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This study aims to understand how quickly Japanese banks readjust their capital ratios (leverage, regulatory capital, tier-I capital and common equity) following an economic shock.

This study uses a two-step system GMM framework to test the study's hypotheses using the annual data of Japanese commercial and cooperative banks ranging from 2005 to 2020.

The findings show that banks adjust their leverage ratio faster than regulatory capital, tier-I capital and common equity ratios. In addition to that, the results reveal that the speed of capital adjustment is higher for commercial banks than for cooperative banks, suggesting higher economic costs and implications for commercial banks. Furthermore, it is worth noting that well-capitalised (under-capitalised) banks tend to prioritise the adjustments to common equity (leverage) before considering the adjustments to leverage (common equity). According to the results, high-liquid (low-liquid) banks alter their regulatory capital and tier-I capital ratios (leverage) more quickly (more slowly) than low-liquid (high-liquid) banks.

The findings suggest that when formulating and implementing new banking regulations, particularly in assessing and adjusting specific capital requirements under Pillar II of Basel III, management (including bankers, regulators and policymakers) should consider the heterogeneity observed in the rate of capital adjustment across various bank characteristics. Additionally, bank managers should also consider the speed of adjustment when determining optimal half-life and target capital structures.

To the author's knowledge, this study represents a pioneering investigation into the rate of adjustment of capital ratios (leverage, regulatory, tier-I and common equity) within Japan's banking sector. The study employs a comprehensive dataset encompassing both commercial and cooperative banks to facilitate this analysis. A notable contribution to the existing body of literature, this study offers a detailed analysis and emphasises the varying degrees of adjustment in capital ratios. The study also highlights the heterogeneous nature of the adjustment rate in these ratios by categorising the data into well-capitalised, under-capitalised, highly liquid and low-liquid banks.

This paper aims to investigate the determinants of capital structure of non-financial firms in Iran.

This paper reviews different conditional theories of capital structure to formulate testable propositions concerning the determinants of capital structure of Iranian companies. Pooled ordinary least squares and panel econometric techniques such as fixed effects and random effects are used to investigate the most significant factors that affect the capital structure choice of manufacturing firms listed on Tehran Stock Exchange Iran during 2003-2007.

The results of the study suggest that variables such as firm’s size, financial flexibility, asset structure, profitability, liquidity, growth, risk and state ownership affect all measures of capital structure of Iranian corporations. Short-term debt is found to represent an important financing source for corporations in Iran. The results of the present research are consistent with some capital structure theories.

In general, the results provide evidence that the five theories discussed influence emerging markets. Due to the existence of a negative relationship between profitability and capital structure, investors must consider capital structure before making investment decisions.

This study has laid some groundwork to explore the determinants of capital structure of Iranian firms upon which a more detailed evaluation could be based. Furthermore, the empirical findings will help corporate managers in making optimal capital structure decisions.

To the authors’ knowledge, this is the first study that explores the determinants of capital structure of manufacturing firms in Iran by using the most recent data. Moreover, this paper provides a theoretical model to explain the mechanism of how the ownership structure impacts debt financing.

This paper aims to offer a comprehensive comparison of the characteristics between banks that securitize and banks that do not and to provide evidence of the capital arbitrage theory of securitization.

First, the fundamental financial similarities and differences between banks that securitize assets and banks that do not participate in the securitization market are tested. Second, variables that help predict whether a bank securitizes assets are analyzed. Third, the determinants of securitization extent in banks that securitize assets are investigated – for general securitization extent and for specific type of asset securitized. Using a sample of 112 banks that securitize different assets, a matched sample of banks that do not securitize based on entity type and size is created. A quarterly panel data set of these banks dating back to 2001 is used.

The results indicate that bank size is a significant determinant of whether a bank securitizes. Further, overall securitization extent is negatively related to the bank's capital ratio (in support of capital arbitrage theory), but this result is primarily driven by credit card securitization.

