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Corporate social responsibility (CSR) has now been paid notable attention by a large number of firms. The aim of this paper is to investigate a better way to implement CSR in a socially responsible supply chain with different channel leaderships.

Started from measuring CSR by purely taking consumer surplus into account, a stylized centralized channel and two different decentralized channels are first developed and examined for equilibria in the socially responsible chain. Furthermore, this paper extends to a socially irresponsible supply chain and a broader practice of CSR by simultaneously incorporating environmental externality and consumer surplus into CSR.

With the analytical studies, several interesting and important results and managerial insights are clearly revealed. For example, but not limited to, it is found that: (1) Compared with the leader, the follower can effectively implement CSR for a better performance in both pure and socially responsible profits in the decentralized channel; (2) undertaking socially responsible concerns does not always mean reducing the economic profit and conversely being socially irresponsible does not always induce an increase in economic profit for the socially responsible member(s); (3) CSR concern level plays a key role in both the pure and socially responsible profit. An increase in CSR concern level clearly increases the socially responsible profit and poses an ambiguous impact on pure profit depending on different channel leaderships: it decreases the centralized channel in pure profit but increases the pure profit with the decentralized channel under certain conditions; and (4) interestingly, the authors find that decentralization can outperform centralization regarding on both pure and socially responsible channel profits by properly implementing CSR concern levels.

The results derived in this paper provide novel managerial implications to the socially responsible members in terms of pricing decisions, order quantity and CSR practice. In addition, this paper assists the socially responsible supply chain in determining the optimal channel leadership to undertake CSR. That is, decentralization may achieve a better performance than integration under certain market conditions.

To the best of the authors' knowledge, this paper is the first attempt to explore the interactive of the CSR practice and channel leadership in a socially responsible supply chain.

Members in a supply chain account for corporate social responsibility (CSR) in different ways. This paper considers a socially responsible supply chain in which the manufacturer innovates in a sustainable product while the retailer exhibits CSR concerns. This paper aims to investigate how socially responsible behavior, namely, sustainable innovations or CSR concerns, affects the pure profit, environmental impact and social welfare, in such a socially responsible supply chain.

This paper first constructs an integrated case as a benchmark and then develops a Manufacturer-Stackelberg game in a decentralized scenario. The pure profit, environmental impact and social welfare are confirmed and analyzed in centralized and decentralized cases. Moreover, two unique coordinating contracts, i.e. wholesale price discount contract and revenue-sharing contract, are used in this socially responsible supply chain.

Analytical analysis shows that, under certain conditions, the optimal CSR strategies hold for maximizing pure channel profit, minimizing environmental impact and maximizing social welfare. Whether the performance in a centralized case outnumbers that in a decentralized case depends on the CSR concerns level and environment-friendly degree of the product. In addition, it is found that a wholesale price discount contract is better for the retailer whereas a revenue-sharing contract is better for the manufacturer in pure profit to improve coordinating efficiency.

These results can offer managerial implications to the socially responsible supply chain in terms of pricing decisions, CSR strategies and sustainability innovations. Specifically, under certain conditions, placing more CSR concerns level increases pure channel profit and the social welfare. A balance between the pure profit and the social welfare is hereby achieved for the two socially responsible individuals by designing a proper contract.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this paper is among the first studies so far to combine the CSR concerns strategy and sustainability innovation into a socially responsible supply chain.

The paper attempts to discuss the optimal pricing decisions under the decentralized and centralized decision and analyze the influence of online reviews and in-sale service on dual-channel supply chain. Finally, the authors design a two-part tariff coordination mechanism.

To deal with this pricing conflict problems of dual-channel supply chain consisting of dominant manufacturer and a retailer, considering the fact that online reviews and in-sale service are important factors on consumers’ purchase decisions, the authors establish some basic models and exploit them to discuss the optimal pricing decisions under the decentralized and centralized decision and analyze the influence of online reviews and in-sale service on dual-channel supply chain. Finally, the authors design a profit-sharing coordination mechanism.

The results show that the optimal online direct selling price is positively correlated with product perceived quality obtained from online reviews and negatively correlated with the in-sale service. The traditional retail price is positively correlated with the in-sale service and weakly correlated with online reviews. For the manufacturer and retailer, whether decentralized decision or coordination contract, their profits increase with the increase of the in-sale service in a certain range and quality perceived from spontaneous online reviews. Online reviews and in-sale service are important factors on consumers’ purchase decisions. Positive in-sale services and online reviews can provide consumers with a better shopping experience, thereby promoting their enthusiasm for shopping and improving their quality of life. The two-part tariff coordination mechanism improves the profits of the manufacturer and the traditional retailer, respectively, through the transfer fee.

The proposed approach can well analyze the channel conflicts and pricing problems between retailers and manufacturers with respect to product offline price and online price. The analysis and results can inform decision-making for manufacturers and retailers.

