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The aim of this chapter is to argue that charisma is a collective representation, and that charismatic authority is a social status that derives more from the “recognition” of the followers than from the “magnetism” of the leaders. I contend further that a close reading of Max Weber shows that he, too, saw charisma in this light.

I develop my argument by a close reading of many of the most relevant texts on the subject. This includes not only the renowned texts on this subject by Max Weber, but also many books and articles that interpret or criticize Weber’s views.

I pay exceptionally close attention to key arguments and texts, several of which have been overlooked in the past.

Writers for whom charisma is personal magnetism tend to assume that charismatic rule is natural and that the full realization of democratic norms is unlikely. Authority, in this view, emanates from rulers unbound by popular constraint. I argue that, in fact, authority draws both its mandate and its energy from the public, and that rulers depend on the loyalty of their subjects, which is never assured. So charismatic claimants are dependent on popular choice, not vice versa.

I advocate a “culturalist” interpretation of Weber, which runs counter to the dominant “personalist” account. Conventional interpreters, under the sway of theology or mass psychology, misread Weber as a romantic, for whom charisma is primal and undemocratic rule is destiny. This essay offers a counter-reading.

The purpose of this chapter is to examine the proliferation of scientific management and then to consider its effect on business and society. Our examination begins with a brief survey of various management approaches that emerged in the early twentieth century. We focus on Frederick Taylor, the originator of scientific management, as the person with the greatest influence on management scholarship. We assert that the propagation of scientific management in all sectors of business and society is so pervasive that is it ubiquitous, making it exceedingly difficult to consciously detect or question. We examine how core ideas from scientific management have facilitated the dehumanization of stakeholders in management scholarship and practice. We then discuss how dehumanizing tendencies — informed by the hidden ubiquity of scientific management — have permeated research in corporate social responsibility and management theory. We conclude with suggestions for integrating humanity into management theory.

In this chapter, we review how scenes theory can be related to civic participation and how the relationship differs across Seoul, Tokyo, and Chicago. The discussion begins with the major Western theory of Tocqueville/Putnam that participation drives legitimacy. However, it can be briefly relativized by introducing alternative paths. These ideas link to results from Kim (Kim, S. 2008) that show different paths for legitimacy and trust according to different political development and different cultural structure in the society. As shown in Fig. 1 of Chapter 2, most of Northwest Europe and North America supports Model 1: more participation leads to more trust. Obversely, Latin Americans have such low participation and trust that even if participation “works” for a few it misses the great majority. However, the model grows more complex when we shift to Korea, Portugal, and Eastern Europe, as the participation to trust path coefficient falls to zero: no impact. For some subgroups, the coefficient even becomes negative (Model 4). How can we codify these results and link them to our cumulative theorizing? This question cannot be answered with a simplistic generalization. Instead, we need to introduce a different conceptual framing to ask where and why and how much this happens.

In this chapter, we try to suggest various propositions to explain differences in civic participation in the three cities by using various concepts related to scenes.

We propose that institutional actors do not just ceremonially comply with the cultural values in their environment, as institutional theorists have suggested. Instead, we argue that institutional actors can use conflicting cultural values as tools to further their interests and, in doing so, affect significant social problems and cause unanticipated changes in their core goals and policies. To present support for that proposition, we describe an epidemic of work disability that occurred in the Netherlands between 1967 and 1988. The epidemic is examined in light of conflicting Dutch cultural conceptions of the meaning of work and the meaning of economic security in the welfare state. The behavior of key institutional actors, including the government, medical institutions, employers, and labor unions, is examined to identify their roles in the epidemic. We assert that, by pursuing its own interests while upholding Dutch cultural values, each institutional actor produced conditions in which the work disability epidemic could occur.

Examines the history of the Illuminated, a secret society founded by Adam Weishaupt in Bavaria, on 1 May 1776, which aimed to overthrow civil and religious institutions with the claim that the ends justify the means. Looks at Karl Marx and the links with the Illuminated's doctrine and also compares the Illuminated's ideas with the teaching of Smith. Concludes that although the Illuminated may have been activated by the most altruistic of motives, their search for the good society was doomed from the start.

Examines the relationship between economics and culture. Discusses the role of Protestantism, Calvanism and Catholicism in the affluency of societies. Refers to the article by D.J. O′Neil in this issue which discusses the works of Horace Plunkett, Edward Banfield and George Foster, who applied Weberian analysis of culture to the problem of societies which fail to become affluent. Compares Marxist and Weberian theories of society and economics.

Schmoller reserves his admiration for those entrepreneurs who succeeded in the acquisition of wealth but whose primary goal was the promotion of the public interest. Such individuals as List, Steiner, Geibel, Abbe and von Mevissen are of this sort. Schmoller is lavish in his praise of them. Schmoller is critical of the natural economy of Adam Smith where each individual is activated by his own self‐interest. Schmoller sees in the higher law a guide to human behaviour. Moneymakers are not necessarily men of great talent. For this reason Schmoller prefers the man who is driven by the pursuit of idealistic goals. Schmoller′s historical approach to the political economy, one shared by some in the Western world, is to be contrasted with the view that the best type of social order permits the individual to pursue his self‐interest and that such a pursuit is in keeping with the social interest.

The entrepreneur, in one form or another, has been around a long time in both economic theory and empirical studies of entry. Argues that these traditions have exhibited an over‐concern with the entrepreneur′s function at the expense of the supply of entrepreneurs, an area which has received only sporadic attention in the literature. It is this supply aspect which is critical to economic development and economists should now devote more attention to it.

Capitalism, religion and science (including calculative sciences such as accounting) have a long and turbulent relationship that, today, is manifest in the “War on Terror”. As social ideologies, religion and science have played a sometimes decisive influence in the history of capitalism. What can one learn from these past encounters to better understand their relationship today? This paper explores the historical origins of this relationship as a struggle over the ideals of the Enlightenment: – as decline of the modern and the rise of the postmodern. The paper begins by tracing the evolution of Christianities and their different potentials in both resisting and accommodating the extant social order. Islam, in contrast, has,until recently, enjoyed a relatively sheltered existence from capitalism, and today, some factions present a militant stance against the market and the liberal democratic state. Overall, the Enlightenment and modernist projects are judged to be jeopardy – a condition fostered by orthodox economics and accounting ideology, where it is now de rigueur to divide the secular from the non‐secular, the normative from the positive, and the ethical from the pragmatic or realist. Finally, the mechanisms behind this Enlightenment regression are examined here using literary analysis, as a modest prelude to developing a new politics for a progressive accounting; one that seeks to restore the integrity and probity of the Enlightenment Ideal.