Utilizing a unique data set of quarterly data from bank Call Reports; the panel data set is large relative to past studies. A matched sample approach was used to test fundamental financial similarities and differences between securitizing and non‐securitizing banks. In addition to aggregated securitization, an examination was made of how different classes of assets affect the banks' risk‐based capital ratios and test the capital arbitrage theory of securitization.

To raise the quality of regulatory capital, Basel III capital rules recognize unrealized gains and losses on all available-for-sale (AFS) securities in Common Equity Tier 1 Capital (CET1). However, by examining the correlations between U.S. GDP growth rate, interest rates and regulatory capital ratios computed using Basel III regulatory capital definition for six U.S. global systemically important banks (G-SIBs) since 2007, this chapter finds that Basel III regulatory capital will enhance the pro-cyclicality of Basel III leverage ratio and Tier 1 capital ratio and their sensitivity to long-term interest rates. Therefore, Basel III capital standards may have significant implications for bank supervision and bank capital risk management in the near future. As banks will hold more high-quality liquid assets (HQLAs) as required by Basel III Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR), the weight of unrealized gains and losses arising from fair value accounting will increase in Basel III Tier 1 capital base, the consequent increase of pro-cyclicality in a bank’s regulatory capital ratios may distort the true picture of bank capital adequacy. If an expected loss approach (EL) is used as the provisioning model, such capital risk may be increased further. Moreover, as U.S. monetary policy has started tapering quantitative easing, long-term interest rates will increase inevitably. This may increase the negative impact of unrealized gains and losses on AFS securities on bank capital. As a result, it may be difficult for banks to maintain appropriate capital ratios to meet regulatory requirements and support business activities.

This study aims to determine how Basel III capital requirements affect the stability of Islamic banks globally during the global financial crisis and the COVID-19 pandemic.

The secondary data for all Islamic banks worldwide from 2004 to 2021 is obtained from the FitchConnect database. The main technique was a two-step generalized method of moment (GMM) system, and the data were tested using pooled ordinary least squares, fixed effects and difference GMM models for robustness checks.

Regression results support the moral hazard hypothesis based on evidence that both the total capital ratio and the Tier 1 capital ratio have a statistically significant positive impact on the stability of Islamic banks globally. Furthermore, neither the global financial crisis of 2008–2009 nor COVID-19 (2020–2021) significantly impacted the stability of Islamic banks worldwide. The results are robust across alternative measures of stability, capital buffers, dummy variables and estimation techniques. According to the descriptive statistics, the number of Islamic banks that disclose their regulatory capital ratios to the public has increased over the study period, and the mean of total capital and Tier 1 ratios are considerably greater than what is required by Basel II and Basel III.

Bankers, regulators and policymakers should benefit from the evidence on capital and risk management in Islamic banking according to Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) and Islamic financial services board (IFSB) international standards in various jurisdictions.

This research builds on earlier studies that were both beneficial and instructive by exploring the relationship between BCBS and IFSB capital guidelines and the trustworthiness of Islamic banks in greater depth. This study uses numerous capital ratios, buffers and stability measures to provide an international context for research on Islamic banking. In addition, the database is up-to-date to include information about the COVID-19 pandemic aftereffects in the year 2021. This study also introduces the Basel membership of Islamic banks to provide context for countries still at the Basel II stage or are yet to begin implementing the Basel III international standard.

In September 2009, G20 representatives called for introducing a minimum leverage ratio as an instrument of financial regulation. It is supposed to assure a certain degree of core capital for banks, independent of the controversial procedures used to assess risk. The paper aims to discuss these issues.

This paper discusses the interaction and tensions between the leverage ratio and risk-based capital requirements, using financial data of the Swiss systemically important bank United Bank of Switzerland.

It can be shown that the leverage ratio potentially undermines risk weighting such that banks feel encouraged to take greater risks.

The paper proposes an alternative instrument that is conceived as a base risk weight and functions as a backstop. It ensures a minimum core capital ratio, based on unweighted total exposure by ensuring a minimum ratio of risk-weighted to total assets for all banks. The proposed measure is easy to compute like the leverage ratio, and also like the latter, it is independent of risk weighting. Yet, its primary advantage is that it does not supersede risk-based capital adequacy targets, but rather supplements them.

