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1 – 10 of over 40000Ruchi Moolchandani and Sujata Kar
This paper examines whether family control exerts any influence on corporate cash holdings in Indian listed firms. It also examines how this accumulated cash of family firms…
Abstract
Purpose
This paper examines whether family control exerts any influence on corporate cash holdings in Indian listed firms. It also examines how this accumulated cash of family firms impacts firm value.
Design/methodology/approach
The study uses dynamic panel data regression estimated using two-step system generalized method of moments (GMM) on S&P BSE 500 firms during 2009–2018 for testing the repercussions of family control on the cash levels of a firm. Further, fixed effects regression has been employed for the valuation analysis.
Findings
Estimation results showed that family control negatively impacts cash holdings in Indian firms. Further, the cash accumulation by family firms adversely affects the market valuation of the firm. These findings signal a principal–principal (P-P) agency conflict in Indian family firms, i.e. friction between family owners and minority shareholders' interests. Minority shareholders fear that a part of the cash reserves will be used by family members for personal benefits. Thus, they discount cash reserves in family firms.
Originality/value
The study adds to the determinants of corporate cash holdings in emerging markets. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first study from India investigating family control as a determinant of cash policy. It sheds light on the P-P agency conflict in Indian family firms. P-P agency conflict is less researched in cash holdings literature as opposed to the principal–agent managerial disputes. Also, the study uses a more comprehensive definition of family control rather than just considering the ownership as used in prior cash holding research.
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Sang Ho Kim and Yohan An
This paper aims to investigate the impact of the separation between control and cash flow rights (control-ownership disparity) on the earnings management practices of Chinese…
Abstract
Purpose
This paper aims to investigate the impact of the separation between control and cash flow rights (control-ownership disparity) on the earnings management practices of Chinese firms. The notable features of Chinese firms are those of concentrated ownership and the severe disparity that exists between the control and cash flow rights of controlling shareholders.
Design/methodology/approach
This study measures the level of Chinese firms’ earnings management by adopting two different methods of measurement: accrual-based earnings management (AEM) and real activity earnings management (REM). The authors also consider the possible trade-off effects between these two types of measurements. The data set in this study encompasses over 2,000 Chinese firms, using data from 2003 to 2015.
Findings
The results indicate that controlling shareholders are more likely to engage in AEM as their cash flow rights are more concentrated, while they are less likely to use REM as the disparity of control-cash flow rights increases. Further, this inverse relationship between REM and control-cash flow rights disparity becomes more pronounced in the case of a low cash flow rights group. As REM generally causes distortions in firms’ operations, it is possible that the controlling shareholders are more likely to constrain the use of REM as the disparity is perceived to grow. This result may indicate a reduced agency problem between controlling and minority shareholders due to the developing and/or existing ownership dispersions, which are mainly driven by recent reforms applied to Chinese capital markets. However, we do not entirely exclude the possibility of other types of expropriations by the controlling shareholders. It appears that the controlling shareholders are still able to exert a significant level of control, even following a substantial ownership dispersion, and they may seek alternative expropriation methods, including but not limited to intercorporate loan or related party transactions as the disparity of control-cash flow rights increases.
Originality/value
Although the Chinese economy is experiencing a series of reforms to infuse market forces into capital markets, little has been known about the effects of ownership-control disparity in Chinese firms. Our findings highlight the importance of the country specific context in this vein of research.
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Fabrizio Rossi, Robert Boylan and Richard J. Cebula
The purpose of this study is to investigate the relationship between financial decisions and ownership structure by using the control contests on a sample of Italian listed…
Abstract
Purpose
The purpose of this study is to investigate the relationship between financial decisions and ownership structure by using the control contests on a sample of Italian listed companies.
Design/methodology/approach
The analysis adopts a balanced panel data set of 984 firm-year observations for the period of 2002-2013, with estimation using a generalized method of moments.
Findings
The results appear to confirm both the hypotheses of the alignment of interests and the entrenchment effect. The entrenchment and alignment effects are not found to be alternatives but rather are found to co-exist. The presence of a coalition of minority shareholders acts as a tool to control agency costs, particularly when the coalition is instrumental in the contestability of corporate control.
