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The present paper compares the protests that CVS, a leading chain retailer, experienced as it attempted to establish a new drug‐store on the Upper West Side of New York City’s borough of Manhattan with those Walgreen, another major chain pharmacy, encountered as it attempted to enter a neighborhood shopping area in Madison, Wisconsin, a medium‐sized city in the mid‐western region of the USA. It finds that well‐educated, affluent residents in both locations believe that they should have input regarding the retail composition of local shopping areas, and that their resistance to new stores can be successful. It also reveals that such consumers may be protective of small retailers and may harbor strong anti‐chain‐store sentiments.

This study attempted to explore the development of an industry‐specific, quantitative instrument for assessing the customer‐perceived service quality level of casual‐wear chain stores. It was the wish of the authors that this alternative approach would supplement existing generic measure instruments for assessing service quality when used in fashion retailing. Applications of the proposed instrument in fashion retailing were also discussed.

The purpose of this study is to compare the patrons of chain home centers and patrons of small hardware stores.

A questionnaire was administered to individuals residing in two adjacent metropolitan areas located in the US Midwest. Respondents were contacted via telephone and were asked to respond to questions addressing their hardware store/home center preferences and shopping activity.

Respondents' assessments of the importance of eight attributes relating to shopping experience were not able to differentiate between patrons of small hardware stores and patrons of large home centers. Furthermore, the type of hardware retailer that individuals most commonly patronize does not appear to affect their assessments of various types of hardware retailers stores nor the amount of time respondents spent during a typical visit to their most patronized home center/hardware store. Finally, the only demographic difference noted involved income – respondents who shopped most often at large home centers were found to have a significantly higher income than those who shopped most often at small hardware stores.

The results of this study indicate that, at least for the issues examined, there appears to be relatively little difference between the individuals who patronize chain home centers and those who patronize small hardware stores. Consequently, individuals' choices of hardware retailer to patronize appears to be more complex than anticipated.

The growth of chains in hardware retailing has not received the same degree of attention as chain stores in other areas of retailing.

The purpose of this paper is to apply Heskett, Sasser and Schlesinger's service profit chain to a single retail service with a view to developing a better understanding of the performance linkages between employee perceptions and performance, customer perceptions and behaviour, and financial performance.

The research was based on the case study of a UK home improvement store chain. Measures of each of the variables in the service profit chain were analysed using Pearson's correlation coefficient, with a dataset based on 75 stores.

Although analysis of the performance relationships revealed many interesting correlations, the data lent little support for some of the expected linkages; in particular, the “satisfaction mirror” effect between employee and customer satisfaction and loyalty, and the link between customer loyalty and financial performance. The possible asymmetries and non‐linearity of certain performance relationships may also have added to the difficulty in applying the model to this organisation. Furthermore, the study revealed many performance linkages between variables which are not aligned in the service profit chain model.

The value of the paper lies in the conclusions directed at both practising managers and academics. It is contended that the service profit chain model cannot be applied generically to services but that managers should undertake the development of context‐specific models of their organisations. Unquestioning acceptance of Heskett et al.'s configuration of the service profit chain may indeed constrain managerial understanding of the complexities of business performance; whilst there is also a danger of applying a strait‐jacket to academic thinking on performance relationships and performance improvement.

An important phenomenon often observed in supply chain, known as the bullwhip effect, implies that demand variability increases as we move up in the supply chain. On the other hand, the cross-docking is a distribution strategy that eliminates the inventory holding function of the retailer distribution center, where this latter functions as a transfer point rather than a storage point. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the impact of cross-docking strategy compared to traditional warehousing on the bullwhip effect.

The authors quantify this effect in a three-echelon supply chain consisting of stores, retailer and supplier. They assume that each participant adopts an order up to level policy with an exponential smoothing forecasting scheme. This paper demonstrates mathematically the lower bound of the bullwhip effect reduction in the cross-docking strategy compared to traditional warehousing.

By simulation, this paper demonstrates that cross-docking reduces the bullwhip effect upstream the chain. This reduction depends on the lead-times, the review periods and the smoothing factor.

A mathematical demonstration cannot be highly generalizable, and this paper should be extended to an empirical investigation where real data can be incorporated in the model. However, the findings of this paper form a foundation for further understanding of the cross-docking strategy and its impact on the bullwhip effect.

This paper fills a gap by proposing a mathematical demonstration and a simulation, to investigate the benefits of implementing cross-docking strategy on the bullwhip effect. This impact has not been studied in the literature.

Proposes two hypotheses and tests them empirically: that consumers do not differentiate between store brands offered by competing stores; that store brand market share is consistent with chain penetration. To test the hypotheses, employs an experimental design using 350 subjects, and collects survey data from 923 respondents regarding store patronage behavior and brand choice. The first hypothesis received unconditional support. The second hypothesis received conditional support. Discusses implications for marketing strategy.

The purpose of this paper is to explore and identify the causes of the failure of the Larkin Company (Buffalo, NY), once one of the nation's largest mail‐order houses in the decades surrounding 1900.

