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The purpose of this paper is to investigate the impact of basel accord on the Bangladeshi bank performance including Islamic banks and the role of subordinated debt (sub-debt) as basel regulatory capital (BRC).

The authors conducted the empirical investigation by adopting a quantitative approach and using the secondary data available in the annual reports of the sample banks between 2009 and 2018. This paper develops an econometric model to compare and analyze the regression result under two states of capital-to-risk adjusted assets ratio (CRAR) with sub-debt and CRAR without sub-debt. This paper analyzes the impact of sub-debt in the largest Islamic bank for the year 2007 as a case study for endorsing the findings.

This paper finds that CRAR has positive alignments with return on equity (ROE) and cash dividend when sub-debt is considered as Tier 2 capital. This paper observes that the huge bad loan write-off supports to downsize the asset size thus temporarily enhance the return on assets (ROA). In a nutshell, sub-debt gives banks an ill incentive to disburse steady cash dividends instead of injecting genuine equity capital, encouraging them to take more credit risk. In fact, more private commercial banks (PCBs) issued huge sub-debts between 2009 and 2018 under a unique arrangement, which the authors termed as the “sub-debt trap.”

This paper draws policy implications for the banking regulator to identify and rectify a systemic problem of the “sub-debt trap” which hinders the regulatory purpose from the implementation of basel accord II and III. A limitation of this study is the authors shed analytical light on Bangladeshi banks, i.e. it a single country analysis which may not be generalized to other developing countries except matching with a similar context.

The paper contributes to accumulating empirical studies on the effectiveness of basel accord implementation in developing countries. In most of the developing countries, where institutional loopholes are a major concern, the research provides evidence that how weak institutional settings are largely responsible for harvesting the potential benefit from micro-prudential regulation such as the basel accord. To shed analytical light on developing country context, the study document that sub-debt has been instrumentalized to maintain minimum capital ratio and banks managers tends more focus on improving ROE instead of ROA. The findings of the study are supportive to other developing countries where sub-debt considered as BRC and issued through private placement. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, it is the first attempt to cast doubt on the impact of sub-debt as a BRC, given the uniqueness of the Bangladeshi banking industry, on the PCBs including Islamic banks.

The purpose of this study is to explore the inherent instability, if any, in the context of investment in stocks of environment friendly companies (or the “green” stocks) across the globe using the time series momentum (TSM) trading strategies.

Using the monthly data for the Green Indexes from the USA, the Europe and the Asia-Pacific region over 2003-2019, the authors construct TSM trading strategies to examine the efficacy of regional Green Indexes as well as two diversified global green portfolios to offer abnormal return to attract investors, particularly speculators. The authors’ explore further whether such strategies could operate as hedging instrument. A comparison of results across different regions helps the authors establish a universal nature, if any, of investment in green stocks.

The study finds that regional Green Indexes are unable to outperform the market. The global green portfolios perform significantly better. The inefficacy of the relevant time series momentum trading strategies rules out the possibility of speculations. However, the number of profitable momentum strategies is significantly higher for the diversified portfolios in longer run. The portfolios perform significantly better in outperforming the buy-only strategies as well. The stable market, escalated demand and the resulting increment in valuation of green stocks make adoption of greener technologies a choice rather than a forced obligation. This offers a solution to the problem of Tragedy of Common.

Sustained increase in investment in green stocks is crucial from an environment perspective, as better valuation of their stocks would indubitably convince firms to reduce their carbon footprints. A continued enthusiasm however would require investors’ faith in it. Presence of momentum profit would invite speculators leading to irrational exuberance, dwindling confidence and consequent fragility. Literature on green investment is relatively sparse with the threat of its vulnerability issues left largely unnoticed. The authors’ study fills these gaps.

The academic literature has examined why bank runs happen based on the work of 2022 Nobel Prize-winning economists Diamond and Dybvig. They have found the source of banking/financial crisis in terms of mismatch between liabilities (deposits being short term and savers wanting to short-term access to their money) and assets (long term and illiquid). The Lakshmi Vilas Bank (LVB) crisis intensified when it came under Prompt Corrective Action (PCA) of the Reserve Bank of India (RBI). This situation provides the opportunity to study whether the elements embodied in the theoretical models like Diamond and Dybvig hold true for LVB crisis. This study aims to examine the reasons for the demise of LVB in India using DuPont financial model, peer group analysis and time series structural break in crucial financial parameters.

The study examines the reason for insolvency of LVB using financial ratios, financial models (DuPont), financial distress model (Z-score) and asset-liability management. The study also adopts univariate structural break models using quarterly financial data covering the key financial measures used in the RBI’s PCA framework.

