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Purpose: This chapter discusses the need for climate change risk mitigation and why it is not the responsibility of Central Banks to mitigate climate change risk.

Methodology: This chapter uses critical discourse analysis to explain why central banks should not have the responsibility for climate change risk mitigation.

Findings: This chapter argues that the responsibility for managing climate change risk should lie with elected officials, other groups and institutions but not Central Banks. Elected officials, or politicians, should be held responsible to deal with the consequence of climate change events. Also, international organizations and everybody can take responsibility for climate change while the Central Bank can provide assistance – but Central Banks should not lead the climate policy making or mitigation agenda.

Implication: The policy implication is that the responsibility for climate change risk mitigation should be shifted to politicians who are elected officials of the people. Also, international climate change organizations or groups can take responsibility for mitigating the climate change risk of member countries. Finally, citizens in a country or region should have equal responsibility for climate change. Climate information should be provided to every citizen to help them prepare for future climatic conditions.

Originality: This chapter propagates the idea that Central Banks should take a lead role in dealing with the problems of climate change. This chapter is the first chapter to contest a Central Bank-led climate change risk mitigation agenda.

The Central Bank of Argentina began its activities in May 1935 surrounded by controversy. The Bank was created as a result of a mission led by the expert from the Bank of England, Sir Otto Niemeyer. The foreign involvement in the origins of the bank was not welcome to a good part of the Argentine society. Finally, the project for a central bank approved by the Argentine Congress was not the one proposed by Sir Otto Niemeyer, but a version of it that contained crucial modifications introduced by Raúl Prebisch. The aim of this work is to highlight Prebisch’s ideas on monetary and banking matters by analyzing the differences with the ideas of Sir Otto Niemeyer around monetary policy and the characteristics of the future Central Bank of Argentina. Even if there were almost no direct debates between them, there were different visions and indirect contentions that can be traced in the writings of both, which on the side of Prebisch were published in the Revista Económica del Banco de la Nación Argentina and some government documents, and on Niemeyer’s side can be traced in some writings and correspondence regarding his visit to Argentina, held in the archives of the Bank of England.

This chapter’s goal is to define the kind of seeds to be planted for moving forward in the safe and stable drive toward a leading central banking role directed at achieving a sustained Islamic banking and finance development within the global financial system. The system witnessed the input of Islamic banking with its fruitful contribution as a feasible banking structure in both implementing agreed reforms and shaping the next steps directed toward crisis prevention and crisis resolution.

The adopted approach is based upon scientific conceptual basis as well as the practical experience related to the central banking role and Islamic banking evolution. This chapter will define the strategic role of Central Banks and highlight the conceptual basis governing the leading role of central banks as well as the practical basis derived from our central banking and Islamic banking experience.

In light of the conceptual and practical basis for enabling an efficient and effective role of Central Banks as a regulatory body in shaping the future of the Islamic Financial System. Legal, institutional and managerial strategic determinants for this role have been defined.

The analytical work of this chapter crystallises in a pioneering initiative the main determining factors governing the role of central banks as the main regulatory body for Islamic banking, and how this role could be effective in affecting the future role to be played by the Islamic banks in the global financial system. Also, to this end, the integrated required role by central banks, public policies, multilateral institutions and Islamic banks are illustrated.

Energy and cooperative hard work and commitment from all players, including the regulators of Islamic banks supported by public policies, international and multilateral institutions and members of the Islamic banking family is thought to be the main determining factor for transforming the Islamic banking family into one that will make the Islamic people and all humanity – through the global financial system – live with more stability, welfare and happiness.

This chapter reviews developments concerning central bank digital currencies (CBDCs). It introduces, analyzes, and discusses the potential implications of CBDCs on the existing cryptoassets landscape. The chapter also provides an overview of the different approaches to adopting and implementing this new form of money. Additionally, it compares traditional cryptocurrencies, privately issued stablecoins, fiat currencies, and CBDCs. Although vastly divergent opinions exist on digital money’s purpose, benefits, and use cases, CBDCs can provide opportunities for innovation and experimentation at a central bank and systemic level. CBDCs may pave the way for democratizing access to unbundled financial services while rethinking the overall purpose of money, monetary systems, and global business.

This chapter investigates the predictability of the European monetary policy through the eyes of the professional forecasters from a large investment bank. The analysis is based on forward-looking Actual and Perceived Taylor Rules for the European Central Bank which are estimated in real-time using a newly constructed database for the period April 2000–November 2009. The former policy rule is based on the actual refi rate set by the Governing Council, while the latter is estimated for the bank’s economists using their main point forecast for the upcoming refi rate decision as a dependent variable. The empirical evidence shows that the pattern of the refi rate is broadly well predicted by the professional forecasters even though the latter have foreseen more accurately the increases rather than the policy rate cuts. Second, the results point to an increasing responsiveness of the ECB to macroeconomic fundamentals along the forecast horizon. Third, the rolling window regressions suggest that the estimated coefficients have changed after the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in October 2008; the ECB has responded less strongly to macroeconomic fundamentals and the degree of policy inertia has decreased. A sensitivity analysis shows that the baseline results are robust to applying a recursive window methodology and some of the findings are qualitatively unaltered from using Consensus Economics forecasts in the regressions.

Traditionally, monetary policy in Latin America followed the recommendations of the missions of the monetary “doctors” who defended an independent central bank and a pro-cyclical monetary policy, adhering to the automatic adjustment of the gold standard. A key function of central banks was to support fiscal stability. The effects of the Great Depression and its aftermath in the periphery countries questioned these recommendations and gave way to a shift in monetary policy. An illustrative example is provided by the creation of the Central Bank of the Argentina Republic (BCRA) under the auspices of Raúl Prebisch, and the technical assistance missions of the United States Federal Reserve to several Latin American countries some of which were led by Robert Triffin. Prebisch actively participated in mission to Paraguay and the Dominican Republic bringing the experience he had acquired as director of the BCRA and the tools devised to adapt monetary policy to a changing external context and circumstances. The use of the discount window and exchange controls, among other instruments, was seen in this new view as necessary to pursue counter-cyclical policies and to provide support for industrialization and full employment in the periphery.