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The chapter investigates three channels through which private benefits are hypothesized to be extracted in dual class companies: excess executive compensation, excess capital expenditures and excess cash holdings.

With a propensity score matched sample of S&P 1500 dual class and single class companies with concentrated control, the chapter analyzes the relationship between the valuation discount of dual class companies and measures of excess executive compensation, excess capital expenditure and excess cash holdings.

Executives in dual class firms earn greater compensation relative to their counterparts in single class firms. This excess compensation is more pronounced when the executive is a family member. The value of dual class shares is discounted most when cash holdings and executive compensation of dual class are excessive. Excess compensation is highest for executives who are family members of dual class companies. The dual class discount is not related to excess capital expenditures.

The research shows that the discount in the value of dual class shares in relation to the value of closely controlled single class company shares is directly related to the channels through which controlling shareholder-managers can extract private benefits.

The information of pledging stocks for liquidity by controlling shareholders of publicly traded firms in Taiwan has been required to disclose since 1998. A common perception by market practitioners in Taiwan is that stock pledging by controlling shareholders is an indication of expropriation of firms. This study first examines the determinants of the tendency that controlling shareholders of firms in Taiwan pledge their stocks to financial institutions for liquidity and then evaluates how stock pledging by controlling shareholders affects their firms' accounting and financial performances. Determinants of firm attributes, market conditions, and corporate governance are identified. The tendency of stock pledging by controlling shareholders has a negative effect on accounting and financial performances. The negative effect on firm performance is reduced when the firm has a higher level of working capital. These findings indicate that stock pledging by controlling shareholders is an indication of weak corporate governance when the firm has lower liquidity. These findings may provide insights to the equity markets of the other countries in which public firms have more concentrated ownerships.

We identify a novel concept of discretionary idiosyncratic volatility proxied by the idiosyncratic volatility component not related to the non-systematic industry volatility as a source of agency problems that have implications for firms’ cash holdings and their investment decisions. We find that firms with low discretionary idiosyncratic volatility, which likely captures discretionary effort and risk-taking by managers, have smaller cash reserves. Moreover, while high discretionary idiosyncratic volatility firms spend cash internally (internal capital building), low discretionary idiosyncratic volatility firms use it for external acquisitions, consistent with the “quiet life” hypothesis. Our findings thus indicate a need for reinforcement of existing regulations and corporate laws to control for agency costs, which could in turn reduce firm risk and the probability of financial meltdown at the aggregate level.

This study provides evidence that Chinese initial public offerings (IPOs) report better operating performance than industry peers in the pre-IPO period, and worse performance in post-IPO period compared to the pre-IPO level. We find that related party transactions (RPTs) with controlling shareholders have significant effects on the long-run performance of IPO firms. Controlling shareholders structure a large percentage of operating (non-loan) RPTs to artificially boost revenues and/or profits of their IPO subsidiaries in the pre-IPO period. However, in the post-IPO period, controlling shareholders discontinue this RPT-based earnings manipulation practice and begin to expropriate IPO subsidiaries by obtaining a large percentage of cash loans, primarily in return for profits and/or resources transferred into the IPO subsidiaries in the pre-IPO period. Finally, we find that state-controlled IPO firms with a highly concentrated ownership structure and a less independent board of directors are more likely to be expropriated by controlling shareholders in the post-IPO period through related loans.

In this paper, we investigate whether internal control and whether corporate life cycle would affect firm performance in the emerging markets of China.

We use Chen, Dong, Han, and Zhou’s (2013) internal control index on the effectiveness of internal control and Dickinson’s (2011) definition on firm life cycle. We use multivariate regression analysis.

We find that the internal control improves corporate performance. When dividing firm life cycle into five stages: introduction, growth, mature, shake-out and decline, we find that the impacts of internal control on firm performance vary with different stages. The positive impact of internal control on firm performance is more significant in maturity and shake-out stages than other stages.

Our findings would have implications for the regulators and policy makers with regards to the importance of internal control in corporate governance and the effectiveness of implementing standards and guidelines on internal control in public firms.

In addition, our findings on the various roles of internal control at different stages of firm life cycle would help managers and board of directors find more focus in risk management and board monitoring, respectively.

Although the prior literature have examined the link between internal control, information quality and cost of equity capital (Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, Kinney, & LaFond, 2009; Ogneva, Subramanyam, & Raghunandan, 2007), our study would be the first attempt to investigate the link between internal control and firm performance during different stages of firm life cycles.

In recent times, the operating landscape of Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) environment can be described as constantly changing. Their performance is more dependent on the managers' ability to implement effective control/management practices suitable for their context and operating environment. Through a multi-site case study, we examine the peculiarities of control/management practices in four SMEs in the city of Bukavu to ascertain whether and how those practices contribute to SMEs' performance. Our findings indicate the predominance of informal practices, which include coordination methods similar to the balanced scorecard, budgeting practices, cost imputation, cash monitoring and inventory management. Compared to the results from literature, these practices did not differ much from those observed in the SMEs of developed countries and are likely to contribute to performance achievement, which corroborates the proposition of the contingency theory.

This chapter investigates the role of macro corporate governance (legal and extra legal institutions) in determining the extent of ultimate excess control (i.e., the ownership-controls rights divergence of the ultimate owner) using a large sample of Asian and European companies. We find that the level of excess control is lower in countries with (1) good investor protection and better enforcement of information disclosure and (2) fairer competition laws, higher newspaper diffusion, and more regulated insider trading. Controlling for institutions subsumes the effect of firm-level determinants, as only leverage appears to be negatively and significantly related to excess control.

This paper focuses on the potential advantages of strategic investment models in examining firm investment behavior. Strategic investment models are derived from rigorous modeling techniques grounded on formal analytical models, and they have been widely applied in corporate finance and economics to examine the problem of firm underinvestment. In this paper, we present an overview of strategic investment models, including empirical applications that highlight their methodological strengths. We conclude that the empirical application of such investment models in the context of strategic management research presents research opportunities in many new directions.