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This study aims to examine the effects of firm performance on chief executive officer (CEO) turnover and the moderating role of CEO attributes on the firm performance–CEO turnover relationship.

Probit regressions were used to examine the relationship between various CEO attributes and CEO turnover and the moderation effect of firm performance on the CEO attributes–CEO turnover relationship. The sample comprises firms from the FTSE 350 Index covering the period 1999–2018.

The results indicate that firm performance negatively and significantly impacts CEO turnover. Further analysis reveals that selected CEO attributes, namely, CEO internal experience, CEO network size and CEO age, moderate the relationship between firm performance and CEO turnover. Specifically, CEO internal experience and performance combine to reduce the likelihood of CEO turnover. However, CEO network size and age when combined with firm performance increase the likelihood of CEO turnover.

The results imply that boards should pay more attention to CEO attributes in their decisions to hire and fire executive managers as these factors may affect a wide variety of firm outcomes.

This paper makes key contributions to the CEO turnover and corporate governance literature by providing evidence of key factors other than performance that can affect the CEO dismissal decision. Specifically, this study shows that CEO attributes such as CEO internal experience, CEO networks and CEO age far outweigh the importance of performance as a factor influencing CEO turnover decisions.

Given the serious question raised by the subprime of the 2008 global financial crisis over the rising practices of excessive rewarding of executives in the USA and European firms, the executive pay-performance nexus has emerged as a popular topic of debate in the contemporary corporate finance research. Conducted mostly on the Anglo-Saxon contexts, research outcomes have been inconclusive and dichotomous. Considering this backdrop, this study aims to investigate the endogenous relationship between executive compensation and risk taking in the context of the USA.

Using a large sample of non-financial firms from 2010 to 2020 based on panel data and two-stage least square regression. In this study, the riskier corporate decision is measured as book leverage and ratio of R&D expense to total assets. Chief executive officers’ (CEO) experience and age are used as instrumental variables, and these are expected to influence compensation incentives and, hence, affect firm riskiness indirectly. Firm size, return on assets and CEO turnover are reported to affect compensation and corporate decisions, therefore, included as control variables. Given that higher executive compensation is related to riskier corporate decision in firms, this study incorporates total wealth (i.e. accumulated equity related compensation) as an additional proxy of compensation, and this selection is justifiable by the perfect contracting notion of the agency theory.

The results of this study show a significant positive and increasing nexus among compensation and riskier corporate decisions. Besides, the compensation level proxied through the percentage of each form of compensation in total compensation is very important as greater equity and greater salary diminishes risk taking.

The outcomes of this study have useful implications for firm stakeholders and policymakers.

The level of pay measured by the percentage of each type of compensation in total compensation is of utmost importance as it can increase or decrease risk taking in corporate decisions.

This study aims to examine the role of the board of directors in affecting earnings management practices across small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) life cycle.

Data is collected from 280 SMEs listed on the London Stock Exchange during the period of 2009–2016. Fixed effects regression analysis is used to test the hypotheses.

This study shows that the impact of the board of directors' roles on earnings management practices varies depending on the SMEs life cycle stage. In the introduction, growth and decline stages of SMEs, the wealth creation role of the board is negatively significant with earnings management, while the wealth protection role of the board is positively significant in the growth and maturity phases. Results suggest that the board's responsibility to create wealth deters early-stage earnings management strategies, while protecting shareholder interests, in latter stages, leads to a decrease in earnings management.

The findings suggest that corporate governance should be customized to the specific stage of the SMEs life cycle. Additionally, different life cycle stages may impose different requirements on corporate boards to shape the effectiveness of these mechanisms and constrain earnings management practices.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this study offers one of the first insights on the UK SMEs to understand how board functions and earnings management practices vary over SMEs life cycles. It will offer important information on the effect of board features on earnings management in SMEs in the UK and is anticipated to be of importance to policymakers, regulators, investors and practitioners.

This study investigates the impact of bank CEOs’ inside debt on shareholder benefits in the context of bank mergers and acquisitions (M&A) before the 2008–2009 financial crisis.

Employing an event-study methodology, this analysis delves into market reactions to bank M&A announcements during 2006–2007, encompassing 105 M&As by 79 public commercial banks. This era witnessed heightened risk-taking behavior on the verge of the financial crisis. We explore the relation between relative inside debt and market abnormal returns at M&A announcements and the association between relative inside debt and cash payment preferences in M&As.

