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The purpose of this paper is to critically analyze the adverse effects of cartels on the economy and the interests of consumers and how they are sought to be regulated under the Indian Competition Act, 2002.

The paper focuses on the definition of cartels and the various factors conducive for the promotion of cartels and how they are sought to be regulated in the select jurisdictions with the help of decided case laws. It also sheds adequate light on the deficiencies of the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices (MRTP) Act, 1969 in curbing cartels and how such deficiencies are sought to be remedied under the Competition Act, 2002. The paper further highlights the new trends and investigative tools in busting of cartels in the developed world and the salutary lessons that could be drawn by the competition regimes of the developing countries.

The paper discloses that the earlier MRTP Act, 1969 as well as the prevailing Competition Act suffers from various flaws in curbing cartels, resulting in the feeble regulation of cartels with all attendant baneful consequences on the economy and consumer interests. The paper strongly advocates the need to treat cartels as criminal offences warranting prosecution and punishment apart from encouraging leniency and whistle blowing for facilitating the busting of cartels.

The paper identifies the potential difficulties and intricacies that could be encountered by the competition authority in addressing the cartels owing to shortcomings in the Competition Act, 2002. Hence, the paper articulates that these concerns should be addressed by the legislature at the earliest for further strengthening the regulatory mechanism over cartels in the interests of economy and consumers.

The subject focused in the paper is a topic of utmost contemporary importance having wide implications on the national economies across the world, calling for novel methods and techniques in dealing effectively with the menace of cartels.

This study aims to investigate whether firms involved in a major corruption scandal, with broad ramifications across several emerging and advanced markets, design the content of their corporate codes of conduct to either improve corporate ethical standards and practices or merely manipulate the impression of stakeholders.

This study adopts an impression management perspective. It uses content analysis techniques to examine the codes of conduct adopted by seven Brazilian engineering and construction multinationals accused of corruption. The analysis covered five major themes: (1) forms of corruption, (2) values or principles, (3) interested parties, (4) procedures and routines and (5) punitive action.

The study provides detailed evidence that the codes of conduct adopted by these firms are mere artifices that aimed at meeting legal requirements but do not target the relevant corporate audience involved in grand corruption. At best, such a code may impede petty and bureaucratic corruption.

This research contributes to improving the understanding of how Latin American multinationals adopted codes of conduct after a major scandal and how they failed—at least to some extent—to design codes complying with established corporate governance principles. It shows that management manipulated the impression of stakeholders by selectively adopting or omitting certain terms, examining or concealing various issues and addressing mainly petty crimes rather than grand corruption. It also identifies areas where Western ethical values conflict with established practices and cultural norms in Latin America.