The purpose of this research is to investigate how to introduce a financing scheme to tackle the manufacturer's capital constraint problem, discuss the effects of data-driven marketing (DDM) quality, cross-channel-return (CCR) rate and financing interest rate on the members' pricing and delivery-lead-time decisions and optimal performances, and analyzes `how to achieve the coordination within a dual-channel supply chain (DSC) by contract coordination.

This work establishes a DSC model with DDM, and the offline retailer can provide internal financing to the capital-constrained online manufacturer. The demand under the price is determined based on DDM quality, customer channel preference and delivery lead time. Then, combined with the Stackelberg game, the optimal pricing and delivery-lead-time decisions are discussed under the inconsistent and consistent pricing strategies with decentralized and centralized systems. Furthermore, it designs a manufacturer-revenue sharing contract to coordinate the members under the two pricing strategies.

(1) The increase of DDM quality will reduce the delivery-lead-time under the inconsistent or consistent pricing strategy and will push the selling prices; (2) The growth of the CCR rate will raise selling prices and extend the delivery-lead-time under the decentralized decision; (3) Under price competition, the offline selling price is higher than the online selling price when customers prefer the offline channel and vice versa; (4) The retailer and the manufacturer can achieve a win-win situation through a manufacturer-revenue sharing contract.

This paper contributes to the studies related to DSC by investigating pricing and delivery-lead-time decisions based on DDM, CCR, internal financing and supply chain contract and proposes some managerial implications.

The objective of this paper is to investigate the impact of the information sharing of the dynamic demand on green technology innovation and profits in supply chain from a long-term perspective.

The authors consider a supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer. The retailer has access to the information of dynamic demand of the green product, whereas the manufacturer invests in green technology innovation. Differential game theory is adopted to establish three models under three different scenarios, namely (1) decentralized decision without information sharing of dynamic demand (Model N-D), (2) decentralized decision with information sharing of dynamic demand (Model S-D) and (3) centralized decision with information sharing of dynamic demand (Model S-C).

The optimal equilibrium results show that information sharing of dynamic demand can improve the green technology innovation level and increase the green technology stocks only in centralized supply chain. In the long term, the information sharing of dynamic demand can make the retailer more profitable. If the influence of green technology innovation on green technology stocks is great enough or the cost coefficient of green technology innovation is small enough, the manufacturer and decentralized supply chain can benefit from information sharing. In centralized supply chain, the value of demand information sharing is greater than that of decentralized supply chain.

The authors used game theory to investigate demand information sharing and the green technology innovation in a supply chain. Specially, the demand information is dynamic, which is a variable that changes over time. Moreover, our research is based on a long-term perspective. Thus, differential game is adopted in this paper.

The purpose of this paper is to explore the impact of the product residual value (PRV) and the loss of value over time of returned products in the reverse supply chain configuration. It also examines whether or not the distinction of Fisher's functional and innovative products holds for the reverse supply chain.

In order to identify the relevance of the Fisher model, the model needs to be recast in terms of PRV, which, in this context, is considered the independent variable in the reverse logistics arena. Products defined as innovative in Fisher's taxonomy correspond to disposed products with high residual value, whereas functional products correspond to disposed products with low residual value. Furthermore, the PRV and the speed at which returned products lose their value are considered in order to determine the configuration of the reverse supply chain that allows for recapturing most of the PRV. These notions have then been tested by analyzing two reverse supply chains with a case study research methodology.

The findings show that low PRV is associated with second‐class recovery options (recycling and energy recovery) and that high PRV is associated with first‐class recovery options (reconditioning and remarketing). When the recovery option is recycling, time is not relevant, the primary objective is cost reduction (efficiency), the chain is centralized, and actors and phases of the reverse chain are determined by the specificity of the recycling process. When the recovery option is reconditioning, time is primarily relevant, tradeoffs between costs and time efficiency are necessary, the chain presents a centralized structure, and the presence of other types of actors and phases influences the structure of the reverse supply chain.

The focus is restricted to the industry of electrical and electronic products.

Based on the outcome of the study, managers are able to determine the basic prerequisites for the design of their reverse supply chains.

Previous literature suggests that when the PRV is high, early product differentiation is necessary, and the chain is therefore decentralized. The paper demonstrates that this is not confirmed in the case of low returned volumes and high reconditioning quality standards.

This study considers transitive service triads, which consist of three dyads formed by three actors: supplier, logistics service provider and customer, who remain directly linked by one or more of the upstream and downstream flows of products, information and finances. This paper aims to explore the link between information governance, decentralized information technologies and supply chain self-organization, and their resulting impact on network performance in the transitive service triads.

Drawing upon the tenets of the theory of complex adaptive systems and supply chain practice view, this paper involves an empirical investigation that uses survey data gathered from transitive service triads in the European countries. The study uses partial least squares structural equation modeling to estimate the formative-reflective hierarchical component model and test the research hypotheses.

