Search results

Over recent years an increasing amount of funds has been committed to mergers and acquisitions in the UK. Expenditure rose nearly tenfold from £2.3bn in 1983 to £22.1bn in 1988. This surge in spending has continued despite fears over economic trends, both domestic and international, and shocks in financial markets, notably the global col lapse in share values of October 1987. This monograph is essentially concerned with the events up to, and including, the first three quarters of 1989, ie, a period of two years after the crash of October 1987. Whilst the financing of mer gers and acquisitons activity is a fast moving arena, it does seem to be an opportune time to review developments to date and, tentatively, to suggest future trends in this sphere.

This paper investigates the role of method of payment in explaining the differences in returns to a bidding firm during the announcement period. The results indicate that the bidding firms’ returns are negative for equity payment bids and positive and significantly larger for cash bids. This is consistent with the view that cash‐offer announcements constitute a revelation by management of favorable new information about a firm’s future cash flows and vice versa for equity offerings. The results from this study provide an explanation of why business executives have been reluctant to issue equity even when they are raising the money to finance profitable projects like acquisitions. Executives relied on internal funds that allowed them to avoid the flotation costs of issuing new shares and the scrutiny by the financial market while limiting growth to that sustainable with internally generated funds.

This study examines the effect of credit card teaser rates on consumer indebtedness and the revenue generated by new customers.

A unique dataset from a national bank in the United States of America is utilized to employ a relatively new method called the covariate balancing propensity score matching, which measures the causal effects of teaser rates.

The results indicate that offering teaser rates improves the revenue generated by customers by indirectly increasing indebtedness. Such offers increase customers' willingness to borrow at regular interest rates that are significantly higher than the teaser rate – the “spillover effects.” Interestingly, customers who pay off their promotional balances before the termination of the promotional period borrow even more at regular rates than customers who do not pay off their balances timely.

The results can assist managers of credit card companies in measuring the value of teaser rates more accurately. Furthermore, the results have implications for public policy aimed at reducing credit card debt by enhancing the understanding of credit card customers' borrowing behavior.

To the authors' knowledge, this is the first study that documents the direct and indirect impacts of teaser rates on credit card customers' borrowing behavior and the resulting bank revenue.

Sees the objective of teaching financial management to be to help managers and potential managers to make sensible investment and financing decisions. Acknowledges that financial theory teaches that investment and financing decisions should be based on cash flow and risk. Provides information on payback period; return on capital employed, earnings per share effect, working capital, profit planning, standard costing, financial statement planning and ratio analysis. Seeks to combine the practical rules of thumb of the traditionalists with the ideas of the financial theorists to form a balanced approach to practical financial management for MBA students, financial managers and undergraduates.

The authors offer a new approach to segment credit card customers by classifying customers into two unobserved (latent) segments: opportunistic and needy.

The authors develop a finite mixture model to estimate customers’ tendency to borrow using the three alternatives available to them—promotional cash advances, regular cash advances and retail balances.

The results support the presence of at least two segments among credit card customers. The authors find that relative to opportunistic individuals, needy customers are typically more sensitive to interest rates. Additionally, the results indicate that offering promotional cash advances to current credit card customers increases their sensitivity to regular interest rates. Furthermore, the findings indicate that needy customers tend to have a higher stickiness in their debt. In the post-estimation analyses, the authors observe that needy customers generate more revenue than opportunistic customers. Interestingly, the bank does not perform well in targeting needy individuals and targets both groups with the same probability.

The authors argue that teaser rates attract at least two segments of borrowers—the “needy” segment, which is more likely to be cash-strapped, and the “opportunistic” segment, which looks at these teaser rates as an opportunity. However, banks do not observe segment membership. Hence, the authors offer a new approach to identifying these segments and show that understanding the behavior of these latent segments could help a bank target profitable customers more effectively.

Within the context of mergers and acquisitions, the purpose of this paper is to clarify the relationship between the deal initiator and various outcomes of the deal, particularly in consideration of the cash position of the acquiring firm.

Using hand-collected deal initiation data from various filings on the Securities Exchange Commission EDGAR online database, this paper performs a series of event study analyses, multivariate analyses, a Heckman two-step estimation procedure, and an instrumental variable approach to examine merger outcomes.

This paper finds that many merger and acquisition (M&A) outcomes (target and acquirer announcement returns, acquirer long-run returns, premiums, and the method of payment) are significantly related to deal initiation, particularly in consideration of the cash position of the acquiring firm. Overall, evidence is seen as consistent with the theory that “lemons” selectively approach cash-rich acquirers, often to the acquirers’ detriment.

This paper finds that target-initiated deals are not necessarily associated with poorer transaction outcomes for targets as contemporaneous studies suggest, and presents the first empirical evidence of M&A outcomes related to the deal initiator which are dependent on the cash position of the acquiring firm.