Borrowing conceptual frameworks from both recent management and historical scholarship on organizational failure that integrates exogenous and endogenous factors, this study employs traditional historical methods to explain the causes of Larkin's failure. The main primary sources include the Larkin Company records, government documents, personal papers, trade journals, and other primary sources.

Begun as a modest soap manufacturer by John D. Larkin, in Buffalo, in 1875, the Larkin Company grew to become one of the largest mail‐order houses in the USA in the decades surrounding 1900 owing to its innovative direct marketing practices, called the “factory‐to‐family” plan, that relied on unpaid women to distribute its products. In 1918, anticipating the chain store boom, Larkin established two grocery store chains (other retail ventures followed). The company regularly lost money in these ventures and, combined with a shrinking mail‐order economy, struggled during the 1920s and 1930s, and eventually liquidated in 1941‐1942. A number of exogenous and endogenous factors, acting alone and in various combinations, proved too challenging to second‐ and third‐generation family members who ran the company after 1926.

This research paper tries to understand the decline of an important progressive firm during the interwar period. Whereas Sears Roebuck and Montgomery Ward were able to make the transition from mail order to stores, Larkin Company failed to navigate this transition successfully. It also adds to the small but important literature in management and business history on organizational failure and may serve as a cautionary tale for family businesses.

The evolution of private labels (PL) is a recent trend in the retail industry: many retailers now manage a PL portfolio that includes multiple value propositions, as well as various brand name strategies. Little research has been done, however, on how this combination of PL strategies conditions the results of the retailer that manages them. This study aims to examine the formation of PL brand equity and its effect on store loyalty for retailers with differently tiered PL programs (a “better” program with standard PL vs a full PL quality spectrum with economy, standard and premium PLs) and different PL naming strategies (store-banner name or stand-alone brand name).

A survey (N = 644) was used to test the model in the context of the consumer goods retail industry. Exploratory factor analysis, confirmatory factor analysis and multi-group structural equation modelling techniques were used to assess the proposed model.

The results show differences in the formation of PL loyalty based on whether the retailer has a tiered PL program. In portfolios with economy, standard and premium PLs, PL associations have a stronger effect than PL awareness in the formation of PL loyalty. Portfolios with a standard PL show balanced effects of PL associations and PL awareness on PL loyalty formation. As to the positive effect of PL brand equity on store loyalty, this study also shows a stronger effect of PL brand equity on store loyalty in chains that choose to use their store banner name in their PLs.

Retailers that manage multi-tier PL portfolios (as opposed to those that commercialise a standard PL) can increase loyalty to the PL portfolio significantly by constructing highly differentiated images of their economy, standard and premium PLs to ensure that consumers truly perceive the different value propositions of their PL tiers. As to PL naming strategy, the authors recommend that retailers that use the same retail chain name for one or several of their PLs invest in their corporate reputation to strengthen the brand equity achieved by their PLs and thus increase loyalty to the retail chain. Retailers must perform specific communication and advertising campaigns for PLs with the stand-alone brand name.

Today, any reference to PLs as a whole is overly simplistic, but no research has assessed empirically differences in the influences of a multi-tiered vs a standard PL program on the PL loyalty formation for PL portfolios. Nor has any empirical research incorporated the influence of PL naming strategy on store loyalty. This study fills these gaps, integrating into the same model two significant moderating variables of retailers’ strategy: their PL tier strategy and their PL naming strategy.

The purpose of this paper is to examine out‐of‐stock (OOS) challenges in the independent grocery sector with a special emphasis on in‐store root causes. The analysis aims to assess the extent and root causes for OOS in the independently controlled retail sector and provide a comparison of these results with the centrally controlled chain sector in Denmark. The paper also seeks to examine the practices and challenges of store ordering and store replenishment processes in the independent sector and identify practical implications for store management and other members of the grocery channels.

The research design includes two studies. Study‐I surveys and compares the extent and root causes of OOS of 42 stores from eight chains in the two sectors. Study‐II identifies, based on qualitative interviews with 17 store managers/owners of independent stores, specific insights on store operations.

The quantitative study shows that the OOS rates in the independent sector are significantly higher than in the centrally organized sector. Furthermore, the independent grocery sector faces OOS challenges in more categories than the centrally controlled sector. The study also reveals a very large variation in the performance of independent stores. Contrary to the centrally controlled chain store sector, the major root cause for OOS in the independent sector is found in the store ordering process. The qualitative study shows that the main discriminating issues between stores with a low and a high OOS rate are: store management emphasis and commitment to OOS issues; the resulting priority and managerial guidance in store ordering and store replenishment tasks; the stability of staff and the proper planning for replenishment peaks; the store size and resulting space conditions; and the use of appropriate decision heuristics and use of inventory in store ordering.

The findings have practical implications for store management as it reveals practices to pursue and to avoid. Also, it is argued that the findings have implications for the other members of the grocery channels.

Empirically, this paper explores two issues not being dealt with in depth in previous research, i.e. the OOS challenge in the independent sector and the emphasis on store operations.