In late 2008, a crisis of unprecedented proportion unfolded on Wall Street that called for the government bailout of institutions. Although the crisis wreaked havoc on the…
In late 2008, a crisis of unprecedented proportion unfolded on Wall Street that called for the government bailout of institutions. Although the crisis wreaked havoc on the lives of firm stakeholders and taxpayers, many of the executives of these rescued firms received bonus compensation as the year closed, which called into question the relationship between pay and performance. Equity compensation is viewed by many as the answer to the principal–agent dilemma. By giving an executive stock in the firm, as an owner, his interests will now be aligned with those of shareholders, and the executive will work to enhance firm performance. Equity compensation was on the rise during the 1990s when stock options became the largest component of executives’ compensation packages [Murphy, K. J. (1999). Executive compensation. Handbook of Labor Economics, 3, 2485–2563]. During the first decade of the new millennium, usage of restricted stock in compensation plans contributed to the executives’ total package. Whatever the form, equity compensation should induce managers to make decisions for the betterment of the firm.
Empirical evidence, however, has contradicted this ideal notion that mangers who are partial owners of the firm work to maximize firm value. Rather, managerial power in the form of earnings management and manipulation of insider information come to the forefront as a means by which executives can maximize the equity portion of their compensation packages. The Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 as well as new accounting rules set forth by the Financial Accounting Standards Board may help to remedy some of the corporate ills that have surfaced in the past. This will not be possible, however, without compliance and increased corporate governance on the part of firms and their executives. Compensation committees must take great care in creating a compensation package that incites the executive to not only act in the best interest of his firm but also consider the welfare of the common good in his actions.
It is obvious to many librarians that requests for information on funding sources are increasing in most types of libraries. Public support programs are dwindling, and corporate profits are receding. The publishing field has responded to this need by producing a new array of tools to help grant seekers find appropriate funding sources.
Based on the aforementioned data, the risk index (RI) identifies the percentage of all students of a given racial/ethnic group in a given disability category. The RI is…
Based on the aforementioned data, the risk index (RI) identifies the percentage of all students of a given racial/ethnic group in a given disability category. The RI is calculated by dividing the number of students in a given racial/ethnic group served in a given disability category (e.g. LD) by the total enrollment for that racial/ethnic group in the school population. The 1998 OCR data revealed risk indices for all racial/ethnic groups that were higher for LD than those found for MR. The NRC (2002) report stated that, “Asian/Pacific Islander have placement rates of 2.23%. Rates for all other racial/ethnic groups exceed 6%, and for American Indian/Alaskan Natives, the rate reached 7.45%” (p. 47). The second index, odds ratio, provides a comparative index of risk and is calculated by dividing the risk index on one racial/ethnic group by the risk index of another racial/ethnic group. In the OCR and OSEP databases, the odds ratios are reported relative to White students. If the risk index is identical for a particular minority group and White students, the odds ratio will equal 1.0. Odds ratios greater than 1.0 indicate that minority group students are at a greater risk of identification, while odds ratios of less than 1.0 indicate that they are less at risk. Using the 1998 OCR placement rates, the LD odds ratio for American Indian/Alaskan Natives is 1.24, showing that they have a 24% greater likelihood of being assigned to the LD category than White students. Odds ratios for Asian/Pacific Islander are low (0.37). For both Black and Hispanic students, the odds ratios are close to 1.0. The third index, composition index (CI), shows the proportion of all children served under a given disability category who are members of a given racial/ethnic group and is calculated by dividing the number of students of a given racial or ethnic group enrolled in a particular disability category. Two underlying assumptions of the CI are that the sum of composition indices for the five racial/ethnic groups will total 100%, and baseline enrollment of a given racial/ethnic group is not controlled. More specifically, the CI may be calculated using the percent of 6- through 21-year old population with the racial/ethnic composition of IDEA and U.S. census population statistics. For example, if 64% of the U.S. population is White, 15% is Black, 16% is Hispanic, 4% is Asian, and 1% is American Indian these data not interpretable without knowing the percentage of the racial/ethnic composition with IDEA. Hypothetically, IDEA data may show that of the 6–21 year olds served under IDEA, 63% are White, 20% are Black, 14% are Hispanic, 2% are Asian, and 1% is American Indian. To calculate disproportionality, a benchmark (e.g. 10%) against which to measure the difference between these percentages must be used. If the difference between the two percentages and the difference represented as a proportion of the group’s percent of population exceeds +10, then the racial/ethnic group is overrepresented. Conversely, if the difference between the two percentages and the difference represented as a proportion of the group’s percent of the population is larger than −10, then, the racial/ethnic group is underrepresented.