Search results1 – 2 of 2
This paper aims to propose a strategy to analyze management governance in China.
This paper incorporates data on 989 Chinese listed firms over 2006 to 2016. A fixed effects model with panel data and an F-test are applied to exploit the relationship between management ownership and firm performance. A threshold model is introduced to explore the impacts of other governance mechanisms on management governance.
This paper finds an inverted U-shaped relationship between management ownership and firm performance. Furthermore, the threshold model demonstrates that large shareholders strengthen the positive effects of management governance and attenuate its negative effects; board size strengthens the positive effects of management governance but cannot attenuate its negative effects; and independent directors attenuate the negative effects of management governance.
This paper indicates that increasing management ownership could motivate managers to ameliorate the agent’s moral hazard problem which link the firm value premium when management ownership is less than 20.286 per cent. However, equity incentives are very rare in China. Thus, the authors expect that equity incentives will be a common phenomenon in Chinese listed firms.
This paper contributes to corporate governance literature by shedding some light on management ownership to explore the effects of management ownership. Specifically, this paper explores the effects of management ownership on firm performance and the impacts of other governance mechanisms on management governance to shape the management governance in China.
Transformations taking place in China are of crucial importance in the development of the world economy. The international community is turning its attention to China's…
Transformations taking place in China are of crucial importance in the development of the world economy. The international community is turning its attention to China's move towards a market economy and assessing the likely impact on the years ahead. This paper aims to plot the evolution of administrative reforms in China with particular reference to the state (and therefore public sector), because the modernization of the state is an issue that will persist into the future, and because the state itself was driving the country's transformation towards a market economy in a deliberate way.
The paper revisits the debate on administrative reforms at different levels, i.e. fiscal, budgeting, government organizations, and public sector units (PSUs). In addition to reconstructing the evolution of norms and procedures as part of deliberate strategies by the center, the paper also investigates how actual practices at the micro level have followed this process of reform, with reference to the administration of cultural heritage at the municipal level, based on a field research project.
A lack of understanding of the role played by actual accounting transformation seems to characterize the current debate on policies. Serious discrepancies can be found between expectations and actual changes; between macro and micro policies, and micro practices.
An holistic focus on various trend of reforms is taken, looking at debates that are usually separated, also linking them to actual changes in accounting practice.