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This paper gives a model of collusion formation and a method of measuring the degree of it among the traders/bidders in the agricultural commodity markets in India. The important assumption is that the bidding is repetitive with a set of common bidders. The theory has been derived based on the behavior of the wholesale market of agricultural commodities in India. The paper is based on full information in the collusion formation. The paper first derives the theoretical structure of the bidders' behavior and thereafter derives a measure of collusion formation with the help of real-life data.

The paper used the standard theory of optimization and the theory of auction and probability statistics.

This is a complete information model of cartel formation. The bidding is repetitive and continues forever in discrete time. Hence bidders behavior is observable. Using the proposed method, if the APMC measures for each market and publishes on a periodic basis, say weekly basis, then it will be easier to break the collusion in the market where relative collision is present. For example, if a farmer has three options to sell in three different markets, then the published data would help them to select the market where the degree of collusion is relatively lower. Moreover, the undesirable loss can be avoided based on the right choice of market. As a result, transaction costs will be optima.

The paper first derives the theoretical structure of the bidders' behavior and thereafter derives a measure of collusion formation with the help of real-life data.

This study aims to investigate the implications of natural gas rents and institutions as co-drivers of economic growth, focusing on the Gas Exporting Countries Forum (GECF) with panel data between 2001 and 2021.

This research paper uses a specialised two stage estimator, the panel instrumental variable technique (panel IV), which takes care of the potential endogeneity issues in the model.

The findings show that natural gas rent significantly impacts the economic growth of the GECF. On average, natural gas rent increases the sample’s growth rate by about 2.634% percentage points in the short run. The result indicates that the qualities of institutions (political and economic) have a significant positive long-term effect on the economies of the GECF. In addition, the study’s energy price volatility positively correlates with the countries’ growth.

There might be a need to investigate the effects of natural gas rents and institutions as co-growth drivers in each country within the GECF. The likelihood exists that the impact of natural gas rents and institutions on economic growth at the country’s level may differ from the outcome of such an experiment on the group level. Because of space and time limitations, this study could not carry out the specific country’s investigation of natural gas rents and institutions as a co-growth driver. That limitation may constitute further study to advance this study to a new height.

With good institutions, natural gas rent is likely to be an alternative growth driver for some economies that rely on fossil fuels like oil as a growth driver. By extension, the GECF has the potential to rival Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in the global energy market, particularly in achieving Sustainable Development Goal number seven. In essence, evidence in this study suggests that natural gas rent has long-term positive effects on the growth of the GECF, conditioned on good institutions. Moreover, the drive of global energy consumption towards sustainable energy usage is an economic blessing for the GECF. By extension, the demand for natural gas would continue to rise, creating opportunities to improve natural gas rents. By implication, the GECF would continue to benefit from the pursuit of sustainability as the world shifts towards energy consumption with less CO₂.

Firstly, this study models the qualities of institutions for the GECF. Secondly, to the best of the author’s knowledge, this study is the first attempt to examine natural gas rents and the qualities of institutions as co-determinants of economic growth among the GECF (a potential cartel).

This study aims to examine the nexuses between economic growth, trade openness, renewable energy consumption and environmental degradation among organization of petroleum exporting countries (OPEC) members over the period 1990–2019.

The empirical strategy for the study includes dynamic heterogeneous panel pooled mean group (PMG), mean group (MG) estimators and dynamic panel threshold regression (TR) analysis. For clarity, PMG and MG are used to explore the long-run relationship between the variables, whereas TR is used to uncover the actionable and complementary policy thresholds in the nexuses between green growth and environmental degradation.

The empirical evidence is based on the significant estimates from PMG and TR. First, using PMG, the study finding revealed a long-run relationship between economic growth and environmental degradation via the PMG estimator. Second, using TR, the study revealed an actionable threshold for carbon dioxide emissions (CO₂) metrics tons per capita (mtpc) not beyond a critical mass of 4.88mtpc, and the complementary policy threshold of 85% of the share of trade to gross domestic product, respectively.

The policy relevance of the thresholds is apparent to policymakers in the cartel and for policy formulation. The policy implication of this study is straightforward.

The novelty of this study stalk in the extant literature on providing policymakers with an actionable threshold for CO₂ emissions with the corresponding complementary threshold for trade policies in the nexuses between green growth and the environment.

With the surge in public procurement, especially in developing countries, ensuring fair competition in procurement has assumed paramount importance. Academic endeavors in the domain of competition issues have often lacked the views of field-level functionaries. This study aims to involve a large number of expert practitioners in India to identify the significant contemporary competition risks in public procurement from the procurer and supplier sides and develop a model depicting the hierarchy of competition-restrictive actions (CRAs) in procurement based on their mutual interactions.

The significant CRAs along the procurement cycle are identified through literature survey, interactive workshops and expert interviews. A questionnaire survey covering 143 respondents from 12 public organizations is used to evaluate their impact. Considering the complex causal interactions involved, interpretive structural modeling followed by MICMAC (Iimpact matrix cross-reference multiplication applied to a classification analysis is used to develop a hierarchical model of competition risks in procurement.

Tailor-made contracts, splitting of a project below competition thresholds, restrictive selection criteria and awarding the contract on nomination emerge as CRAs with the highest driving power. Horizontal collusion among vendors strongly depends on practices followed in the procuring organization.

The survey data and the experts’ opinions emanate from practitioners in India, which is a limitation. However, with necessary contextual calibrations, the study is of high functional utility to policymakers and practitioners.

The research facilitates a comprehensive understanding to procurement managers/policymakers of the CRAs along the procurement cycle and their interdependencies. It offers valuable insights for improving competition, which is foundational for optimal procurement outcomes.

The study enriches the public procurement domain knowledge by identifying and assessing the significant contemporary CRAs, examining their mutual interactions and developing an interpretive structural model. Although contributing to the body of knowledge, the study is unique in being grounded in field realities.

This chapter presents a critical analysis of the wealth current practices of multinational firms as wealth predators; and relevant references from the theory of multinational corporations and globalization from a Marxist perspective. The Marxist approach has also contributed to a theory of the self-expansion of capital (internationalization of the circuits of capital) on a global scale, within an analysis of the differentiation and of inequality.

Achieving social sustainability has become a critical challenge in global supply chain networks, particularly during complex crises such as terrorism. The purpose of this study is to explore how institutional forces influence the social sustainability approaches of logistics service providers (LSPs) in high terrorism-affected regions (HTAR). This then leads to investigating how the key factors interact with Institutional Theory.

An exploratory multiple-case study research method was used to investigate six cases of different-sized logistics LSPs, each in an HTAR. The data was collected using semistructured interviews and triangulated using on-site observations and document analysis. Thematic analysis was used in iterative cycles for cross-case comparisons and pattern matching.

The findings interact with Institutional Theory and the three final-order themes. First, management processes are driven by coopetition and innovation. Second, organizational resources, structure and culture lead to an ineffective organizational design. Finally, a lack of institutionalization creates institutional uncertainty. These factors are rooted in many other first-order factors such as information sharing, communication, relationship management, capacity development, new process developments, workforce characteristics, technology, microlevel culture and control aspects.

This study answers the call for social sustainability research and enriches the literature on social sustainability, Institutional Theory and LSPs in HTARs by providing illustrations showing that institutional forces act as driving forces for social sustainability initiatives by shaping the current management processes. Conversely, the same forces impede social sustainability initiatives by shaping the current organizational designs and increasing institutional uncertainty.