LVB crisis is like Diamond–Dybvig model, in the sense, savers requiring short-term access to their money (liquidity for their deposits) on the information of high non-performing assets, which further deteriorates the illiquid nature of loan portfolio (assets) of banks. The study finds its profit margin (net interest margin and non-interest margin) and managerial efficiency had started deteriorating since 2018. The study finds that LVB’s main weakness lies in its limited credit appraisal ability, its monitoring and weak internal controls. Lending to sensitive sectors (like real estate, capital markets and commodities) and exposure to large business groups also contributed to its weakness. The study also finds huge, elevated asset-liability mismatch, especially in the short-term maturity buckets. Using univariate econometric time series model, the study also confirms financial weakness being evident much earlier than the time when resolution was undertaken by the RBI through PCA.

The study has implications for analysing and monitoring financial distress of banks. The study also has implications for devising banking regulation and supervision.

The study brings in a perspective of the banking regulations using the application of PCA framework on a listed private sector bank. The authors combine an accounting ratio model and combine risk measures that could identify the incipient risks in a bank. The authors believe this will help in refinement of banking regulations and better monitoring mechanisms.

The purpose of this study is to analyze and forecast the financial sustainability and resilience of commercial banks of Bangladesh in response to the negative effects of COVID-19 pandemic.

Eighteen publicly listed commercial banks of Dhaka Stock Exchange (DSE) have been taken as a sample for this study. To measure the riskiness of banks' credit portfolio, nine industries of DSE have been considered to determine probable loss of revenue arising from the COVID-19 pandemic shock. Moreover, two commonly used multiple-criteria-decision-making (MCDM) tools namely TOPSIS method and HELLWIG method have been used for analyzing the data.

Based on the performance scores under TOPSIS and HELLWIG method, banks are categorized into three groups (six banks each) namely top resilient, moderate resilient and low resilient. It is found that EBL and DBBL are the most resilient banks, and ONEBANK is the worst resilient bank in Bangladesh in managing the COVID-19 pandemic shock.

This study concludes that banks with low capital adequacy, low liquidity ratio, low performance and higher NPLs are more vulnerable to the shocks caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. The management of commercial banks should emphasize on maintaining higher capital base and reducing default loans.

Resilience of the Bangladeshi banking sector under any adverse economic event has been examined by only using stress testing approach. This study is empirical evidence where both TOPSIS and HELLWIG MCDM methods have been used to make the result conclusive.

If banks solve an inter-temporal problem under adverse selection and moral hazard, then bank specific factors, regulatory and supervisory features, market structure, and macroeconomic factors can be expected to affect banks’ loan interest rates and their spread over deposit interest rates. To examine interest rate pass-through for Indian banks in a period following extensive financial reform, after controlling for all these factors, we estimate the determinants of commercial banks’ loan pricing decisions, using the dynamic panel data methodology with annual data for a sample of 33 banks over the period 1996–2012. Results show commercial banks consider several factors apart from the policy rate. This limits policy pass-through. More competition reduces policy pass-through by decreasing the loan rate as well as spreads. If managerial efficiency is high then an increase in competition increases the policy pass-through and the vice-versa. Reform has had mixed effects, while managerial inefficiency raised rates and spreads, product diversification reduced both. Costs of deposits are passed on to loan rates. Regulatory requirements raise loan rates and spreads.

Shadow banks or non-bank financial intermediaries (NBFIs) are facilitators of credit, especially in emerging market economies (EMEs). However, there are certain risks associated with them, such as their unchecked leverage and interconnectedness with the rest of the financial system. In light of this, the present study analyses the impact of the growth of shadow banks on the stability of the banking sector and the overall stability of the financial system. The authors further examine the effect of the growth of finance companies (a type of NBFIs) on financial stability.

The study employs data of 11 EMEs (monitored by the Financial Stability Board (FSB)) for the period 2002–2020 to examine the above relationships. Panel-corrected standard errors method and Driscoll–Kray standard error estimation are deployed to conduct the analysis.

The results signify that the growth of the shadow banking sector and the growth of lending to the shadow banking sector are negatively associated with the stability of the banking sector and increases the vulnerability of the financial system (overall instability). This implies that the higher the growth of the shadow banks, the higher the financial fragility. Finance companies are also found to negatively affect financial stability. These findings are validated by different estimation methods and point out the risks posed by the NBFI sector.

The extant study builds a composite index (Financial Vulnerability Index (FVI)) to measure financial stability; thus, the findings contribute to the evolving literature on shadow banks.

This paper has used account-level data of corporate and retail borrowers, assessed their credit risk through the risk-neutral principle and examined its implication on loan pricing.

It derives the capital charge and credit risk-premium for expected and unexpected losses through a risk-neutral approach. It estimates the risk-adjusted return on capital as the pricing principle for loans. Using GMM regression, the article has assessed the determinants of risk-based pricing.

