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During the 1980s, as organizational uses of information technology (IT) increased in both number of users and amount of use, and as more technology options presented themselves, organizations began to appoint senior personnel as “technology czars.” For executives outside the IT industry, particularly those focused on other aspects of running an enterprise (various business units, finance, human resources, etc.), the IT world seemed to be chaotic, out of control and full of terminological confusion. IT budgets and expenditures were growing rapidly and demands for service continued to increase both in scale and scope. Meanwhile organizational IT units seemed unresponsive, and curiously resistant to change. Central IT units in universities seemed stuck in the mainframe culture of home-grown, customized system development and controlled access at a time when distributed client-server computing offered the promise of low cost, local control and agility. As a result, many local IT support units evolved throughout academic institutions, placing even greater demand on scarce institutional resources and fuelling the potentially explosive tension between central administrative and local authority.

The chapter investigates three channels through which private benefits are hypothesized to be extracted in dual class companies: excess executive compensation, excess capital expenditures and excess cash holdings.

With a propensity score matched sample of S&P 1500 dual class and single class companies with concentrated control, the chapter analyzes the relationship between the valuation discount of dual class companies and measures of excess executive compensation, excess capital expenditure and excess cash holdings.

Executives in dual class firms earn greater compensation relative to their counterparts in single class firms. This excess compensation is more pronounced when the executive is a family member. The value of dual class shares is discounted most when cash holdings and executive compensation of dual class are excessive. Excess compensation is highest for executives who are family members of dual class companies. The dual class discount is not related to excess capital expenditures.

The research shows that the discount in the value of dual class shares in relation to the value of closely controlled single class company shares is directly related to the channels through which controlling shareholder-managers can extract private benefits.

This chapter examines the role of national governments in the evolution of power relationships in multinational companies. The empirical study is based on a longitudinal analysis (2000–2011) of the EADS Group (European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company), which resulted from the merger of French company Aérospatiale-Matra, German company DASA and Spanish company CASA. The analysis focuses on the impact of national governments that were involved in the creation of EADS and national governments of emerging economies which have become priority markets for the company. The findings show that the political context has strongly influenced the balance of power within the EADS group.

Change of leadership is a big and important incident in the life of a company. As important as it is for the company, it is equally a difficult decision to make for the board of directors. Most of the big companies have a committee dedicated toward laying out a succession plan of the existing chief executive officer (CEO). The big dilemma, however, is whether to appoint someone from within the company and let him or her lead as he or she has been associated with the company and knows the internal dynamics better or to induct some outsider and take advantage of his or her expertise/reputation in the market. The balance appears lopsided when the result of this chapter is perused. Companies on an average seem to reap more benefits if an existing executive is promoted to the office of CEO rather than hiring an outsider. The benefits which are talked here from promoting insiders are indirect ones and do not have a direct bearing with the finances of the company. As shown by the results that insiders are more likely to continue with the company for a longer duration as the CEO as well as not as the CEO which defers the hiring and firing costs (screening candidates, conducting interviews, huge severance packages, golden parachutes, etc., are the costs referred to) for a longer period. Other benefits arising from insider CEOs are upfront awareness about the company’s work culture, production/service capacity, efficiency, strategies followed till date, etc., which gives him or her a head start compared to an outsider.

Personnel costs typically account for 60% or more of total operating expenses in health systems, and as such beome a necessary focus in most if not all substantive health reform adaptations. This study sought to assess whether strategic alignment of the human resource (HR) and learning functions was associated with greater adaptive capacity in U.S. health systems.

Data were gathered using a survey that was distributed electronically to chief human resource officers from two U.S.-based associations. The survey included questions about organizational structure, strategic human resource management, strategic learning, and organizational response to health reform.

Significant correlations were found between strategic alignment of HR and HR’s involvement in responses related to cost control (r=0.46, p<0.01); quality improvement (r=0.45, p<0.01), and patient access (r=0.39, p<0.01). However, no significant relationships were found between strategic alignment of organizational learning and HR involvement with these responses.

Results suggest that HR structure may affect an organization’s capacity for adaptive response. Top-management teams in health systems should consider positioning HR as part of the core leadership team, with a reporting relationship that allows HR to maximally participate in formulating and implementing organizational adaptation.