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Whether a worker is an employee of a business or an independent contractor with that business is an issue that can have many significant problems. Generally, an employee is someone who works for an employer. An employee is controlled by the employer and has little discretion in the timing and performance of his tasks. According to Wilson, on the other hand, “independent contractors contract to do work and have the ability to perform the work without being subject to the control of the employer as long as they meet the expected results required by the contract (Wilson, 1999).” In short, independent contractors are independent business people who are hired to perform specific tasks. They are just like any other vendor, except they perform services rather than provide tangible goods and basically are in the business for themselves. Thus, they are not the hiring firm’s employees. They are not eligible for unemployment, disability, or workers compensation benefits (California Chamber of Commerce, 1991). There is no certain and consistent definition to distinguish an employee and an independent contractor. However, there are a number of rules that govern whether someone is an employee or an independent contractor; and each of the rules has its own characteristic in determining the issue.

Looks at the process of conducting qualitative management research. Concentrates on data collection used in fieldwork, the way in which data is analysed and the various output from the work. Uses a PhD based upon the management of group moves as a case study. Defends the overall research strategy in terms of confirmability, dependability, credibility and transferability of findings.

The concept of corporate social responsibility of the enterprise covers a vast territory! This paper proposes to limit the analysis and evaluation of this concept to three distinct aspects. The first will treat the comparatively new and evolving common law implied term in corporated into the contract of employment relating to the enterprise’s social responsibility of respect towards the employee. The second will analyse an other generically linked recent common law development in the field of the enterprise’s social responsibility of respect towards the employee, namely the implied over‐riding term. Thirdly, the novel and developing wider concept of corporate social responsibility will be addressed and assessed. Some concluding thoughts will follow.

This study models competition in local deposit markets between for‐profit and not‐for‐profit financial institutions. For‐profit retail banks may offer a superior bundle of financial services, but not‐for‐profit (occupational) credit unions enjoy subsidies from their sponsors (and exemption from federal income taxes), which allow them to capture a share of the local market. The model predicts that, at the county level, greater participation in credit unions is associated with higher levels of retail‐banking concentration. This hypothesis is supported by empirical evidence for the period 1990‐2000, but not for the most recent past (2001‐2002). The ability of credit unions to affect local banking market structure supports the presumption of current banking anti trust analysis that retail banking markets are local. Further, this study provides an empirical analysis of how local economic conditions‐income per capita and population density‐affect competition between banks and credit unions.

Investigates the differences in protocols between arbitral tribunals and courts, with particular emphasis on US, Greek and English law. Gives examples of each country and its way of using the law in specific circumstances, and shows the variations therein. Sums up that arbitration is much the better way to gok as it avoids delays and expenses, plus the vexation/frustration of normal litigation. Concludes that the US and Greek constitutions and common law tradition in England appear to allow involved parties to choose their own judge, who can thus be an arbitrator. Discusses e‐commerce and speculates on this for the future.

Ports, as one of the important links between different modes of transport within the logistics chain, have special essence since their efficiency and competitiveness will certainly have an impact on the chain, and hence the national and regional economy. Vietnam, as a developing country gradually integrating into the regional and global economy, is rationalizing its economic sectors, including transportation. In this environment, ports play a vital role for the purpose of achieving comparative advantages in the international market. However, the Vietnamese port system is burdened with outdated work practices, low efficiency and poor competitiveness compared to other ports in the region. This paper identifies some of the problems in the Vietnamese port system and proposes strategies to address them.

Argues that the gold standard is the only monetary regime consistent with the philosophy of free enterprise and assesses the contributions of Friedman, Mundell and Hayek to monetary theory as supporters of the free market but opponents of the gold standard. Critically reviews the basic ideas of each and notes that Greenspan, while apparently endorsing the gold standard, has not actually used his position as chairman of the US Federal Reserve System to move towards it. Lists some economists who support both free enterprise and the gold standard as a “vital aspect of political economy”.

Outlines the theory of public choice (i.e. the equilibrium of a formal political model based on functions: not politicians) and identifies some reasons why US politicians may actually vote for rent seeking (“pork barrel”) projects. Suggests that they include the need for election, campaign contributions and financial or non‐financial (ideological) personal gain; and considers the implications for political reforms such as term limits, rules on campaign finance etc. Discusses how the motives of individual politicians can be discovered and some additional applications of this idea.

Explores the influence of Japan’s culture on its innovative strengths and weaknesses. Indicates that Japan is good at evolutionary and process innovation but not so hot on inventing. Links this to Hofstede’s cultural dimensions, comparing Japanese with US results. Attempts to link Japanese cultural attributes to rice and its consequent agricultural system and associated human relations. Devotes a section each to Japanese collectivism, power, uncertainty avoidance, masculinity/femininity, and Confucianism. Finds that Japanese culture does not promote individuality or risk‐taking (unlike the US), but does excel at process technology.

Executive compensation packages are often valued in an inconsistent manner: while employee stock options (ESOs) are typically valued ex‐ante, i.e., before uncertain ties are resolved, cash bonuses are valued ex‐post, i.e., by discounting the realized cash grants. Such a lack of consistency can, potentially, distort empirical results. A related, yet mostly overlooked, problem is that when ex‐post valuation is used pay‐performance measures cannot be well defined. Consistent use of ex‐ante valuation for all components of a compensation package would simultaneously resolve both of these problems and provide a natural framework for the analysis of agency problems. In this paper, we perform ex‐ante valuation of cash bonus contracts as if the executive’s performance were measured by the company stock price, demonstrate how the shape of the bonus contract influences the executive’s attitude toward risk, and study the pay‐performance sensitiv ty of such contracts. We commence by demonstrating that a typical executive bonus contract with a linear incentive zone has a pay off structure equivalent to a portfolio of standard and binary European call options so that the ex‐ante contract value is given by the linear combination of Black and Scholes call and binary call prices, with the strike prices at the boundary points of the incentive zone. Assuming that a risk neutral executive can choose the level of stock price volatility by selecting a set of projects at origination, we show that bonus contract terms can dramatically affect the executive’s risk taking behavior and pay performance incentives. Our results are extended to bonus contracts with non‐linear incentive zones, and performance share contracts with vesting risk.