Practical implications
These findings suggest that minority shareholders may have a larger impact than previously identified by strategically aligning with other shareholders to form coalitions. This study provides several practical implications. First, dividend payout is not necessarily a good instrument to control and monitor agency costs. This is because the payout can be used to expropriate benefits from the minority shareholders. Second, high ownership concentration does not always reduce agency costs. Third, a non-collusive coalition can be more useful in the monitoring of agency costs than other tools, such as the debt level.
Originality/value
This study shows that there is considerable value to the firm when individual blockholders come together in a contestable environment and become instrumental in making business decisions. The results support the contention that contestability is an excellent deterrent to dampen the expropriation of benefits to minority shareholders. This study also provides evidence that cash holding can be a good substitute for dividends and debt in the effort to limit agency costs.
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Ben Amoako-Adu, Vishaal Baulkaran and Brian F. Smith
The chapter investigates three channels through which private benefits are hypothesized to be extracted in dual class companies: excess executive compensation, excess capital…
Abstract
Purpose
The chapter investigates three channels through which private benefits are hypothesized to be extracted in dual class companies: excess executive compensation, excess capital expenditures and excess cash holdings.
Design/methodology/approach
With a propensity score matched sample of S&P 1500 dual class and single class companies with concentrated control, the chapter analyzes the relationship between the valuation discount of dual class companies and measures of excess executive compensation, excess capital expenditure and excess cash holdings.
Findings
Executives in dual class firms earn greater compensation relative to their counterparts in single class firms. This excess compensation is more pronounced when the executive is a family member. The value of dual class shares is discounted most when cash holdings and executive compensation of dual class are excessive. Excess compensation is highest for executives who are family members of dual class companies. The dual class discount is not related to excess capital expenditures.
Originality/value
The research shows that the discount in the value of dual class shares in relation to the value of closely controlled single class company shares is directly related to the channels through which controlling shareholder-managers can extract private benefits.
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The information of pledging stocks for liquidity by controlling shareholders of publicly traded firms in Taiwan has been required to disclose since 1998. A common perception by…
Abstract
The information of pledging stocks for liquidity by controlling shareholders of publicly traded firms in Taiwan has been required to disclose since 1998. A common perception by market practitioners in Taiwan is that stock pledging by controlling shareholders is an indication of expropriation of firms. This study first examines the determinants of the tendency that controlling shareholders of firms in Taiwan pledge their stocks to financial institutions for liquidity and then evaluates how stock pledging by controlling shareholders affects their firms' accounting and financial performances. Determinants of firm attributes, market conditions, and corporate governance are identified. The tendency of stock pledging by controlling shareholders has a negative effect on accounting and financial performances. The negative effect on firm performance is reduced when the firm has a higher level of working capital. These findings indicate that stock pledging by controlling shareholders is an indication of weak corporate governance when the firm has lower liquidity. These findings may provide insights to the equity markets of the other countries in which public firms have more concentrated ownerships.
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Qian Wang, Xiaobo Tang, Huigang Liang, Yajiong Xue and Xiaolin Sun
In public firms, the largest shareholder can make decisions on cash dividends in favor of its own interests at the expense of other investors. While the second largest shareholder…
Abstract
Purpose
In public firms, the largest shareholder can make decisions on cash dividends in favor of its own interests at the expense of other investors. While the second largest shareholder can actively participate in corporate governance and protect the interests of investors, its impact has not been fully understood. This research investigates how shareholding ratio and ownership type of the second largest shareholder moderate the relationship between controlling shareholder's shareholding ratio and cash dividends.
Design/methodology/approach
The authors conducted econometrics analysis based on a panel data of China's A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2017.
Findings
The authors find that the controlling shareholder's shareholding ratio has a significant negative impact on cash dividends. However, this influence is conditional on the shareholding ratio of the second largest shareholder. The negative impact is weakened when the second largest shareholder holds a large proportion of shares or when the shareholding gap between the second largest and the controlling shareholder is small.