Evidence suggests that M&A announcements from banks where acquiring CEOs hold a substantial inside debt experience favorable stock market reaction, particularly for smaller banks. Additionally, banks with elevated CEO inside debt tend to favor cash as a payment mode for M&As.

One limitation of this study is the short period of data availability. The data used in this study covers only 2006 and 2007, the periods marked by notable risk-taking activities on the verge of the financial crisis. Although this period is perfectly suitable for our investigation, given the prevalence of conflicts between equity and debt holders, it is essential to acknowledge that our findings may not capture changes or trends over time. Nevertheless, the results offer valuable insights into the factors that influence the behavior of the studied population. Future research could employ a longitudinal design to address this limitation and gain a more comprehensive understanding of the dynamics over extended periods.

Our study has significant implications for businesses and policymakers as it provides insights into the factors contributing to financial crises and how compensation mechanisms can be used to moderate bank risk-taking. We propose that CEO inside debt compensation presents a plausible mechanism that boards of directors can incorporate into bank executive compensation contracts. By doing so, they can promote value-enhancing investments and moderate excessive risk-taking, thereby safeguarding the financial stability of individual banks and overall financial system.

Our study sheds light on the beneficial role of bank CEO inside debt for shareholders, contributing empirical backing to the conflict resolution viewpoint in the discourse on wealth appropriation. From a regulatory stance, our findings advocate for the inclusion of bank CEO inside debt in executive remuneration agreements. Such a strategy can empower boards of directors to mitigate undue risk and enhance shareholder value in M&As, safeguarding both individual bank and broader financial system stability.

This study examines the impact of chief executive officer (CEO) power, institutional investors and their interaction on green financing provided by Bangladeshi financial institutions and the moderating effect of government policy and CEO political connections on these relations.

We employ ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions and interaction terms among variables of interest for the empirical analysis.

Green financing decreases with CEO power, implying that CEOs of this country’s financial institutions are averse to green loans, whereas institutional investors increase green financing extended by these institutions. The government policy, which includes financial incentives for complying financial institutions, strengthens institutional investors' positive impact on green financing, but it does not change CEOs' aversion to green loans. Institutional investors have a positive moderating effect on the relationship between green finance (GF) and CEO power, but this positive moderating effect is negated in banks where the government owns a stake, possibly because CEOs of state-owned financial institutions are politically connected, which reduces institutional investors’ influence over them.

This study is unique in that it is the first to examine how the interaction among different stakeholders affects green financing in a unique setting. As the literature is almost silent on this topic, the findings of this paper are expected to raise policymakers’ awareness of the obstacles that hamper the efforts of developing countries to go green.

The complexity of succession in family firms is multifaceted and can sometimes lead to turbulence. While structured succession strategies offer a roadmap for smoother transitions, intergenerational differences in family small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) can lead to varied interpretations of an effective succession blueprint. This study synergizes the strategic entrepreneurship framework with the socioemotional wealth (SEW) perspective to probe into how formalized succession planning impacts performance in family SMEs. Furthermore, it delves into the mediating role of succession satisfaction, especially in family firms characterized by pronounced SEW and helmed by CEOs from different generational cohorts.

Employing a comprehensive dataset from 1,833 global family businesses, this research utilizes bootstrapping regression models to discern the intertwined effects of mediator and moderator variables and their statistical significance.

The main findings suggest that succession satisfaction does matter for a good succession process and that succession plans work only in family firms with a high degree of SEW and that are led by older family CEOs (e.g. baby boomers).

The results offer fresh perspectives on succession processes, with a particular focus on how to improve the satisfaction of millennial family CEOs.

The study uniquely combines strategic entrepreneurship and SEW to offer a holistic view of succession planning, highlighting satisfaction’s mediating role and SEW’s moderating influence. Additionally, it pioneers the incorporation of generational cohorts into the succession discourse.

The purpose of this study is to examine the relationship between stock options compensation and firm strategic risk-taking, employing a quantile regression (QR) model. This study aims to analyze whether the impact of stock options on firm strategic risk-taking changes across various quantiles and investigates the moderating role of firm performance.

This study is based on a sample of 90 French firms for the period extending from 2008 to 2019. To deal with the non-uniform association, the authors use a panel quantile method.

The results reveal that the impact of chief executive officer (CEO) stock options on firm strategic risk-taking varies across risk-taking quantiles. More specifically, the study’s results show a positive association at low quantile levels of strategic risk-taking, measured by research and development (R&D) and a negative linkage at high levels. The authors also find that firm performance moderates the impact of CEO stock options on strategic risk-taking.

