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The purpose of this paper is to review the historical background for broad-based ownership in the USA, the development of forms of employee ownership and profit sharing in the USA, the research literature on employee ownership and profit sharing and related employee participation, the development of policy and options for new policies.

It is a literature review.

There are four reasons to be interested in employee stock ownership and profit sharing today: first, employee share ownership and profit sharing can increase worker pay and wealth and broaden the overall distribution of income and wealth, a key ingredient for a successful democracy. To be a tool for reducing inequality, employee stock ownership and profit sharing must be spread more widely and meaningfully than it is today. Second, employee share ownership and profit sharing provide incentives for more effort, cooperation, information sharing and innovation that can improve workplace performance and company productivity. Third, employee share ownership and profit sharing can save jobs by enhancing firm survival and employment stability, with wider economic benefits that come from decreasing unemployment. Fourth, employee share ownership and profit sharing can create more harmonious workplaces with greater corporate transparency and increased worker involvement in their work lives through access to information and participation in workplace decisions.

Growth has been extraordinarily sluggish in the recovery from the Great Recession and has weakened in advanced countries over a longer period, leading some analysts to believe that the authors have entered a new economic era of small to modest growth. This may turn out to be true, which will increase the importance of growth-enhancing policies. The evidence that firms with employee stock ownership and/or profit-sharing perform better than others suggests that policies that extend ownership would boost the country’s lagging growth rate. The evidence that employee share ownership firms preserve jobs and survive recessions better than others suggests that policies that extend ownership could help stabilize the economy when the next recession comes down the pike.

Because there may be informational or institutional barriers about the benefits of ownership and sharing and the ways firms can introduce such programs that government can help overcome. Government has often played a role in promoting performance-enhancing work practices to enhance overall economy-wide outcomes from higher productivity and innovation, such as the long history of agricultural extension services (since 1887) to spread information on best practices in farming, and employer education on safety practices conducted by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration.

Because of the “externalities” – effects that extend beyond the firm and its members – that greater ownership/profit sharing can bring us. If employee ownership and profit sharing lead to fewer layoffs and firm closures, this can reduce recession-created drops in consumer purchasing power and aggregate demand; government expenditures on unemployment compensation and other forms of support; decreased tax base for supporting schools and infrastructure; and potentially harmful social and personal effects, such as marital breakups and alcohol abuse. Apart from unemployment, more broadly shared prosperity and lower inequality may also have wider benefits for macroeconomic growth, stability and societal outcomes, as described by a number of social scientists. To the extent the ownership and profit sharing is a public good, a nudge in policy to consider the idea makes sense.

Because it is hard to find policy options that are as bipartisan as the shares policy. In The Citizens’ Share, and in other articles and venues, the authors lay out the areas in which there is evidence or logic for in-depth development of, and experimentation with, several broad policy directions, with the details to be worked out by members of Congress based on their deliberations.

Senior management in the newly privatized water companies have been keen to secure employee commitment to the new commercial goals they are now pursuing. Considers the use of profit sharing as a rhetorical device for this purpose. The introduction of profit sharing schemes was intended by management not only to assist in the construction of a new version of organizational reality, but more particularly to communicate to organizational members the quite different ideological conceptualization of organizational purposes and activities associated with the change in status from public sector water authority to private sector water company. Reports research based on documentary evidence and interviews with managers from six of the new water companies which provides scope for comparisons between the companies high‐lighting different interpretations of the role profit sharing may play in the processes of organizational change.

I point out also that there are 1,800,000 more owner‐occupiers since 1979 — a policy fought tooth and nail by the Labour Party; that there has been a dramatic extension of share ownership as with British Telecom and an increase in the number of employee share option schemes.

Examines the implementation of profit sharing and employee ownership schemes, uses some case examples to show how the popularity of these concepts has grown over the years. Presents the results of recent research on top management views of such schemes, which show a high percentage of managers in favour of them in order to encourage employee involvement and commitment. Looks at the gains and benefits that may follow as a result of these schemes, but also warns that there may be problems too if the schemes are not properly thought out.

Recent policies designed to promote profit sharing in Great Britain are surveyed. Evidence on the extent of profit sharing in Britain is presented, and the economic impact of such schemes is assessed. It is found that there is little strong evidence to support the notion that profit sharing significantly improves either employment, profitability, productivity, investment or remuneration.

The purpose of this paper is to examine which forms of compensation are more efficient at affecting employee attitudes, thus extending efficiency wage theory from wage-based compensation to profit sharing and stock-based compensation.

