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Recent reports suggest that employees have concerns about their company’s leadership and ethical environment. Despite more stringent regulations, top executives are continuing to pursue aggressive financial reporting practices by managing earnings. In this study, the authors find that individuals have more significant concerns about the workplace environment when the chief financial officer (CFO) manages earnings that result in personal gain relative to when the CFO manages earnings that benefit other stakeholders (i.e., employees and investors). Further, the authors show that this negative effect of earnings management for personal gain on workplace environment quality becomes more prominent when the control environment is weak and when the CFO possesses accounting expertise. The authors add to the body of academic knowledge on financial reporting, ethical leadership, and the workplace environment. Business practitioners can use our study to inform their decisions, particularly those about financial reporting and managing the workplace environment.

This study aims to analyze the effect of top management team (TMT) expertise on real earnings management (REM) and accrual earnings management (AEM) activities in companies in Indonesia by examining a hand-collected secondary data from non-financial publicly listed companies in Indonesia in 2016 and 2017. The expertise of TMT members is measured by possession of a master’s degree, understanding and experience of managed core functional areas, and possession of accounting certifications such as CA or CPA. The results of the study show that the expertise of the members of the TMT has no influence on the activity of AEM in companies in Indonesia. Meanwhile, understanding and experience on the managed core functional areas have a positive influence on REM activities through abnormal cash flows. Possession of accounting certification has a positive influence on REM activities in companies that are in accordance with managerial entrenchment effects, as well as a negative influence on REM activities in companies through abnormal discretionary expenses that are in line with incentive-reduction effects.

The Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act calls for substantially increased government regulation. Whether those regulations are, in some sense, appropriate is a function of whether the benefits of the increased regulation exceed the costs. Those costs and benefits, however, are probably impossible to measure, at least at this early stage of the implementation of the Dodd–Frank reforms. On the other hand, financial professionals who regularly deal with governmental regulations probably have a good sense of the costs and benefits based on their own experience with other similar regulations. This chapter reports the result of a survey of high-level auditors and CFOs regarding their perceptions of the costs and benefits of the main parts of the financial regulatory reform incorporated into the Dodd–Frank legislation. It concludes that there is support among these individuals for some aspects of Dodd–Frank, but no consensus.

This study examines perceptions of auditor independence (AI) and financial reporting quality (FRQ) when former auditors are hired by public companies into accounting oversight positions under differing strengths of corporate governance. Although the Sarbanes–Oxley (SOX) mandate of a one-year cooling-off period for the hiring of former audit engagement team members into accounting oversight positions (e.g., chief financial officer) may enhance perceptions of AI, it potentially sacrifices FRQ by restricting the hiring of candidates most familiar with a particular company's industry, risks, and controls. The results of this experiment suggest when a company (i) has strong corporate governance and (ii) hires an audit engagement team member without a one-year cooling-off period, stakeholders perceive financial statement quality to be highest as compared to all other experimental conditions. Interestingly, we also find hiring a former auditor who has not cooled-off one-year results in roughly the same perception of AI as hiring an auditor observing the one-year cooling-off requirement. Collectively, results suggest stakeholders may not perceive a benefit from the cooling-off requirement as independence is not viewed as enhanced and FRQ is viewed as diminished. Requiring disclosure of auditor alumnus hires, in lieu of a mandated cooling-off period, coupled with external measures of companies’ strength of corporate governance may be sufficient to protect AI and FRQ.

Despite the need for effective global leaders on the part of business (McKinsey, 2012) and the growing body of empirical research related to the topic of global leadership (Osland, 2013a), very little is known about what global leaders actually do. How do they spend their time? In what kinds of activities are they involved? How do they communicate, coordinate, make decisions, and lead? How is their work similar to or different from that of domestic leaders? In this chapter, we respond to these questions by exploring the nature of global leaders’ work using an approach similar to Mintzberg (1973) in his classic book, The Nature of Managerial Work. We observed five global leaders from five different industries, each for 1 week, and compared our results with Mintzberg’s (1973). In addition, we conducted informal interviews and collected archival data. We content-analyzed the data using the conventions of grounded theory and identified 10 distinguishing characteristics of global leaders’ work. It is characterized by (1) multiple time zones and geographical distance; (2) long hours; (3) flexible schedules and fluid time; (4) dependence on technology; (5) time alone connected to others; (6) extensive travel; (7) functional expertise with global scope; (8) facilitation of information, advice, and action; (9) management of complexity; and (10) confrontation of risk. We conclude by discussing implications for future global leadership research.

