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The purpose of this paper is to provide insights into the multiple anti-corruption agencies (ACAs) in Taiwan and their conflict resolution. The birth of the Agency Against Corruption (AAC) in 2011 created the unintended consequence of sibling rivalry with the elder Ministry of Justice Investigation Bureau (MJIB).

A historical background of these agencies is discussed and followed by an analysis of the diversified conflicts among the prosecutor’s office, the AAC and the MJIB. The empirical sources of this study include 17 in-depth interviews with government officials both at ministerial level and field level, scholars and NGO representatives.

The redundancy of ACAs in Taiwan is a fact, which is extremely difficult to change in the foreseeable future in the light of current political and fiscal constraints. This paper concludes that the conflicts among multiple ACAs and their operational weaknesses will not fade away after a mere directive from their superior, the Ministry of Justice, unless genuine cooperation is put into place in various individual cases.

This paper provides a road-map for decision makers to improve collective anti-corruption performance. Taiwan’s AAC serves as the latest example testing the efficacy of the multiple specialized ACAs.

This pioneering study provides insights into Taiwan’s anti-corruption policy and practices. More investigative studies should be conducted on the effectiveness of multiple ACAs in other countries.

The purpose of this paper is threefold: first, to ascertain the levels of effectiveness of the anti-corruption agencies (ACAs) in China, Japan, Philippines, Singapore and Taiwan; second, to explain why some of these ACAs are more effective than others; and third, to suggest some policy recommendations for addressing their limitations.

This paper relies on three well-known international indicators to assess the perceived extent of corruption in the five countries. Similarly, their quality of governance is assessed by their total percentile rank on the World Bank’s six governance indicators in 2013.

Singapore’s Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau is effective because of its government’s political will and favorable policy context. The Philippines and Taiwan rely on ineffective multiple ACAs, which are inadequately staffed and funded, and compete with each other for limited resources. China’s Central Commission for Discipline Inspection is ineffective because corrupt party members are disciplined and not prosecuted, and the political leaders use corruption as a weapon against their opponents. Japan’s weak political will is reflected in its reluctance to address its structural corruption. This paper concludes with policy recommendations for enhancing the effectiveness of the ACAs in the five countries.

The comparative analysis of the effectiveness of the ACAs in the five Asian countries and the policy recommendations for addressing their limitations will be of interest to policy makers, scholars and anti-corruption practitioners.

The purpose of this paper is to analyze several measures which the government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has adopted to curb corruption and to make recommendations to curb the spread of corruption.

The study is based on the analysis of government policy documents and reports, and statistical data on anti-corruption measures in China.

During the past ten years, the government of the PRC has adopted these anti-corruption measures: first, increasing the ability to handle cases for deterring corrupt officials; second, improving the work style of officials and prohibiting them from enjoying special privileges, and promoting moral behavior among them; third, reforming the economic and political system to reduce corruption opportunities; and fourth, reforming the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) to more effectively handle corruption cases. Nevertheless, in despite of these anti-corruption measures, there remain serious challenges for reducing corruption stemming from an irrational system of administrative reform and balancing the relationship between the CCDI and the judiciary departments to enhance the professionalism and efficiency of the anti-corruption agencies, which continue to constrain China’s current anti-corruption efforts. Therefore, the Chinese government should take a top-down approach, analyze the characteristics and trends of corruption in the new era, strengthen the institutional structures, and strive to suppress the spread of corruption.

This paper will be useful for those scholars, policy-makers and anti-corruption practitioners who are interested in China’s anti-corruption measures.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the anti-corruption performance of the Philippine government, particularly under the leadership of President Benigno Aquino III.

The paper evaluates the anti-corruption measures as represented by pertinent laws as well as anti-corruption agencies (ACAs) under the Aquino administration.

The Aquino government has exercised remarkable political will in acting on high-profile cases involving former government officials, including former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. However, the government’s overall anti-corruption performance is hampered by outdated and conflicting laws, lack of compliance with anti-corruption laws and regulations by public officials and employees, poor ACA operational capacities, judicial inefficiency, deficient organizational systems and change-resistant government agencies, and selective and partial enforcement of anti-corruption laws. These problems are characteristic of Philippine political administrations and are arguably rooted in a system long characterized by fragile state institutions, strong oligarchic control, and weak citizenship.