The purpose of this paper is to examine minority squeeze-outs and their regulation in Germany, a country where majority shareholders have extensively used this tool since its introduction in 2002. Using unique hand-collected data, the authors carry out the first detailed analysis of the German squeeze-out offers from the announcement to the outcome of post-deal litigation, examining also the determinants of the decision to squeeze-out minority investors.

Using unique data on court rulings and compensations, the authors analyze a sample of 324 squeeze-outs of publicly listed companies from 2002 to 2011 to carry out the first detailed analysis of the squeeze-out procedure and the post-deal litigation. The authors employ the event study methodology to assess the stock market reaction around the announcement of the squeeze-out.

Large firms with foreign large shareholders are the most likely to be delisted. Positive stock price performance increases the likelihood of a squeeze-out, but operating performance has the opposite effect. Stock prices react positively to squeeze-out announcements, in particular when the squeeze-out does not follow a previous takeover offer. Post-deal litigation is widespread: nearly all squeeze-outs are legally challenged by minority shareholders. Additional cash compensation is larger in appraisal procedures, but actions of avoidance are completed in less time. Overall, the evidence suggests that starting post-deal litigation by challenging the cash compensation offered in a squeeze-out delivers high returns for minority investors.

The lack of data concerning the identity of minority shareholders in firms undergoing a squeeze-out does not allow a proper investigation of the incentives of the different types of investors.

The paper provides evidence about the incentives of the different players in a squeeze-out offer. The findings of the paper could be helpful in assessing the impact of the squeeze-out rule. The results also contribute to the understanding of minority investors’ incentives to start post-deal litigation.

This paper provides new evidence about post-deal litigation, in particular how investors use the procedures that the system provides them to protect themselves against controlling shareholders. The paper examines all the phases of the squeeze-out procedure and challenges.

Though cross-border acquisitions have grown dramatically in value and frequency in the last ten years, little is known about returns to acquirers or their method-of-payment choice. This paper studies returns to U.S. bidders and their method-of-payment choice for acquisitions of foreign targets. Results indicate that bidder returns are higher for cash offers, for offers to private and subsidiary targets, if there is high insider ownership, and if there is high exchange rate variation. The method-of-payment choice for these bidders is linked to the target country’s legal regime and accounting standards, insider ownership, target type, and value uncertainty.

The purpose of this paper is to examine trading costs of both acquiring firms and target firms differentiated by method of payment, mode of acquisition, and deal attitude around merger and acquisition (M&A) announcements. The author calculates four spread measures of trading costs: quoted spread, percentage quoted spread, effective spread, and percentage effective spread.

Differences in spreads differentiated by M&A characteristics are calculated and two‐sample t‐tests applied. A linear regression model is developed to test whether changes in trading costs are related to acquiring firm's post‐merger price performance. The regression is estimated by OLS method.

It is found that various methods of payment affect the spreads of target firm differently on certain days around M&A announcement. For acquiring firms, significant differences are found in spreads between cash offers and stock offers, and between stock offers and mix offers. Significant difference was not found in spreads between cash offers and mix offers. The mode of acquisition affects the bid‐ask spreads of target firms only, but not those of acquiring firms. Deal attitudes affect the spreads of target firms on and after M&A announcements. It was also found that all four spread measures are significantly linked to acquiring firms’ post‐merger daily returns.

Further study can be done on mechanisms through which M&A characteristics impact trading costs.

This study suggests that M&A characteristics affect firms’ spreads and that changes in spreads need to be accounted for in explaining acquiring firms’ post‐merger daily returns.

The paper fills in an important gap in existing literature by examining trading costs of acquiring firms around M&A announcements. It provides additional evidence on the anomaly of acquiring firm's negative post‐merger returns. The paper is intended to help improve the understanding of trading costs and the behavior of the market participants in response to a major corporate event.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether ex ante board connections and director retention result in agency costs to target company shareholders in the form of reduced payment in mergers and acquisitions transaction.

The authors employ detailed data of ex ante board connection and director retention in the mergers and acquisition in the UK from 1999 to 2015. Ex ante board connections are measured as proportion of target and acquirer companies’ directors worked on the same board at any time prior to the takeover, while director retention is measured as proportion of target companies’ directors remains on board after the takeover is completed. For mergers and acquisition payment characteristics, the authors examine takeover premium, cash payment percentage and offer price adjustment.

The authors find that ex ante board connections and director retention lead to reduced offer prices and lower proportions of cash payment. Notably, when there is no connection and target directors are not retained, the authors find that the bidding companies increase their final offer by £14m more than in other scenarios. The authors also document strong evidence that ex ante board connections lead to a higher probability of director retention.

The paper highlights that ex ante board connections and director retention will lead to a significant cost on target company shareholders. The authors recommend that a more detailed set of information on ex ante board connections and intended target board retention should be disclosed.