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This paper gives a model of collusion formation and a method of measuring the degree of it among the traders/bidders in the agricultural commodity markets in India. The important assumption is that the bidding is repetitive with a set of common bidders. The theory has been derived based on the behavior of the wholesale market of agricultural commodities in India. The paper is based on full information in the collusion formation. The paper first derives the theoretical structure of the bidders' behavior and thereafter derives a measure of collusion formation with the help of real-life data.

The paper used the standard theory of optimization and the theory of auction and probability statistics.

This is a complete information model of cartel formation. The bidding is repetitive and continues forever in discrete time. Hence bidders behavior is observable. Using the proposed method, if the APMC measures for each market and publishes on a periodic basis, say weekly basis, then it will be easier to break the collusion in the market where relative collision is present. For example, if a farmer has three options to sell in three different markets, then the published data would help them to select the market where the degree of collusion is relatively lower. Moreover, the undesirable loss can be avoided based on the right choice of market. As a result, transaction costs will be optima.

The paper first derives the theoretical structure of the bidders' behavior and thereafter derives a measure of collusion formation with the help of real-life data.

The purpose of this paper is to show that cartel conduct is a common example of non‐compliance with competition laws and, in order to generate insight and lessons regarding aspects of corporate governance, two areas of cartel behaviour are to be analysed. The first is the extent to which employees of organisations were aware of the seriousness and illegality of their cartel conduct, and the second is the extent to which determining bodies acknowledged the presence or absence of compliance strategies within corporations being prosecuted for cartel conduct.

A measurement matrix devised from the literature was used as a methodological framework through which content analysis was conducted to explore whether cartel offenders were aware of the illegality of their behaviour and whether the presence or absence of compliance strategies was acknowledged by the court. In total, 69 publicly available investigatory outcomes sourced from 11 different jurisdictions were analysed.

The findings suggest a need for competition regulators to educate and raise the awareness of business people to improve understanding of the deleterious effects of cartels and of the provisions of relevant legislation in order to achieve better corporate governance and observance of enacted laws.

In 71 per cent of matters examined, cartel participants were found to be aware of the illegality of their behaviour and, whilst 45 per cent of Australian companies had no compliance programme in place to begin with, some other companies had established compliance programmes which were blatantly ignored by employees.

Using resource dependency theory, the purpose of this paper is to examine what elements in the business environment may be associated with the formation and continuance of cartels.

The authors employ a unique data set of 148 cartel data points from the 1970s to 2008 which have at least one American company involved to quantitatively test causal relationships. The authors also interview key class action anti-trust attorneys for their views and opinions on the impact of these environmental factors on cartel formation and continuance.

The authors find statistically significant relationships between the pursuit and maintenance of industry profits and the dynamism in the industry, and illegal behavior as represented through price fixing by business cartels. The authors find that in the attorneys’ opinion, it is also the pursuit of individual corporate profits and munificence that are associated with these cartels.

This research furthers the understanding of organizational deviance which is critical given its impact on organizations, individuals, regulators, law enforcement, and the general public.

This research is a first step in considering cartel activity in a way that encompasses external influences in a new and innovative manner and as a tool to help researchers and practitioners better understand how organizational deviance, as manifested through illegal corporate activity, can be anticipated, identified, and prevented.

The paper aims to explore the penetration of power in Mexico by drug cartels and the attendant policy challenges to address the problem.

The history of unlawful activity and cartels is discussed as well as the policy solutions being explored by the Mexican Government and its partners like the USA.

The challenges are longstanding, complex and defy simple solutions. Concerted problem solving can change conditions on the ground.

The impact of longer term initiatives to strengthen the rule of law merits further study.

Drug cartels are taking a huge toll on Mexico, particularly in terms of violence; this threatens not only Mexico but neighbouring countries as well.

The problems Mexico faces are placed in historical context and in the context of the larger international trade in illicit drugs.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the trend towards the criminalization of hard core cartel conduct and to consider the appropriateness and effectiveness of extending the criminal law to this conduct. In addition, it will consider some of the legal implications, including the exposure of directors of companies to potential racketeering charges.

The paper first examines cartel theory and the justification for prohibition. The paper then identifies the emerging trend toward criminalization of hard core cartel conduct, followed by an assessment of potential justifications for criminalization. Implications of criminalization, including the potential impact of organized crime legislation on offenders and regulators, will then be considered.

There is a clear trend towards the criminalization of hard core cartels. The paper argues that this trend is appropriate, both because of the moral culpability it attracts and because of its potential to enhance general deterrence. The paper also argues that cartel conduct, in jurisdictions in which it is criminalized, will constitute “organized crime” as defined in the Palermo Convention and, as such, expose participants to potential money laundering and asset forfeiture consequences.