The paper is intended to update scholars, policy makers, and anti-corruption practitioners interested in corruption, ACA performance, and political reform in the Philippines. It discusses corruption-related problems of public administration within the purview of political economy. Based on this perspective, it argues that the key to effective control of corruption is a change in the political system’s configuration rather than the mere change in leadership.

This purpose of this paper is to discuss the relationship between political independence and operational impartiality in regard to the effectiveness of anti-corruption agencies (ACAs). Against this background of western orthodoxy, it asks whether a non-western country with high levels of corruption (Vietnam being an example) can find another pathway in its efforts to effectively combat corruption.

An exercise in qualitative conceptual clarification and theoretical speculation, drawing upon practical examples.

It is argued that it is important to distinguish between de jure and de facto political independence, and that neither can be fully understood unless they are considered in relationship to other key values, particularly operational impartiality, public accountability, and systemic legitimacy, and in the context of bureaucratic politics. There is little coherent theoretical knowledge available about the relationships among these variables. Such values are central to western notions of “good government” but are much less institutionalised in non-western jurisdictions with high levels of corruption. The question is raised: can such countries, Vietnam being one example, develop effective anti-corruption strategies which because of the nature of their own political system, cannot depend on political independence for its ACAs?

Attention is drawn to some conceptual and putatively theoretical issues relating to the effectiveness of ACAs, and which have received little explicit attention in the relevant academic literature.

The purpose of this paper is to analyze recent Japanese corruption prevention mechanisms and assess the efforts of the Japanese government in winning public trust.

This paper discusses public sector corruption in Japan at an institutional level through a study of its features and current status. It then analyzes and evaluates the effectiveness of corruption prevention measures and the public perceptions of these measures. The paper concludes with a discussion on whether such measures can be adopted by other countries.

Recent preventive measures in Japan are effective in decreasing corruption opportunities, but not in enhancing the public trust of the government. Major findings are: first, Japan is the only Asian country without a dedicated anti-corruption agency (ACA); second, there is more emphasis on corruption prevention in the anti-corruption measures; third, the government is concerned with initiating measures to prevent the further erosion of public trust when corruption occurs; fourth, while preventive measures such as public disclosure and whistle-blower protection acts are in place, public awareness of their existence is still lacking and the usage of these systems is limited; fifth, more efforts are placed on prevention through the promotion of government transparency and accountability and public sector ethics education rather than penalizing the corrupt offenders; and sixth, though efforts to minimize amakudari practices are made, lack of political will and its sustainability prevents further reform.

This paper will be useful for scholars, policy-makers, and anti-corruption practitioners interested in learning how Japanese government practices prevent corruption.

The purpose of this paper is to make recommendations to address the four limitations of Singapore’s Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB).

The paper begins by attributing Singapore’s reputation as the least corrupt Asian country to the CPIB’s four strengths: its independence from the police; its adequate staffing and funding; its adoption of the total approach to enforcement; and its impartial enforcement of the anti-corruption laws. It then proceeds to identify the CPIB’s limitations and provides four suggestions to address these limitations.

The sentencing of Edwin Yeo, a senior CPIB officer, to ten years’ imprisonment on 20 February 2014 for misappropriating US$1.76 million for nearly four years reveals that there were weaknesses in the CPIB’s internal controls and procurement procedures in spite of its effectiveness in curbing corruption. This paper recommends that the CPIB addresses its four limitations by strengthening its internal controls and procurement procedures; enhancing public trust and confidence by further improving its outreach to the population; improving the external oversight of its activities; and developing its in-house research capabilities.

This paper will be useful for those scholars, policy-makers, and anti-corruption practitioners who are interested in how the CPIB can further enhance its effectiveness even though Singapore is perceived as the least corrupt Asian country.

Explains the rating system for US municipal bonds and its effect on borrowing costs, reviews relevant research and provides a study of the factors affecting grading by rating agencies in Virginia using 1995 data. Explains the methodology and presents the results, which identify five significant determinants of favourable ratings. Shows that net interest costs are lower when other rates of interest are low, real estate taxes are high (though not excessive), total municipal debt levels are low and credit risks are low. Confirms that bond ratings capture additional information and that a drop in ratings will raise net interest costs substantially. Considers consistency with other research and the implications of the findings for participants in the municipal bond market.