Information governance defines how supply chain information flows are controlled, accessed and used by a focal organization and its business partners. As empirically evidenced in this study, it can be depicted as a latent construct consisting of three distinct dimensions of information custody, information ownership and right to data access. Likewise, the study also indicates that supply chain self-organization, as a second-order construct, consists of three interactive self-organization actions undertaken by specific firms participating in the triadic arrangement. Supply chain self-organization is thus produced by firms that are reciprocally interrelated and interacting, having effects on one another. Furthermore, the study also highlights that information governance creates an environment for applying decentralized information technologies, which then positively affects supply chain self-organization. Finally, the research also empirically operationalizes the construct of network performance within the transitive service triads.

Although the results provide several major contributions to theory and implications for practitioners, the study still demonstrates some methodological constraints. Specifically, although the study uses a relatively large research sample of 350 transitive service triads, it still focuses only on a selected group of industries and is limited to investigating solely a particular type of service triads.

Given the increasing interest in investigating triads, this study examines how information governance and decentralized information technologies support supply chain self-organization to yield network performance in transitive service triads.

Fresh product loss rates in supply chain operations are particularly high due to the nature of perishable products. The purpose of this paper is to maximize profit through the contract between retailer and supplier. The optimized prices for the retailer and the supplier, taking the fresh-keeping effort into consideration, are derived.

To address this issue, the authors consider a two-echelon supply chain consisting of a retailer and a supplier (i.e. wholesaler) for two scenarios: centralized and decentralized decision making. The authors start from investigating the optimal decision in the centralized supply chain and then comparing the results with those of the decentralized decision. Meanwhile, a fresh-keeping cost-sharing contract and a fresh-keeping cost- and revenue-sharing contract are designed. Numerical examples are provided, and managerial insights are discussed at the end.

The results show that the centralized decision is more profitable than the decentralized decision; a fresh product supply chain (FPSC) can only be coordinated through a fresh-keeping cost- and revenue-sharing contract; the optimal retail price, wholesale price and fresh-keeping effort can all be achieved; and the profit of a FPSC is positively related to consumers’ sensitivity to freshness and negatively correlated with their sensitivity to price.

This research is based on the assumption that demand is relatively stable. It has not addressed when demand is stochastic.

The findings would be useful for managers in fresh food sector in terms of how to deal with suppliers in order to maximize total profit while also provide freshest food to the customers.

Few studies have considered fresh-keeping effort as a decision variable in the modelling of supply chain. In this paper, a mathematical model for the fresh-keeping effort and for price decisions in a supply chain is developed. In particular, fresh-keeping cost-sharing contract and revenue-sharing contract are examined simultaneously in the study of the supply chain coordination problem.

From the quantum game perspective, this paper aims to study a green product optimal pricing problem of the dual-channel supply chain under the cooperation of the retailer and manufacturer to reduce carbon emissions.

The decentralized and centralized decision-making optimal prices and profits are obtained by establishing the classical and quantum game models. Then the classical game and quantum game are compared.

When the quantum entanglement is greater than 0, the selling prices of the quantum model are higher than the classical model. Through theoretical research and numerical analysis results, centralized decision-making is more economical and efficient than decentralized decision-making. Publicity and education on carbon emission reduction for consumers will help consumers accept carbon emission reduction products with slightly higher prices. When the emission reduction increases too fast, the cost of emission reduction will form a significant burden and affect the profits of manufacturers and supply chain systems.

From the perspective of the quantum game, the author explores the optimal prices of green product and compares them with the classical game.

It is necessary to implement green supply chains. But green development needs to be gradual and coexist with ordinary products in the market. This paper aims to study the green and ordinary product pricing and green decision-making under chain-to-chain competition.

This paper considers consumers' multiple preferences and takes two competitive supply chains with asymmetric channels as the research object. Through the construction of the game models involving different competitive situations, this paper studies the pricing, green decision-making and the supply chains' profits, and discusses the impact of consumer green preference, channel preference, green investment and competition on the decision-making and performance. Finally, this paper further studies the impact of the decision structure on the environmental and economic benefits of supply chains.

The results show that consumer green preference has an incentive effect on the green supply chain and also provides an opportunity for the regular supply chain to increase revenue. Specifically, consumers' preference for green online channels improves the product greenness, but its impact on the green retailer and regular supply chain depends on the green investment cost. Moreover, competition not only fosters product sustainability, but also improves supply chain performance. This paper also points out that the decentralization of the regular supply chain is conducive to the environmental attributes of the green product, while the environment-friendly structure of the green supply chain is different under different conditions. In addition, the profit of a supply chain under centralized decision is not always higher than that under decentralized decision.

The novelty of this paper is that it investigates the pricing of two heterogeneous alternative products and green decision-making for the green product under the competition between two supply chains with asymmetric channels, in which the green supply chain adopts dual channels and the regular supply chain adopts a single retail channel.