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The aim of this paper is to examine how managerial ability affects corporate tax aggressiveness.

The study follows the work of Demerjian, Lev, and McVay (2012) and quantifies managerial ability by calculating how efficiently managers generate revenues from given economic resources using the data envelopment analysis (DEA) approach. The study uses a wide range of measures of tax aggressiveness. Firm fixed-effects regressions and a difference-in-differences approach using information regarding CEO turnover to control for endogeneity are used.

The study finds a negative relationship between managerial ability and corporate tax aggressiveness. Further tests show that this negative relationship is more pronounced for firms with higher investment opportunities or firms with more reputational concerns.

Given the significant costs associated with tax aggressiveness and the negative effect it can have on managerial reputation if discovered, the results suggest that more able managers invest less effort in aggressive tax avoidance activities. This study furthers the understanding of how managerial personal traits affect corporate decision-making.

This study aims to examine the impact of corporate tax aggressiveness on future stock price crash. It also tests the impact of corporate tax aggressivness in predicting stock price crash for a two-year forecast window.

The study sample consisted of 1,169 firm-years observations. The multivariate analysis uses three measures of stock price crash risk, as a dependent variable. The key variable is tax aggressiveness lagged by one period (one year) as all independent variables. As a robustness check, this paper uses alternate measures of earning management and a longer forecast window (two years) to predict stock price crash risk.

Tax aggressiveness activity is positively related to a firm-specific future stock price crash. Moreover, corporate tax aggressiveness predicts stock price crash risk for a long forecast window (two years). The findings are robust to a number of checks and have several policy implications.

The cost of continuing to accumulate bad news will be greater than the cost of revealing them. Thus, board of directors should encourage disclosure in order to reveal private news and then, to increase the amount of firm-specific information in returns. Another point is that tax aggressiveness behavior implies a risk to be perceived by the market as socially irresponsible, and may harm the firm reputation. This fact leads, in terms of portfolio management, to deter investment in firm-equity. Therefore, Investors should be cautious about the different risks of corporate tax aggressiveness.

The accounting system in France, as in most European countries, relies upon codified rules and government requirement. Thus, our results provide some evidence of the effectiveness of the French laws and regulations in preventing indirectly earnings management from affecting stock price crash risk.

French companies are among the heavily taxed in Europe which makes France a particularly suitable context for studying tax aggressiveness issues. To the best of our knowledge, this study is the first in the french context, that document a signifcant and positive relation between tax aggressiveness and future crash risk. It focuses on the important role of corporate tax planning as a means of withholding bad news and its consequences in inflating stock prices.