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This article investigates the intellectual roots of perestroika. Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, the architect of perestroika claims that his programmes and policies are aimed at a revolutionary transformation of the Soviet economy from an overly centralised command system of management to a democratic system based mainly on economic methods and on an optimal combination of centralism and self‐management. To facilitate the restructuring process, Gorbachev simultaneously initiated two sweeping political reforms: glasnost (no “radical change is possible without it”); and demokratizatsiya (”there is no present‐day socialism, nor can there be, without democracy”). Therefore, prominent features envisaged by perestroika would presumably include: an optimal combination between centralism and self‐management, that would imply decentralisation in the economic management of the country; replacement of administrative methods by economic methods, that would emphasise economic incentives and market processes more than machineries of central planning; democratisation and openness in Soviet society, aimed at guaranteeing greater democratic rights for citizens, and pluralism in governmental and political processes.

The purpose of this paper is to present empirical evidence on how and why a poor rural community is engaged in certain calculative practices, and how these are embedded in a “total institution” defined in terms of “relations of production” and “relations in production”.

Focusing on the traditional fishing industry in the Sri Lankan village of Kalamatiya, this study employs a qualitative, ethnographic methodology to collect and analyse data.

The underlying calculative practices are shown to resemble an articulated mode of production fabricated with some heterogeneous complexities, especially patronage relations, village cultures, and local capital and political power, rather than mere economic rationalities.

The paper argues that the notions of the “total institution” and the “articulated MOP” can inform accounting researchers to conceptualise research sites beyond the organisation as a novel “field” for empirical studies.

Extensions/applications/revisions of the Marxian vision of socialism can broadly be categorized into two polar strands: the centralized and the decentralized strands of socialist economic systems. Explores the main postulates of a decentralized version of a socialist economic system as provided by Kautsky, Luxembourg, Bernstein, Bukharin and Lange. The centralized strand of socialist economic systems has been elaborated drawing mainly from the writings of Lenin, Trotsky, Dobb, Sweezy and Baran.

This paper explores the sociological, economic, and political reasons for the collapse of Venezuela's 40-year “pacted” democracy, the eight-year conflict between the country's new president and the opposition, where this conflict has led Venezuela, and what its prospects are for the near future. It proposes that the collapse of Venezuela's “ancien regime” can best be understood by an examination of the impact the rise and fall of oil prices had on its economy, society, and polity. A 20-year economic decline led to the election of Hugo Chavez, a radical outsider, who refused to play along with the country's old political class. This class, in turn, refused to accept Chavez as the legitimately elected president and launched the country on an eight-year roller-coaster ride of counter-revolution and radicalization, which recently ended with the reelection of Chavez and a massive popular endorsement for the establishment of “21st century socialism” in Venezuela. Exactly what such a project means is still unclear, but it so far involves state support for self-managed workplaces and an anti-capitalist and participatory democratic state in the midst of a still functioning capitalist economy. With the apparent defeat of obstacles that are external to the Bolivarian movement, as the pro-Chavez movement is called, such as the domestic opposition and U.S. intervention, the movement is now forced to confront its internal obstacles, such as clientelism, corruption, and personalism, if it is to succeed in the long run.

This paper aims to investigate the possibility of a methodological error made by the concerned scholars and academics of Islamic finance & economics to understand and study the modern framework of financial institutions, where they intend to practice Islamic law of contract. This error has led them to expect something which the institutional modern framework of banks, adopted by Islamic banks (for e.g.), wasn’t designed to accomplish, hence the disappointment.

This study reviews the literature on history of evolution of banking industry and the corresponding ideological and cultural changes in the European society which drove this evolution; this is followed by a conceptual analysis to identify the institutional components inconsistent with ethos of Islamic norms and ethos.

