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This paper is about apparent failure in an aspect of financial regulation: non‐compliance with regard to taxation. An idealised compliance model of tax advice, from the Inland Revenue perspective, merely involves application of revenue law to the facts to determine fiscal liabilities. A less compliant approach involves, for example, creative accounting to amend figures and so reduce such liabilities. The focus here, however, is on legal creativity to reduce or even cancel tax bills: just how tax advisers match, mismatch or rematch their clients' facts interactively with malle‐able interpretations of both revenue and other laws. Following classification of various tax devices — with three examples for each of five categories — recurrent concepts, themes and techniques of avoidance are then further analysed. This analysis not only confirms that legal creativity makes compliance problematic but also offers a novel exposition of just how that paradoxical use of the law occurs.

This study investigates whether corporations consider shareholder-level taxes when setting corporate distribution policy. I investigate the relation between the tax-rate differential on dividend and capital gains income and its effect on firms’ distribution policies. I find that firms consider shareholder-level taxes and that this association varies with the percentage of the firm owned by individual shareholders. Hence, firms increase share repurchases and decrease the percentage of total corporate payout in the form of a dividend as the tax-rate differential increases. Thus, an increased substitution effect occurs as capital gains become relatively more tax-advantaged compared to dividends. Furthermore, I find a positive association between the percentage of the firm owned by individual investors and the percentage of total corporate payout distributed as a repurchase. These findings are consistent with personal income taxes influencing managerial decisions regarding the payout of excess corporate funds.

This article aims to report the results of research into the effect of expanding the traditional models for valuation of simple securities to include the effect of taxation of the cash flows from investing and the possibility of bankruptcy of the issuer.

The models developed use the same techniques as the textbook models but lead to conclusions that are novel.

In particular, the models suggest that reducing the tax rate on capital gains does not always benefit bondholders and shareholders. For common stock the changes in both market value and realizable value depend not only on the change in tax rate, but also on the growth rate of the dividend stream.

The models presented follow the textbook models, so they assume stationary conditions. Future research should examine the case of conditions that may be mean‐reverting but are not stationary.

The immediate practical implications are in the domain of public policy, where the debate over the effect of tax changes has been based on overly simplified models.

Investment companies dominate U.S. equity markets, both in terms of the large proportion of equity capital they control and the sizable trading volume they generate. This shift in the ownership of U.S. equity securities could lessen the impact of changes in U.S. capital gains tax policy which are aimed at individual investors. This paper examines the effect of capital gains tax rates on investment company capital gains realizations. Empirical tests on cross-sectional, time-series data provide evidence of an unlocking effect of lower marginal capital gains tax rates. Investment companies exhibit economic response behavior consistent with the lock-in effect characteristic of individual investors. Capital gains realized are higher during periods of low marginal capital gains tax rates. The significant permanent tax effects estimated in the analysis are strengthened when transitory effects are introduced into the model.

The purpose of this paper is to give an updated overview over the development of employee-ownership in Italy, France, Spain including Mondragon, the UK and the US with relatively many employee-owned firms. How have the barriers for employee-ownership been overcome in these countries?

The overview is based on updated descriptions of the development of employee-ownership included in this special issue. The analysis follows the structure of overcoming five barriers: the organization problem; the problem of entry and exit of employee-owners; the startup and takeover problem; the capital- and the risk problem.

Italy, France and Spain have overcome the barriers by specific legislation for worker cooperatives, this includes rules for entry and exit of employee members. Cooperative support organizations play an important role for monitoring and managing the startup problem and for access to capital. The Mondragon model includes individual ownership elements and a group structure of cooperatives. The EOT and ESOP models are well suited for employee takeovers, financing are eased by tax advantages and they are all-employee schemes. While the EOT has no individual risks, the ESOP model has the possibility for capital gains for employees but also the risk of losing these gains.

Comprehensive and updated overview of the development in employee-ownership in the five countries to identify successful formats of employee-ownership for implementation in countries with few employee-owned firms.

Sees the objective of teaching financial management to be to help managers and potential managers to make sensible investment and financing decisions. Acknowledges that financial theory teaches that investment and financing decisions should be based on cash flow and risk. Provides information on payback period; return on capital employed, earnings per share effect, working capital, profit planning, standard costing, financial statement planning and ratio analysis. Seeks to combine the practical rules of thumb of the traditionalists with the ideas of the financial theorists to form a balanced approach to practical financial management for MBA students, financial managers and undergraduates.