The non-uniform relationship between CEO stock options and firm strategic risk-taking shows that the weight of CEO stock options in the total compensation can be a major determinant of the firm's strategic risk-taking attitude.

This study extends existing research on executive compensation and strategic risk-taking. Thus, this study has the potential to help stakeholders, board of directors and regulators, who are attempting to understand how the compensation contract – in particular, stock option pay – is related to the risk behavior of the agents and guide them to structure the executive compensation in an optimal way.

Corporate governance scholars have built on agency theory premises to document chief executive officers' (CEOs’) debt-based compensation, also known as inside debt, as an effective tool to control excessive risk and deter risky corporate strategies. In this study, the authors draw on behavioral agency model to put these well-established assumptions to the test in a different setting and argue for the context-specific effects of CEOs' long-term compensation.

Focusing on corporate mergers and acquisitions in a post-crisis period (2011–2017), the authors cast doubt on agency theory predictions on debt-like compensation, point to the more realistic assumptions of behavioral decision models, and call for more contingency approaches in theoretical arguments.

An analysis of more than 4000 observations reveals that neither CEOs nor shareholders react significantly to inside debt after the economy recovers. Firm risk is also influenced only marginally by long-term compensation in a normal period of time.

While extant literature is rather unanimous on risk-reducing impact of inside debt, the study periods span the financial crisis of 2007. This research is the first conducted in regular times to demonstrate that previous findings are biased and heavily influenced by an exogenous shock.

The aim of this paper is to examine the effect of structural and demographic board diversity as well as board tenure on family firms' environmental performance, by analyzing the differences between family and non-family businesses and within family firms.

Tobit regressions are applied to investigate the effect of independent directors, CEO non-duality, board gender diversity and board tenure on environmental performance. The study also controls for other board and firm characteristics, as well as for time, industry and country-fixed effects. In doing so, the authors rely on a sample of non-financial listed firms from France, Germany, Italy, Spain and Portugal over the period 2014–2021.

The authors find that women on the board positively influence environmental performance and this effect is significant only in family firms, although board tenure negatively moderates the relationship. Board independence significantly affects environmental performance only in non-family firms. A strong presence of family directors has a negative effect on family firms' environmental performance, especially when directors' turnover is low.

This paper examines the unexplored relationship between structural board diversity and environmental performance in family companies. This study provides empirical evidence on the association between gender diversity and family firms' environmental performance focusing for the first time on a European setting. Moreover, this study provides evidence of a different effect of board tenure in family and non-family businesses.

This paper investigates the role of the founder CEO and board independence in shaping the way in which Indian and Italian family firms (FFs) pursue international growth via two modes, that is exports and FDI. This article claims that country's context matters in determining the relationship between the presence of the founder CEO and FFs' extent of exports and extent of FDI. Further, this article examines the moderating role of board independence on the above-mentioned founder CEO–FF's international growth relationship.

Using a fixed-effect panel data method, this article tests the hypotheses on a sample of 1,275 Indian FF-year observations and 705 Italian FF-year observations over the period 2008–2015.

This article reveals that the presence of a founder CEO is positively associated with the extent of exports but negatively associated with the extent of FDI in Italian firms. However, in case of Indian firms, the presence of the founder CEO is negatively associated with the extent of exports as well as with the extent of FDI. This founder CEO's influence on the firm's international growth is mitigated by the presence of an independent board in Italian firms; however, this moderation is not significant in the case of Indian firms.

It is important to capture heterogeneity within family firms and across institutional contexts while studying family firms' international growth. Further, it is important for international business scholars to theorize for different modes of international growth because challenges faced in expansion via exports are different from the challenges faced in expansion via FDI (foreign subsidiaries). Therefore, family firms leadership might prefer a certain mode of international growth.

The findings of the study imply that national culture and institutional context could play an important role in determining (a) Founder CEO's inclination towards FF's extent of exports and FDI as well as (b) the effectiveness of an independent board in mitigating founder CEO's influence on FF's international growth.

This work is one of the very few studies that examines the impact of FF's heterogeneity and country heterogeneity on two modes of international growth, namely exports and FDI, in the Indian and Italian contexts. Further, this work provides empirical evidence on the independent board's role in mitigating founder CEO's influence in decision making in the case of Italian firms. Extant literature expects an independent board to encourage FFs' international growth both via exports and FDI; this study shows that independent boards could reduce the founder CEO's inclination towards exports and mitigate founder CEO's influence on the decision making; however, this mitigation effect is highly context dependent.