After review of history and evolution of modern banking framework, in the light of Hollingsworth frame of institutional analysis, it is inferred that the said framework was designed for a secular, liberal and capitalist society to efficiently and effectively enhance freedom and accumulate capital and wealth, without much regard for equitable distribution of wealth and economic justice. These goals are very much in contrast with the normative premise of Islamic Economics, which cannot be efficiently used to achieve the related objective. This indicates that framework of banking was narrowly understood by the concerned scholars and academics, without considering its history of evolution and intended objectives, before adopting for IBs.

The disconnect between the Western institutional framework and ethos of Islam implies that the concerned need to look deeper and holistically while adapting Western institutions, so that necessary alteration is done in advance, if such an adoption is inevitable.

This study introduces a new dimension for the concerned scholars, academics and practitioners to reanalyze the institutional framework adopted from the West, so that necessary adjustments can be worked out to make the said framework compatible with the ethos of Islamic economics.

Like the quixotic character that never knew that he was speaking all through his life in pure and simple prose, Gandhi never realized that what he was preaching and practicing throughout his life was in fact the basic principles and theories that could be subsumed under the contemporary discipline of political economy (PE). Gandhian political economy (GPE) is replete with many of the characteristics of classical and Marxian political economy and these are mentioned at relevant places throughout this work. It also assimilates some of the major features of contemporary heterodox political economy, in particular, the class analysis of Neo‐Marxism; gender, ethnicity and class analysis of Feminist political economy; the analysis of justice, ethics and institutional trust of social political economy; the analysis of the significance of institutions and institutional change of the institutional‐evolutionary political economy; and the importance of the interdisciplinary focus on contemporary issues like development and international political economy.

Aims to explore the possibility of developing a neoclassical theory of institutional failure, based on “transaction costs”. Critically assesses the role of institutions in General Equilibrium theory and concludes that, with the exception of the market (price mechanism), this is institution‐free. This is unsatisfactory, given the importance of the firm and the state, in particular, which have received wide attention recently in the theory of transaction costs. It is claimed that General Equilibrium theory can be given microfoundations based on transaction costs. This provides the possibility of a neo‐classical theory of institutional failure. It also has important implications on the nature and scope of economic theory in general and the plan versus markets debate in particular.

Analyses the economics of socialism within the Marxian tradition. The ideas of Marx and Engels are included, as are those of the theorists of the Second International. The debate on market socialism associated with Oskar Lange also receives attention. The evolution of Mises′s and Hayek′s responses is traced, and there is an outline of how economists in Eastern Europe have come to similar conclusions to these Austrians. Concludes with an assessment of the economics of socialism in the work of contemporary theorists.

In the original history of the socialist calculation debate (e.g., Bergson, 1948), Oscar Lange proved that bureaucrats can find the equivalent of equilibrium prices through trial and error. In the revised history of this debate (e.g., Caldwell, 1997; Lavoie, 1985), Lange proposed an erroneous solution to the calculation problem. Dynamic entrepreneurial rivalry moves prices toward equilibrium. Lange and other “Market Socialists” allies thought only in terms of a static competitive market equilibrium that excludes the role entrepreneurs play in adjusting prices.

Analyzing how the post-Soviet transition interacts with the crisis of market finance exhibits a new “greed-based economic system” in the making. Asset grabbing is at its core and hinders capital accumulation. All the various privatization schemes have triggered off asset grabbing, asset stripping, and asset tunneling. A global contagion of such behavior has spread the power and cohesion of managers/shareholders (oligarchs) worldwide. Financial asset grabbing is less straightforward, though much widespread, and operates in financial markets through new financial products, securitization, firms buying their own shares, hedge funds, stock price manipulation, short selling, and the distribution of stock options.Shadow banking, and more generally a global informal economy, results from grabbing strategies in financial markets that breach the formal rules of capitalism. In alleviating and circumventing the rules, the oligarchy paves the way for economic malpractices and crime, calling capitalist laws into question.In such context, systemic greed underlies unconstrained maximization of relative wealth, for which asset grabbing is a rational means, in a winner-take-all economy. At the present stage of our research, a greed-based economy cannot yet be theoretically defined as a transition either to a new phase of capitalism or to another different system.