This paper is of value to governments and regulators considering adoption or implementation of a criminal cartel regime and to practitioners in advising clients about potential consequences of cartel conduct within a criminal regime.

The purpose of this paper is to critically analyze the adverse effects of cartels on the economy and the interests of consumers and how they are sought to be regulated under the Indian Competition Act, 2002.

The paper focuses on the definition of cartels and the various factors conducive for the promotion of cartels and how they are sought to be regulated in the select jurisdictions with the help of decided case laws. It also sheds adequate light on the deficiencies of the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices (MRTP) Act, 1969 in curbing cartels and how such deficiencies are sought to be remedied under the Competition Act, 2002. The paper further highlights the new trends and investigative tools in busting of cartels in the developed world and the salutary lessons that could be drawn by the competition regimes of the developing countries.

The paper discloses that the earlier MRTP Act, 1969 as well as the prevailing Competition Act suffers from various flaws in curbing cartels, resulting in the feeble regulation of cartels with all attendant baneful consequences on the economy and consumer interests. The paper strongly advocates the need to treat cartels as criminal offences warranting prosecution and punishment apart from encouraging leniency and whistle blowing for facilitating the busting of cartels.

The paper identifies the potential difficulties and intricacies that could be encountered by the competition authority in addressing the cartels owing to shortcomings in the Competition Act, 2002. Hence, the paper articulates that these concerns should be addressed by the legislature at the earliest for further strengthening the regulatory mechanism over cartels in the interests of economy and consumers.

The subject focused in the paper is a topic of utmost contemporary importance having wide implications on the national economies across the world, calling for novel methods and techniques in dealing effectively with the menace of cartels.

The aim of this case study is to review the in-depth (and successful) investigation carried out in 2016 by the Italian Competition Authority [Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato (AGCM)] on a nation-wide (multi-lot) framework agreement for consulting services. We also critically assess the tender design and emphasize which dimensions may have facilitated the uncovered anticompetitive agreement.

The case study borrows from the official Antitrust Authorities’ findings and from the tender documents to paint a comprehensive picture of the cartel’s strategy.

The case study emphasizes that AGCM’s the “conjectured logic” of the cartel’s behaviour (endogenous evidence) did coincide with those pieces of evidence seized by police forces for criminal crimes at the cartel members’ premises (exogeneous evidence). This infrequent feature of bidding rings investigations underlines the importance of theoretical as well as practical analyses of cartels’ behaviour in public procurement markets.

As the antitrust investigation was triggered by a confidential report sent by the awarding authority (Consip, the Italian national central purchasing body), the case study also emphasizes the importance of informal as well as formal co-operation between awarding authorities, especially central purchasing bodies, and competition authorities.

The case study belongs to a small set of applied research papers attempting at building a bridge between public procurement design, particularly of sizeable framework agreements, and the mechanisms devised by cartels to “game” procurement procedures. All this is accomplished by looking at all design dimensions that were exploited by cartel’s members.

In a recent paper in this Journal, Z.A. Spindler has proposed a determinate solution for bilateral monopoly, taking issue with the conclusion of many microeconomics textbooks that both the equilibrium price and the equilibrium quantity are theoretically indeterminate. His analysis relates to what may be termed ‘pure’ bilateral monopoly — in which there is literally only one seller and only one buyer. In practice, however, bilateral monopoly situations frequently are characterised by the existence of some sort of cartel arrangement on one side or the other, if not on both. The purpose of this paper is to consider the circumstances under which Spindler's determinate solution applies to these more general formsof bilateral monopoly.

An important aspect of UK competition policy is the attempt to maintain competitive markets by prohibiting restrictive agreements and cartels involving price fixing, market sharing, etc., the effect of which is to suppress, limit or distort active rivalry between suppliers. Examines UK policy towards restrictive agreements, alongside similar attempts to control cartels in the European Community. Outlines the regulatory frameworks operating in the UK and EC and emphasizes particular points of interest in the application of policy control by reference to selected restrictive agreement/cartel cases. While the attack on formal “open” collusion has been highly successful, it is clear from the work of the Office of Fair Trading and the European Commission that clandestine (”covert”) collusion between suppliers remains an on‐going problem.

Since the appearance of Simon Rottenberg's seminal paper on the baseball players' labour market in the Journal of Political Economy (1956), the literature on the economics of professional team sports has increased rapidly, fuelled by major changes in the restrictive rules which had pervaded these sports, themselves a consequence of battles in the courts and the collective bargaining arena. These changes have not been limited to North America, to which most of the literature relates, but also apply to Western Europe and Australia in particular. This monograph surveys this literature covering those various parts of the world in order to draw out both theoretical and empirical aspects. However, to argue that the existence of what is now an extensive literature “justifies” such a survey on professional team sports clearly begs a number of questions. Justification can be found in at least two major aspects.