Originality/value
This research extends the existing literature by highlighting the nuanced moderating effect of the second largest shareholder on the relationship between the controlling shareholder and cash dividends, thus making a unique contribution to the understanding of corporate governances in the emerging financial market in China.
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Jin Ho Park, Kwangwoo Park and Ronald Andrew Ratti
The purpose of this paper is to examine the effect of controlling shareholders’ ownership of firms on the firms’ financial constraints in 22 economies for the 1982-2009 period.
Abstract
Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to examine the effect of controlling shareholders’ ownership of firms on the firms’ financial constraints in 22 economies for the 1982-2009 period.
Design/methodology/approach
The authors employ a generalized method of moments-based instrumental variables estimator to estimate empirical models.
Findings
It found that the overinvestment propensity of controlling shareholders becomes less severe with an increase in cash-flow rights. It further indicates that a higher deviation between the control rights and cash-flow rights of controlling shareholders lower their overinvestment propensity, thereby lowering the firm’s financial constraints.
Originality/value
The results suggest that a higher protective legal environment for minority shareholders blocks the entrenchment of controlling shareholders and thus benefitting the firm with slackened financing constraints in the given legal origin.
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Johnny Jermias, Yuanlue Fu, Chenxi Fu and Yasheng Chen
The purpose of this study is to examine the design and implementation of enterprise risk management (ERM) in three large Chinese state-owned enterprises and to develop…
Abstract
Purpose
The purpose of this study is to examine the design and implementation of enterprise risk management (ERM) in three large Chinese state-owned enterprises and to develop propositions on integrating ERM, budgetary control system and cash flow stability approach.
Design/methodology/approach
This study adopts a field study approach to analyze the risk assessment and risk-return matching of ERM. A field study was carried out over three years from 2008 to 2011 in three Chinese state-owned enterprises. These companies were chosen because less attention has been given to the implementation of ERM in such firms.
Findings
First, the authors find that all three companies use budgetary control to identify risks, analyze each risk to determine the potential consequences, determine the acceptable levels of risk, develop a risk mitigation plan and monitor the activities in all business processes that may change the levels of risks continuously. Second, the companies focus on cash flow risks through budgetary control to ensure the stability of cash flows. Finally, the degree of intensity of using budgetary control institutionalization to design and implement ERM has a positive impact on the level of risk acceptance and risk assessment culture.
Research limitations/implications
The findings of this study, however, should be interpreted with caution because this study was conducted in three Chinese state-owned enterprises. To increase the generalizability of the findings, future research is encouraged to replicate this study in different industries, as well as in different countries. Furthermore, future research might also examine the authors’ propositions using a large-scale survey across other regions of the world.
Practical implications
Companies can minimize resistance to change by using budgetary control institutionalization when implementing the ERM. State-owned enterprises can initiate and implement a new risk management system by identifying the potential risks and by developing a risk mitigation plan.
Social implications
The results of this study will help companies, particularly state-owned enterprises, to improve their performance and become more competitive, which in turn will benefit the society as a whole by performing their risk driver identification, risk driver impact assessment, risk management actions and risk management optimization more effectively.
Originality/value
The authors investigate how the firms use a legitimate system, namely, budgetary control, that is widely accepted and used in China to foster the acceptance and use of ERM. The authors also develop testable propositions of ERM implementation and cash flow stability that will provide useful guidelines for future research.
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SIDE by side with a steady reduction in the natural resources of the world there is a rapid increase in the amount of information available on almost every subject. Every year…
Abstract
SIDE by side with a steady reduction in the natural resources of the world there is a rapid increase in the amount of information available on almost every subject. Every year human beings generate more knowledge in the social, economic and scientific fields. So vast is the flood that the task of finding relevant information on a particular subject at the right time is of a magnitude impossible to imagine fifty years ago.
A self‐help guide to achieving success in business. Directed more towards the self‐employed, it is relevant to other managers in organizations. Divided into clear sections on…
Abstract
A self‐help guide to achieving success in business. Directed more towards the self‐employed, it is relevant to other managers in organizations. Divided into clear sections on creativity and dealing with change; importance of clear goal setting; developing winning business and marketing strategies; negotiating skills; leadership; financial skills; and time management.
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