Three models of efficiency wage theory were tested: shirking, turnover and gift exchange. The effects of those three modes of compensation (wages, profit sharing and stock) were contrasted for the three models of efficiency wage theory.

The findings were that raising wages is the most efficient form of compensation in the turnover and shirking models, while in the gift exchange model profit sharing and stock-based compensation may function like efficiency wages.

This is the first study of this particular issue.

The bulk of research on approved profit sharing and SAYE schemes tends to focus on the effects of their presence/absence, which says little about how effectively such initiatives are implemented, particularly with regard to different categories of employee. This paper seeks to contribute towards filling that gap through comparing responses between different categories of employee, and the relative effects of differing forms of financial participation.

The paper shows that the population for the study consisted of employees in a large (153,000 employees) retail organisation in the UK. A stratified proportionate random sampling procedure was adopted to include employees at the managerial/non‐managerial levels and in shareholder/non‐shareholder groups. A total of 1,000 questionnaires were mailed to a broad spectrum of employees and a total of 430 usable returns were received. The survey results were analysed using regression analysis.

The paper found that more junior employees are less likely to choose to actively buy into profit sharing and share ownership schemes; among workers in the lower job bands, the rewards accruing from participation in such schemes are likely to be the least, yet it is there that the effects of any undermining of collective solidarities are likely to be particularly pronounced.

The paper shows, while based on the case of a single large enterprise, this case study highlights something of the contradictions and limitations of flexible reward systems.

The paper highlights the divergent effects of individualized forms of participation. On the one hand, financial participation lengthens the reward cycle; employees will be encouraged to remain with the firm, to maximise their shareholdings. On the other hand, a greater individualisation of reward systems will undermine notions of collective solidarity; workers will have different agendas according to individual choices made regarding the scale of participation in such schemes. This central contradiction will be particularly pronounced among workers in the lower job bands, where the rewards accruing from participation in such schemes is likely to be the least, yet it is there that the effects of any undermining of collective solidarities is likely to be particularly pronounced.

Research is currently being conducted at Cardiff Business School into the impact of wider share‐ownership/profit sharing and privatisation on various aspects of employee relations (see e.g. Poole and Jenkins, 1988; Wilson and Peel, 1989; Groves, Peel and Pendlebury, 1989; Peel, Pendlebury and Groves, 1989; Matthews, 1988). The purpose of the current paper is to outline a specific aspect of this research which is investigating the impact of share‐ownership/privatisation on the ‘financial awareness’ of employees; and to outline some preliminary evidence based on detailed questionnaire returns from leading UK quoted companies.

Profit‐sharing and employee share ownership schemes have attracted great interest in the 1980s. The findings of the first phase of a Department of Employment study which involved a large‐scale investigation of British companies is reported. Details on the operation, coverage and type of scheme which had been adopted were gathered for 822 firms and extended interviews were conducted with a further 303 firms. A highly varied rate of adoption of schemes in different industrial sectors and with diverse economic and industrial relations experiences is revealed. If further advances in profit‐sharing and share ownership are considered to be worthwhile, policy initiatives should be centred on the medium and smaller companies in Britain. Considerable efforts outside the financial sector are necessary to effect any marked acceleration of profit‐sharing and share ownership. If future developments are envisaged senior management of the main types of enterprise are a vital target group. Foreign‐based companies should also be encouraged to embark on profit‐sharing or share ownership. If the advancement of more specific Inland Revenue APS schemes is to become general policy, information and advice for companies outside the financial sector is needed.

This purpose of this paper to examine how profit sharing depends on the underlying profitability of firms. More precisely, motivated by theoretical research on fair wages and unionized labor markets, profit sharing is estimated for six different profitability categories: positive, increasing, positive and increasing, negative, decreasing and negative or decreasing.

The paper exploits a high-quality linked employer–employee data set covering the universe of Finnish workers and firms. Endogeneity of profitability and self-selection of firms in different profitability categories are accounted for by an instrumental variables approach. The panel-structure of the data is used to control for unobserved heterogeneity (spell and individual fixed effects).

Profits are shared if firms are profitable or become more profitable. The wage-profit elasticity varies between 0.03 and 0.13 in such firms. However, profits are not shared if firms make losses or become less profitable. There is no downward wage adjustment.

Because of the instrumental variables approach the question of external validity arises. Further empirical research on profit sharing with an explicit focus on firm profitability is warranted. The results of the paper indicate a connection between rent sharing and wage rigidity, as suggested by union and fair wage theory.

This is the first paper to consistently estimate the extent of profit sharing depending on the underlying profitability of firms.