This paper compares the performance of the big four UK banks and four Australian banks between 2004‐2009. The banks are chosen according to the total assets as listed in The Banker magazine 2009. The purpose is to analyse why UK banks were more vulnerable to the financial crisis of 2007‐2009 than Australian banks. The consequence of this study is what improvements can be made in relation to liquidity, leverage, loan to deposit, asset quality and capital ratios.

The author adopts an empirical approach and gathers data from the annual reports of the big four UK banks and Australian banks and the database “Factiva” and the Financial Times. The data contains liquidity, debt, capital, asset quality and profitability ratios during 2004‐2009.

The author's data show UK banks had on average higher cash ratios, higher leverage ratios, higher loan to deposit ratios, higher capital ratios, lower asset quality, lower ROA but higher ROE than the Australian banks.

The results support the findings in the Financial Development Index 2011 of the World Economic Forum. UK banks should ameliorate its ranking on financial stability by improving the quality of loans and capital.

The analysis is of use to regulators who are contemplating the need for reforms aimed at improving financial ratios of banks. Basel III Accord has introduced some recommendations but has its limitations.

This paper's value lies in providing analysis of the top four UK and Australian banks' performances during 2004‐2009. There is room for improvement in providing a more stable financial environment in the UK.

The purpose of this paper is to examine firms' strategies to change long‐ and short‐term debt financing in Egypt. It aims to examine a list of capital structure determinants that include the basic assumptions of the three well‐known theories of capital structure: tradeoff, pecking order, and free cash.

The paper utilizes the properties of partial adjustment model for three heterogeneous systematic risk classes: high, medium and low. The sensitivity analysis is carried out using the “extreme bound analysis”.

The results indicate that Egyptian firms adjust short‐ and long‐term debt according to the class of systematic risk; long‐term debt is a source of financing at all classes of systematic risk; firms have obvious tendency to extent short‐ to long‐term one; medium risk firms adjust long‐term debt according to the industry average debt, and depend heavily on long‐term debt financing; firms depend significantly and constantly on the liquidity position to adjust short‐term debt levels; and medium risk firms are relatively affected by the basic assumptions of free cash flow and low‐risk firms are relatively affected by the assumptions of the pecking order theory.

In general, the results provide evidence that the three theories have transitory effect from developed markets to transitional markets. In addition, the firm‐specific variables (industry characteristic, size and time) provide an additional support to the robustness of the results.

Few, if any studies, have been carried out in Egyptian data.

The purpose of this study is to investigate the impact of leverage, regulatory capital and tier-I capital ratios on the ex ante and ex post risk of Japanese banks.

To test the hypotheses, the authors have implemented a panel of 507 commercial and cooperative banks of Japan over the period extending from 2001 to 2020, using a two-step system Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) framework.

The overall sample banks' results show that the impact of leverage, regulatory capital and tier-I capital ratios on ex ante and ex post risk is positive. The findings reveal that the effects of regulatory and tier-I capital ratios on ex post risk are negative (positive) for commercial (cooperative) banks, high-liquid, low-liquid and high-growth banks in Japan. In addition, the regulatory capital ratio is more beneficial for risk due to its power to absorb losses. The lagged coefficient indicates that banks require more time to adjust their ex post and ex ante risk during crisis period than during normal economic conditions.

The heterogeneity in results has practical implications for regulators, policymakers and bank managers in formulating the capital requirement guidelines with respect to ex ante and ex post risk across different categories and characteristics of banks.

To the best of the authors' knowledge, this is the first study investigating the impact of leverage, regulatory capital and tier-I capital ratios on the ex ante and ex-post risk of Japanese commercial and cooperative banks over the period from 2001 to 2020. The insights into the impact of leverage, regulatory capital and tier-I capital ratios on the ex ante and ex post risk of well-capitalized, under-capitalized, high and low-liquid banks are new in the context of Japan.