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This chapter examines the association between corporate governance and environmental performance. The purpose of governance mechanisms is to build trust by ensuring that corporate responsibilities, including environmental responsibilities, are met. We obtain corporate governance data from the Investor Responsibility Research Center, Inc’s (IRRC’s) governance and director database and additional corporate governance and environmental performance data from Kinder, Lydenberg, and Domini’s (KLD’s) database. Our analyses document a significant positive association between corporate governance and environmental performance. Moreover, we find that corporate governance is positively related to environmental strengths, and negatively related to environmental concerns. Our findings contribute to and extend our understanding of the relationship between governance and performance and have important implications for policy makers, managers, investors, and others.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effect of accounting conservatism (as a proxy for financial reporting quality) on the degree of financial leverage. In addition, this paper examines the impact of global diversification (as a proxy for operational complexity) on the relationship between conservatism and financial leverage.

A panel data regression analysis is conducted for the period 2000-2006. The authors utilized a two-way fixed-effects model to control for unobservable firm characteristics and time effects that may influence the firm’s decision to report conservatively.

This paper provides empirical evidence that conservatism is positively associated with the degree of financial leverage, and the influence of conservatism on financial leverage is enhanced by the degree of global diversification.

A major issue in corporate finance is the identification of variables that influence corporate capital structure choices. The evidence presented in this paper reveals that more conservative financial reporting is associated with a higher degree of financial leverage in the firm’s capital structure. This effect increases with the extent of global diversification, indicating that bondholders place a higher value on conservatism when there is more information asymmetry between stakeholders and managers caused by global diversification.

This study aims to examine the use of real activities manipulation by firms implicated in the stock option backdating scandal.

The real activity manipulation measures are as follows: abnormal R&D expense, abnormal SG&A expense, abnormal production cost and abnormal cash flow from operations. Using a sample of firms alleged to have backdated options during the period 1998-2006 and non-backdating one-on-one matched firms, a separate regression is run for each of the real activity manipulation measures (dependent variables) on backdating and other variables.

The authors report unusually low R&D and unusually low SG&A expenses among the backdating firms. They also find evidence of unusually high production costs among backdating firms compared to the matched firms.

The findings imply that backdating firms are more aggressive in the use of real activities to manipulate earnings and the use of real activities appears to be opportunistic.

The study contributes to the literature by providing evidence of the use of real activities manipulation by firms under investigation for fraud. The authors also add to the debate on whether the use of stock options as part of compensation aligns the interest of management with the interest of shareholders.

The paper aims to examine the relation between fees paid to auditors and audit quality during the period of 2000‐2003.

The paper constructs a measure of auditor profitability that is used as a proxy for auditor independence. The methodology is grounded in the notion that auditor independence is influenced by effort and risk‐adjusted fees, rather than the level of fees received from clients. Since, risk and effort are unobservable, the paper uses proxies based on client size, complexity and risk to estimate abnormal fees. Abnormal fees are derived using a fee estimation model drawn from prior literature. The paper employs two metrics to assess audit quality – the standard deviation of residuals from regressions relating current accruals to cash flows and the absolute value of performance‐adjusted discretionary accruals.

The paper documents a statistically significant negative association between total fees and both audit quality proxies over all years. These findings are robust to a variety of additional tests and several alternative design specifications. The results (pre‐ and post‐SOX) are consistent with economic bonding being a determinant of auditor behavior rather than auditor reputational concerns.

The possibility that the empirical tests do not completely capture the impact of unobserved risk cannot be ruled out, though the paper attempts to do so by employing alternative specifications and sensitivity tests.

Policy makers should note that current restrictions on the provision of non‐audit services may not sufficiently resolve the issue of economic bonding and its impact on auditor independence.

In contrast to previous studies whose results are ambiguous, the paper finds a statistically significant positive association between several measures of total fees (it uses size‐adjusted and abnormal fees) and two metrics of accruals quality in all years (2000‐2003), consistent with economic bonding being a determinant of auditor behavior rather then auditor reputation concerns.

Economic theory suggests that profits of firms in industries with higher competition are less persistent and more volatile than in industries with lower competition (Stigler, 1963; Mueller, 1977). Extending this reasoning, I hypothesize that accounting-based fundamentals are more effective in predicting performance in industries with lower competition. I find that a measure of fundamentals (Piotroski’s F-score) has greater ability to identify potentially mispriced securities in industries with lower competition. The results are robust to using a variety of competition measures and imply that industry competition is an important consideration in the application of fundamental analysis.

Many argue that the design of compensation contracts for public company chief executive officers (CEOs) is often not guided by a goal of value maximization. Yet, there is limited direct empirical evidence on the negative consequences of the proposed inefficient contracting between shareholders and CEOs. Using data on CEO bonus contracts of the S&P 500 firms, we investigate potential firm performance implications of the use of qualitative criteria such as leadership and mentoring in those contracts. We maintain that unlike quantitative criteria, qualitative criteria are difficult to define and measure on an objective basis, possibly resulting in an inefficient and biased incentive structure. Twenty-five percent of the sample observations have CEO bonus contracts that include a qualitative criterion for bonus payment determination. Our results show that employee productivity, asset productivity, capital expenditures, and future abnormal stock returns are lower for firms that use a qualitative criterion in CEO bonus contracts than those that do not. Further, contrary to the argument in prior literature that earnings management decreases with the use of subjective performance indicators in incentive contracts, we find that income-increasing accruals are actually higher when the CEO bonus contract includes a qualitative criterion. We recommend that compensation committees set concrete, measurable performance goals for CEOs, providing CEOs with better guidance and helping improve their corporate decision making.

We examine the stock market reaction to the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA) of 2017 during its enactment process, focusing on its international provisions. Consistent with extant evidence, we find lower returns for high-foreign-activity firms, indicating a negative market reaction to the international provisions overall. Considering specific international provisions, we find that the market reaction was more positive (negative) for firms likely most affected by the shift to a quasi-territorial system for taxing foreign earnings (the transition tax on existing unrepatriated earnings, the tax on global intangible low-taxed income, and/or the base erosion and antiabuse tax) than for other firms. Our findings imply that investors are able to disentangle the economic implications of complex and interactive tax law changes.

Our chapter raises serious questions about the long-term efficiency of stock prices in relation to the realized returns of the underlying corporate real assets. In our large-scale calculations that cover horizons of 10, 20, 30, 40, and 50 years, returns on corporate real assets suffer a long-term decline, and have been below the yields of 10-year Treasury bonds since 1973. Real assets that received more external financing from capital markets and institutions actually report even lower realized long-term returns. The decline in realized returns cannot be attributed to declining risks as the volatilities of realized returns have been increasing over time. These surprising results may stimulate fresh debate on the roles and long-term performance of capital markets and institutions.

We identify a novel concept of discretionary idiosyncratic volatility proxied by the idiosyncratic volatility component not related to the non-systematic industry volatility as a source of agency problems that have implications for firms’ cash holdings and their investment decisions. We find that firms with low discretionary idiosyncratic volatility, which likely captures discretionary effort and risk-taking by managers, have smaller cash reserves. Moreover, while high discretionary idiosyncratic volatility firms spend cash internally (internal capital building), low discretionary idiosyncratic volatility firms use it for external acquisitions, consistent with the “quiet life” hypothesis. Our findings thus indicate a need for reinforcement of existing regulations and corporate laws to control for agency costs, which could in turn reduce firm risk and the probability of financial meltdown at the aggregate level.