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The Telecommunications Act of 1996 led to the creation of the competitive local exchange carriers, known as CLECS (pronounced sea‐lecks). Despite a strong beginning and great optimism, between January 2000 and September 2002, almost half of the publicly held CLECS filed for bankruptcy. Though their path to bankruptcy was typical, the atmosphere surrounding the CLECS was not. They enjoyed the strong support of Wall Street analysts in the form of positive reports and buy ratings, as well as support from institutional investors in the form of investments, for much of their lives. This support may have been the consequence of the telecommunications mania that marked the late 1990s and part of 2000, or, it has been alleged, the result of unethical and possibly illegal behavior on the part of some of Wall Street analysts. Though this situation will no doubt generate a great deal of research in the coming years, this paper examines one of the most important issues that is prompted by the question: Using metrics that are readily available, could investors, analysts and other interested parties have predicted which CLECS would file for bankruptcy prior to the filings? This study attempts to respond to this question by envisioning a scenario in which an investor, analyst, or other observer learns in 2001 that three of the CLECS filed for bankruptcy in 2000. In response, the interested party reads some of the literature on predicting bankruptcy, and then uses certain of the methods described to determine which of the remaining CLECS are likely to become insolvent in 2001 and 2002.

Explores how in the USA the Telecommunications Act of 1996 was designed to usher in an era of competition in all telecommunications markets. In practice, the initial explosion of competitive local exchange carriers (CLECs) and an $87 billion publicly traded valuation has fallen instead to less than 200 CLECs and a value of only $4 billion; and has been beset by litigation over the Act and the cost standard for implementing the Act’s unbundling provisions. Reviews studies to date that attempt to determine the extent to which the prices for unbundled network elements (UNEs) have affected competitive entry into local exchange markets; presents new evidence and summarizes the effect of UNE policy on competitive entry.

Examines recent trends in local exchange competition in the US telecommunications industry. Shows that the predominant modes of operation by competitive local exchange carriers (CLECs) have been changing over time. These operating modes also vary substantially in different regions of the country. Provides a preliminary exploration of the role of potential profit in explaining the extent of overall CLEC activity. Also considers the role of prices in explaining variation in CLEC operating mode, and discuss possible additional determinants of CLEC activity that merit further investigation.

The purpose of this paper is to assess the costs and benefits of local loop unbundling with an eye toward determining whether developing countries should pursue this strategy despite the significant controversy it has generated in the USA.

The paper examines arguments for and against local loop unbundling and determines which claims make economic, legal and practical sense and which claims support stakeholders' other public policy objectives.

The paper identifies legitimate reasons for favoring and opposing local loop unbundling. However, the paper also finds false justifications, unsupported by economic and legal principles, that serve incumbents' quest for further deregulation and securing greater incentives for investment in next generation infrastructure, and market entrants' interest in exploiting margins without having to invest in infrastructure. The paper provides recommendations on how developing countries can implement local loop unbundling that balances public benefits against specific downside risks and costs borne by incumbents or market entrants.

This paper supports conditional implementation of local loop unbundling by developing countries that concludes at a future date and incorporates desirable incumbent deregulation and liberalization.

The author has received no financial sponsorship from one or more of the stakeholders to prepare this paper. This paper offers an unbiased assessment of the benefits and burdens imposed by local loop unbundling.

The purpose of this paper is to examine economic debates over the conception of barriers to entry and speculates which definitions can be applicable to the telecommunications industry, more specifically, the residential broadband market. Also, it seeks to clarify the various industrial factors that could prevent or mar the success of entry into the residential telecommunications market and it also seeks to introduce an analytical framework that can be adopted for evaluating the barriers to entry.

The approach takes the form of a literature review.

It clarifies the various industrial factors that could prevent or mar the success of entry into the residential telecommunications market and introduces an analytical framework that can be adopted for evaluating the barriers to entry.

Although market entry barriers are crucial industrial factors that influence the market share and profit of firms already in the market, very little research has specifically examined barriers in the telecommunications and broadband industry.

Creates a future history of the evolution of the US telecommunications network infrastructure, by combining a scenario approach with the tool of concept mapping to explain how optical fibre technologies became the dominant technologies in that infrastructure.

The United States Federal Communications Commission has taken action or is considering taking action on several controversial issues that arise from the growth of the Internet. In analyzing these issues, the Commission is applying a voice‐centric circuit‐switched telecommunications model that is based on an outdated view of the world and is attempting to protect a regulatorily created system of artificial prices and subsidies. The Commission has failed to come to grips with a new state of the world, characterized by packet networks and data traffic. This has led to a series of decisions that are ill‐suited to the new environment.

Sheds light on the “new” Federal Communications Commission (FCC), and its opportunity to fashion an Agenda for Reform to fulfil the 1999 Act’s vision. Submits that since the passing of the Act, some progress has, of course, been made and this progress should be recognized. Concludes there is no shortage of work to be done to bring the newly constituted Commission’s policies more in line with the realities of the pre‐competitive and deregulatory vision of the Telecommunications Act of 1996.

A federal district court injunction in Illinois will reverberate beyond the Land of Lincoln by reaffiriming policy and law for local phone competition in the USA. Chief District Judge Charles P. Kocoras reminded legislators, regulators and telecommunications executives that state regulators are to employ federal telecommunications law and policy, specifically total element long run incremental pricing (TELRIC) for unbundled network elements (UNE‐s), to administer markets for local telephone services. The genius of the decision resides in its fidelity to sedulous implementation of telecommunications statute and precedents, and by so doing, in sustaining public policy that enhances consumer welfare, stimulates investment and spurs innovation.