It has been found that risk-premium is not reflected in the current loan pricing policy as per Basel II norms. However, the GMM estimation on RAROC can price risk premium and probability of default, LGD, risk weight, bank beta and capital adequacy, which are the prime determinants of loan pricing. The average RAROC for retail loans is more than that of corporate loans despite the same level of risk capital requirement for both categories of loans. The robustness tests indicate that the RAROC method of loan pricing and its determinants are consistent against the time and type of borrowers.

The RAROC method of pricing effectively assesses the inherent risk associated with loans. Though the empirical findings are confined to the sample bank, the model can be used for any bank implementing the Basel principle of risk and capital assessments.

The article has developed and validated the model for estimating RAROC, as per Basel II guidelines, for loan pricing that any bank can use.

It has developed the risk-based loan pricing model for retail and corporate borrowers. It has significant practical utility for banks to manage their risk, reduce their losses and productively utilise the public deposits for societal developments.

The article empirically validated the risk-neutral pricing principle using a unique 1,520 retail and corporate borrowers dataset.

After studying and analysing this case, students would be able to evaluate and understand the importance and need of an infrastructure sector in a country, its inherent risks and scope of infrastructure investment and financing in India – National Infrastructure Pipeline and the important role of Non-Banking Finance Company’s (NBFC) vis-à-vis banks in infrastructure financing in India; critically analyse and recommend alternative decisions in a business problem situation using multi-criteria decision analysis, which is a tool used for business portfolio analysis; understand and evaluate the corporate portfolio management (CPM) tools used for an optimum portfolio mix to turn around companies; identify and suggest an optimum portfolio mix to turn around a finance company using CPM assessment applied to Pidun matrix; and recommend operational and strategic levers for successful turnaround implementation by using the integrated canvas on turnaround.

On 10 May 2020, in New Delhi, India, J. Ray took charge as a full-time director of an Indian Non-Banking Finance Company – Infrastructure Finance Company (NBFC-IFC). The NBFC-IFC of the Indian Government extended long-term financial assistance to infrastructure projects in India. During the financial year (FY) 2017–2018 till FY 2019–2020, the company suffered substantial losses to the tune of US$13.7bn, with profitability experiencing a notable decline – return on assets at a negligible 0.11% and return on equity of only 0.68%.

The NBFC-IFC had a declining yield on advances at 7.05%, net interest margins (NIMs) of 2.08% against a high cost of borrowing at 7.66%, a declining loan book (by 4.35%) of US$336.27bn and a fast-deteriorating asset quality with highest ever non-performing assets (NPAs) at 19.70% of its loan book. Such financial parameters, compared with that of the industry average of banks and finance companies, meant that the NBFC-IFC Ray had taken over was fast bleeding and was on the brink of being declared a sick company. In comparison, private and other government players had profitable and much healthier financials, and Ray felt that there was a need for improvement. To make things worse, Ray got to know that the Indian Government was in the final stages of setting up a new development finance institution focused on long-term infrastructure financing in India. Ray realized the question was not only of the NBFC-IFC remaining relevant but also of its existence in the fast-evolving sector. Ray wondered what could his his integrated canvas be for a turnaround strategy that could include effective management of an optimal portfolio mix.

With a healthy capital-to-risk (weighted) assets ratio of 30.85% and a satisfactorily improved net worth of US$103.1bn, in the given Reserve Bank of India regulatory provisions for the NBFC-IFC including restrictive exposure norms and NBFC-IFC’s operational mandate prescribed by the Indian Government, Ray had to shift the product and sectorial investment of the NBFC-IFC to reduce the NPAs, increase loan book size and improve the yield of advances and its NIM to effectively turn around the company’s profitability. Ray realized that he needed his team to evaluate and select a product and sector strategy for this change.

The present case of financing investment in infrastructure is interesting for implementation in developing economies because a lack of infrastructure is a common problem and there is a necessity of achieving a more developed infrastructure system to support accelerated economic growth in these countries. This case can be used in elective courses on corporate finance strategy and corporate portfolio management for infrastructure finance companies. This case can be taught in elective courses in post-graduate and MBA programs. This case can also be included in management development programs (MDP), executive MBA programs and executive-level courses that have subjects such as corporate finance strategy, corporate portfolio management and strategy management that focus on turnaround strategies including portfolio management for banks and finance companies.

Teaching notes are available for educators only.

CSS 11: Strategy.

The case deals with an Urban Cooperative Bank situated in Ahmedabad, known as Ahmedabad Peoples Urban Cooperative Bank (APUCB). The bank had come under the scanner of Reserve Bank of India (RBI) during 2009 because of mismanagement. It had failed to resolve its liquidity crisis even after the Reserve Bank of India imposed restrictions. The Government then appointed an external administrator, Hemant J. Rindani, to resolve APUCB's liquidity crisis. The bank had started paying claims but had lost people's trust. The last option for Rindani was to liquidate the bank. Rindani was however contemplating on various other options to come out with amicable solutions like, merge with other branches or pump in fresh capital and restart the business.