Integrating interdisciplinary studies with Human Capital Management Accounting (HCMA) refers to the dynamics of organized interdisciplinary action that are transversal or cross-cutting. This approach requires the mastery of a certain number of technical skills and disciplines, as well as the capacity to use them in a process to solve problems of financial performance. This is accomplished through the specific interaction tasks that are performed by each management function and operational unit, which act in real time with others, in the same direction as an organizational team, using a selected risk appetite threshold base.

Putting business fields side by side, (i.e., business disciplines silos, as is normally the case in MBA programs), is not enough to create the transversal interaction dynamic needed for firms to achieve expected financial performance goals. As a result, few graduates today have the cross-cutting or vertical skills required to act, in real time, from their workstation in accordance with the pyramid shape of the organization chart in order to create value.

This chapter presents the results of the interface established by a faculty member in the Accounting Department of the University of San Francisco with a “seasoned leader in the FinTech industry.” It proposes a single portal for employers and HRMs to which the continuing education services of professional training associations, executive education departments of colleges, and MBA schools and universities, can connect to issue the HCMA certificate supplementing their training offerings focused on “Leadership Development”.

Krull (2004) finds that US multinational corporations (MNCs) increase amounts designated as permanently reinvested earnings (PRE) to maximize reported after-tax earnings and meet earnings targets. We extend this research by examining the relationship between executive equity compensation and the opportunistic use of PRE by US MNCs, and the market reaction to earnings management using PRE designations. Firms use equity compensation to incentivize executives to strive for maximum shareholder wealth. One unintended consequence is that executives may engage in earnings management activities to increase their equity compensation. In this study, we examine whether the equity incentives of management are associated with an increased use of PRE. We predict and find strong evidence that the changes in PRE are positively associated with the portion of top managers' compensation that is tied to stock performance. In addition, we find this relationship to be strongest for firms that meet or beat forecasts, but only with the use of PRE to inflate income, suggesting that equity compensation incentivizes managers to opportunistically use PRE, especially to meet analyst forecasts.

Further, we provide evidence that investors react negatively to beating analysts' forecasts with the use of PRE, suggesting that investors find this behavior opportunistic and not fully convincing. This chapter makes an important contribution to what we know about the joint effects of tax policy, generally accepted accounting principles, and incentive compensation on the earnings reporting process.

The practice of real earnings management (REM) or earnings manipulation through the company’s real activities is increasingly widespread. Companies that want to achieve profit targets have switched from accrual-based to REM, especially in the firm family owner, who is an active manager. Our study aims to determine whether family ownership in a company will be a factor in the existence of greater REM practices. The authors collected 2,613 observational data from non-financial companies on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) during 2013–2018 using a purposive sampling method and then analyzed using panel random effect (RE) regression. The results show that family ownership significantly negatively affects abnormal operating cash flow which means that family firms are more likely to reduce operating cash flow to report higher income than non-family firms. Thus, it can be concluded that family firms in Indonesia are more likely to be involved in REM than non-family firms.

We investigate the association between attributes of the audit committee of a firm and the likelihood of negative events occurring in the firm’s life in Israel. The mandate of the audit committee in Israel is substantially different from its mandate in the US. The responsibilities of the committee in the US are divided between two committees in Israel, one of which deals with reviewing the financial statements and the other one, titled “audit committee,” is in charge of the remaining tasks of the US-type audit committee. This allows us a unique opportunity to focus on the roles of the audit committee other than reviewing the financial statements. Using hand-collected data on firms traded on Tel Aviv Stock Exchange in 2010–2014, we find that the larger the audit committee size, the larger the likelihood of negative events, consistent with the cumbersome workings and potential conflicts of interests characterizing a large committee. The percentage of directors with accounting and financial expertise on the audit committee is associated with a lower likelihood of negative events, in line with the value of such experts in tasks beyond reviewing the financial statements. The fraction of independent directors on the audit committee is not found to be significantly related to the likelihood of negative events. This is consistent with the notion that some independent directors are independent in form but not necessarily in substance, which is surprising in light of the comprehensive regulation regarding audit committee independence imposed by the Israeli regulator.