

The research is based on a unique data set collected by the authors and other collaborators from a 1998 survey of financial institutions, enterprises, and government officials in southern China.

Based on an empirical investigation of rural financial reforms, it is argued that China's two‐decade long financial reform was a gradual process that accommodates reforms in other sectors and responds to changing policy goals and the economic and institutional environment in which financial institutions operate. Although using standard measures of financial system performance may cast doubt on the effectiveness of China's rural banking system, when one understands the different roles that it has been asked to play, it can be argued that it has not operated so poorly.

In conclusion, it is found that China's rural economic environment is still changing. If the system continues to change in the future, responding to pressures in the economy, further financial reforms will almost certainly emerge in the coming years.

These findings, although primarily from the 1980s and 1990s, are still helpful in understanding the reform process that is currently ongoing.

This paper will help readers make sense of agricultural financial reforms and will allow for more discourse over what has been accomplished and what still is needed.

This is the first manuscript to comprehensively put China's rural financial reforms into the context of modern economic analysis, explaining why China's government proceeded as they did and why the reforms have unfolded in such a stop and start manner.

We take a state-stewardship view on corporate governance and executive compensation in economies with strong political involvement, where state-appointed managers act as responsible “stewards” rather than “agents” of the state.

We test this view on China and find that Chinese managers are remunerated not for maximizing equity value but for increasing the value of state-owned assets.

Managerial compensation depends on political connections and prestige, and on the firms’ contribution to political goals. These effects were attenuated since the market-oriented governance reform.

Economic reform without reforming the human resources policies at the executive level enables the autocratic state to exert political power on corporate decision making, so as to ensure that firms’ business activities fulfill the state’s political objectives.

As a powerful social elite, the state-steward managers in China have the same interests as the state (the government), namely extracting rents that should adhere to the nation (which stands for the society at large or the collective private citizens).

As China has been a communist country with a single ruling party for decades, the ideas of socialism still have a strong impact on how companies are run. The legitimacy of the elite’s privileged rights over private sectors is central to our question.

Chinese executive compensation stimulates not only the maximization of shareholder value but also the preservation of the state’s interests.

In the mid-1970s, China's economy had only two forms of public ownership: state ownership and collective ownership. In the agricultural sector, virtually all production was organized into collectively owned Production Brigades (villages) and People's Communes (townships or groups). In industry, SOEs accounted for 80% of total industrial output, with the remaining 20% shared by urban and rural collectives. By the late 1990s, SOEs and collectives accounted for less than 50% of GDP (International Finance Corporation, 2000; p. 18). Transformation of the ownership of production has undoubtedly been one of the key components of China's successful reform program. This has been achieved through combined efforts: privatization of agricultural production on collectively owned land; new entry of collectively owned industrial enterprises, especially township and village enterprises (TVEs), and their subsequent privatization; new entry of foreign-invested and domestic private enterprises; and ownership transformation of existing SOEs (Mako & Zhang, 2003).