Capital Gains Tax (or an equivalent charge to Corporation Tax) applies to any profit derived from the disposal of any interest in property. Any gain accruing on disposal (or other chargeable event) is computed under specific and detailed rules provided for in taxation legislation. Because of the variety of circumstances which can arise on the disposal of an asset (transactions otherwise than at arm's length, certain deemed disposals, disposals involving the receipt of premia etc), special problems can be encountered in assessing the amount of tax due. Such a problem is the assessment of capital gain for taxation purposes on assets whose lives have limited duration. These are known as wasting assets and include leasehold interests in property which are terminable interests with (usually) zero residual value. This paper examines the problems connected with the valuation of short leaseholds (ie, leases with less than a 50‐year term to run) and demonstrates that the specific and detailed rules for the valuation of these interests for the purpose of assessing capital taxation are at best inadequate and potentially inequitable.

We use the 1995 IRS Public Use Tax File in simulation models to examine the factors associated with the widely anticipated growth in the alternative minimum tax (AMT). The evidence suggests that the changes in the marginal tax rate structure associated with the 2001 and 2003 tax legislation are likely to result in exponential growth in AMT incidence and create a substantial hidden marriage tax penalty, a result contradictory with the intent of these tax law changes. The evidence further suggests that the elimination of preferential long-term capital gain rates for the AMT could effectively fund structural changes in the AMT that would substantially reduce the impact of the AMT on middle and lower income taxpayers, many of whom are liable for the AMT due to the add-back for AMT purposes of such non-tax preferential items as Schedule A adjustments and personal and dependency exemptions.

Several studies have observed that stocks tend to drop by an amount that is less than the dividend on the ex-dividend day, the so-called ex-dividend day anomaly. However, there still remains a lack of consensus for a single explanation of this anomaly. Different from other studies, this dissertation attempts to answer the primary research question: how can investors make trading profits from the ex-dividend day anomaly and how much can they earn? With this goal, I examine the economic motivations of equity investors through four main hypotheses identified in the anomaly's literature: the tax differential hypothesis, the short-term trading hypothesis, the tick size hypothesis, and the leverage hypothesis.

While the U.S. ex-dividend anomaly is well studied, I examine a long data window (1975–2010) of Thailand data. The unique structure of the Thai stock market allows me to assess all four main hypotheses proposed in the literature simultaneously. Although I extract the sample data from two data sources, I demonstrate that the combined data are consistently sampled. I further construct three trading strategies – “daily return,” “lag one daily return,” and “weekly return” – to alleviate the potential effect of irregular data observation.

I find that the ex-dividend day anomaly exists in Thailand, is governed by the tax differential, and is driven by short-term trading activities. That is, investors trade heavily around the ex-dividend day to reap the benefits of the tax differential. I find mixed results for the predictions of the tick size hypothesis and results that are inconsistent with the predictions of the leverage hypothesis.

I conclude that, on the Stock Exchange of Thailand, juristic and foreign investors can profitably buy stocks cum-dividend and sell them ex-dividend while local investors should engage in short sale transactions. On average, investors who employ the daily return strategy have earned significant abnormal return up to 0.15% (45.66% annualized rate) and up to 0.17% (50.99% annualized rate) for the lag one daily return strategy. Investors can also make a trading profit by conducting the weekly return strategy and earn up to 0.59% (35.67% annualized rate), on average.

The purpose of this paper is to examine housing speculation in Auckland, New Zealand, the second most unaffordable market in the world.

The study considers rental property purchases from 2002 to 2016 within the Auckland region. The authors apply a simple cash flow model that emulates the before-tax investment calculations used during purchasers’ due diligence. From this model, the authors determine whether purchases involved speculation on capital gains or not and the authors estimate the degree of speculation at the transaction level.

The authors find that housing speculation in Auckland is endemic and its housing market is a politically condoned, finance-fuelled casino with investors broadly betting on tax-free capital gains.

Although political leaders have decried that the “speculation-driven housing bubble in Auckland is a social and economic disaster”, the government’s main anti-speculation tool – the Income Tax Act’s intention test – sits idle and inoperable. By holstering this key policy tool, politicians foster housing speculation and use residential property investment to buttress New Zealand’s asset-based welfare system.

The authors develop novel methods to objectively distinguish speculators from genuine investors, measure the speculative pressure applied by individual rental property purchasers and outline an evidence-based approach to operationalise New Zealand’s currently impotent anti-speculation tool, the intention test.