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Purpose – This chapter aims to identify and address methodological issues inherent in business group studies, especially within the context of South Korean chaebols, many of which have been exalted as most remarkable cases of business groups.

Design/Methodology/Approach – After reviewing the theoretical background and the evolution of chaebols, the authors identify methodological issues focusing on the constructs of major interest to researchers, which need careful treatment for enhancing the internal and external validity of studies on business groups in general and chaebols in particular.

Findings – Any sample of business groups must be composed based on accurate definitions rather than conventional lists readily available, in accordance with the research purpose. Identifying and quantifying the strategic and structural characteristics of business groups should be accompanied by an understanding of the various types of economic organizations. The uniqueness of business groups in each country should also be considered, especially in conducting comparative analyses and generalizing research findings. Measuring performance needs more careful attention given the increasing complexity in many business groups. The embeddedness of business groups in a specific society as well as their coevolution with the institutional context urges researchers to employ more qualitative or ethnographic methods.

Originality/Value – The authors suggest alternatives through which we can cope with the methodological issues, and make suggestions for future research. As business groups continue to play a significant role in many emerging economies, continuing efforts to elaborate methods will contribute to improving the value of our scholarly work in both academic and practical dimensions.

The Korean enterprise group, known as chaebol, is unique for its corporate form consisting of a pyramid of subsidiary firms operated by a single line of family. This study investigates how the family of chaebol system has been able to exert its control over a wide range of businesses with its limited resources. It finds that the chaebol families, for the attainment of proper control, have maintained a certain amount of inside shareholding in various forms; share ownership by family itself, affiliate firms, non-profit organizations, and employees. At the same time, families of conglomerates have created intricate web of ownership network to grip the control in different styles; direct family control, indirect family control via a base company, indirect family control via non-profit institutions, and indirect family control via a combination of base company and outside institution.This study is conducted on the basis of support from The Asia Research Fund.

Reforms in corporate governance in selected Asian countries were introduced after the financial crisis of 1997–1998. After the financial collapse, several crisis-affected economies overhauled their corporate governance, strengthening market forces, implementing tougher regulations and focusing on transparency in decision-making and accountability. Since then, a commitment to improving corporate governance has grown as governments recognised the need to protect investors’ interests, reduce systemic market risks, maintain financial stability and enhance investors’ confidence to encourage the return of capital to the region through better accountability and transparency. The incentive for corporations to follow best practice is to boost their corporate performance and attract investment. Effective corporate governance is also recognised as essential for economic growth. Governments are realising that good governance of corporations is a source of competitive advantage and critical to economic and social progress.

Since the financial crisis, corporate governance has become a key policy issue in most of Asia. Progress in reforming corporate governance, however, has been uneven across Asia. This paper documents that progress.

The 1997 financial crisis in Asia has entailed significant changes and governance reforms in the Korean banking industry. This study investigates the impact of corporate governance on the risk and return of Korean banks during the 10 years that followed the financial crisis era. In particular, we investigate the ownership structure of banks, the extent of involvement of foreign institutions and investors in ownership and board membership of Korean banks, and the heterogeneity of board structure on bank performance. Our findings indicate that foreign ownership, the extent of external board involvement, and the presence of foreign directors on the board are associated with significantly higher bank returns. Although foreign ownership and the number of outside board directors are associated with lower risk, the involvement of foreign board members is positively associated with risk. The results are fairly robust to a battery of tests and control variables, and offer the first detailed empirical documentation of the Korean banking governance reform and its achievements since 1997.

This chapter explores the adaptation and evolution of stand-alone CSR reporting in two different political economies and late-capitalist countries: Brazil and South Korea. Instead of selecting between new institutionalism and the varieties of capitalism (VOC) approach, this study attempts to explore how the interaction between converging and diverging pressures appears in the adaptation and evolution of stand-alone CSR reporting (i.e., cross-fertilization process) in two countries.

Using qualitative content analysis this study focuses on the frameworks of CSR reports and the way CSR issues are described within the stand-alone CSR reports of four telecommunication companies in Brazil and South Korea.

Even though CSR reports in both countries have become similar due to the convergence of frameworks of CSR reporting, the key themes and the representation on each theme are still embedded within each form of market economy: a hierarchical market economy (HME) in Brazil and a network market economy (NME) in South Korea. From a cross-fertilization perspective, this chapter shows that the adaptation and evolution of CSR reporting occurs at two different levels of CSR reporting.

This study has three major values. First, it explains the two different levels of the adaptation and evolution process of CSR reporting by bringing a dynamic cross-fertilization view. Second, it provides a qualitative study that focuses on the content of CSR disclosures instead of the quantity of those disclosures. Lastly, it contributes to the academic and practical research on CSR in late-capitalist countries and in two under-researched types of political economies.

This paper is ambitious. Its central purpose is to examine how a number of developed economies, plus the largest developing economy, vary in terms of corporate governance: USA, Japan, Germany, UK, France, Italy, South Korea, Taiwan, Sweden, Switzerland and mainland China. We understand corporate governance in a very broad sense, descriptive not prescriptive: as who controls and influences firms, and how. We are thus dealing very much with varieties of capitalism. In a sense, we shall be seeking to characterise national systems of corporate governance, but we must stress that our concern is always with the situation of the individual firm. We shall find it convenient most of the time to give one label to a country's whole economy, but this will always be an approximation, which conceals variations among that country's firms. At other points, we shall distinguish types of firm and indicate the rough proportions of each type in a particular economy.

This paper explores the pattern of technical change in the Korean economy from 1970 to 2013 and investigates its determinants. We use the Classical growth-distribution schedule to show that the labor-saving and capital-using pattern has predominated. For the rationale behind this Marx-biased technical change, we focus on the relationship between technical change and real wage growth via the evolution of labor and capital productivity, and verify the historical direction of technical change against the rise and fall of the working class. Furthermore, we find that the deviation during the post-crisis period from the long-run trend of Marx-biased technical change is not attributable to the vitality of new technological innovations, but rather the reflection of class dynamics over extracting productivity under weaker capital deepening. The results suggest that the recent deterioration of labor share and labor unions in Korea is closely associated with low incentive for technological progress, which contributes to prolonged stagnation.

With their national economy rapidly and structurally turning away from the long-cherished stable employment regime since the national financial crisis, South Koreans’ poverty is increasingly manifested through financial entrapment ensuing from heavy personal indebtedness to banks, kin members and friends, and, the worst of all, private usurers. The world’s once most aggressively saving population turned into one of the world’s most indebted populations merely in a decade. Having lost its once-proud capacity of a developmental state, the South Korean government has instead been busy devising various public schemes for offering grassroots consumer loans in supposedly preferential terms. Consumer credit, instead of social wage, has been offered rather generously by this increasingly neoliberalized state. This is another crucial component of financialization in the contemporary world political economy. South Korea’s emergency measures for escaping the national financial crisis have paradoxically ended up transplanting the financial trouble from banks and industrial enterprises to grassroots households.