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1 – 10 of 800Naseem Ahamed and Nitya Nand Tripathi
Change of leadership is a big and important incident in the life of a company. As important as it is for the company, it is equally a difficult decision to make for the board of…
Abstract
Change of leadership is a big and important incident in the life of a company. As important as it is for the company, it is equally a difficult decision to make for the board of directors. Most of the big companies have a committee dedicated toward laying out a succession plan of the existing chief executive officer (CEO). The big dilemma, however, is whether to appoint someone from within the company and let him or her lead as he or she has been associated with the company and knows the internal dynamics better or to induct some outsider and take advantage of his or her expertise/reputation in the market. The balance appears lopsided when the result of this chapter is perused. Companies on an average seem to reap more benefits if an existing executive is promoted to the office of CEO rather than hiring an outsider. The benefits which are talked here from promoting insiders are indirect ones and do not have a direct bearing with the finances of the company. As shown by the results that insiders are more likely to continue with the company for a longer duration as the CEO as well as not as the CEO which defers the hiring and firing costs (screening candidates, conducting interviews, huge severance packages, golden parachutes, etc., are the costs referred to) for a longer period. Other benefits arising from insider CEOs are upfront awareness about the company’s work culture, production/service capacity, efficiency, strategies followed till date, etc., which gives him or her a head start compared to an outsider.
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Moren Levesque, Phillip Phan, Steven Raymar and Maya Waisman
We study the events that motivate CEOs to underinvest in R&D long-term projects (CEO myopia). Based on the existing literature in earnings management and agency theory, myopia is…
Abstract
We study the events that motivate CEOs to underinvest in R&D long-term projects (CEO myopia). Based on the existing literature in earnings management and agency theory, myopia is likely to become more problematic under five circumstances: when the CEO nears retirement (the CEO horizon problem), R&D projects have very long time horizons (the project horizon problem), the firm’s financial health is deteriorating (the cover-up problem), ownership structure is heavily weighted toward insider owners (minority owner oppression problem), and when the threat of hostile takeover increases (the entrenchment problem). We setup a dynamic simulation model in which rational CEOs maximize the total value of their bonus compensation over their tenure. Our findings related to the five circumstances are consistent with the extant literature. However, we found an unexpected stable, nonlinear (inverted U-shaped) relationship between CEO tenure and R&D investment. We discuss the theoretical implications of our model and offer suggestions for future research.
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The M&A literature lacks coherence and consistency when explaining the role of CEO power in influencing post-acquisition firm performance in both theoretical and empirical terms…
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The M&A literature lacks coherence and consistency when explaining the role of CEO power in influencing post-acquisition firm performance in both theoretical and empirical terms. This study uses meta-analytic techniques to quantitatively synthesize and evaluate the impact of 11 CEO power constructs (CEO duality; compensation; ownership; founder CEO; acquisition experience; functional area experience; outside directorship; elite education; CEO celebrity; age; and tenure) on acquiring firms’ post-acquisition performance. Results of 85 independent studies show that CEO ownership, functional area experience, and tenure are significantly positive predictors for better acquisition performance. At the same time, CEO duality and CEO elite education are significantly negative predictors of different measures of acquisition performance. These findings indicate the importance of integrating different theories to enhance our understanding of the nature of strategic leadership in acquisition performance.
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Diyah Kusuma Wardhani, Tastaftiyan Risfandy, Yunieta Anny Nainggolan and Bowo Setiyono
The authors examine the impact of CEO generalist experience on firm performance. Using 522 listed firms in Indonesia for the period 2010–2018, the authors find that the generalist…
Abstract
The authors examine the impact of CEO generalist experience on firm performance. Using 522 listed firms in Indonesia for the period 2010–2018, the authors find that the generalist CEO is negatively associated with firm performance. Generalist CEOs tend to experience ambiguity in adjustments in the new environment. In order to decrease the impact of a generalist CEO, our empirical evidence finds that CEO tenure does not significantly moderate the association between the two. This is because generalist CEOs with longer tenure tend to avoid changing strategies, and therefore the negative impact of CEO generalist is not altered. The results of this study provide suggestions for the firm in the developing country to appoint a CEO with generalist experience.
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Belal Ali Ghaleb, Sumaia Ayesh Qaderi and Faozi A. Almaqtari
The global economy has been affected by the COVID-19 pandemic, which has placed greater responsibility on companies to fulfill their obligations to Corporate Social Responsibility…
Abstract
The global economy has been affected by the COVID-19 pandemic, which has placed greater responsibility on companies to fulfill their obligations to Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) amid the crisis. This chapter investigates the role of a Chief Executive Officer (CEO) attributes in improving a firm's CSR in the emerging economy of Jordan and how the COVID-19 pandemic modifies this relationship. Using a Jordanian sample of 655 firm-year observations during the 2014–2021 period, the research results show that older CEOs, well-educated CEOs, CEOs' remuneration, and CEOs' ownership positively correlate with CSR reporting. However, long-tenured CEOs are associated with lower CSR initiatives. The subsample analysis findings also validate the significance of CEO attributes in improving CSR practice during the COVID-19 pandemic compared to the prepandemic period. These findings are beneficial for the regulatory setters to understand better whether CEO attributes are linked to engagement in CSR-related information. This research is among the limited number of studies that have explored how CEO attributes impact CSR reporting for the stakeholder's welfare. Moreover, it uniquely concentrated on contrasting the findings before and during the COVID-19 pandemic.
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David A. Waldman and Mansour Javidan
The primary purpose of this chapter is to examine some old truths about leadership at the CEO level, and to summarize a new perspective based on charismatic leadership theory that…
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The primary purpose of this chapter is to examine some old truths about leadership at the CEO level, and to summarize a new perspective based on charismatic leadership theory that could help cast light on this important area of strategic management. In so doing, we attempt to move charismatic leadership theory in some new directions by bridging micro-and macro-level conceptualizations. The upper echelons perspective from the strategic management literature is first summarized. We then identify problems in conceptualization and measurement that have served to limit the usefulness of this theoretical approach with regard to understanding the leadership role and effects of CEOs. We present two alternative new models that incorporate the constructs of strategic change, CEO charisma, and perceived environmental uncertainty. Data are also presented, suggesting mixed support for the models. Suggestions are made with regard to future quantitative and qualitative research.
Odysseas Pavlatos and Hara Kostakis
The aim of this chapter is to investigate the relationship between the uses of budgets with financial performance in start-ups’ business environment. For this reason, an empirical…
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The aim of this chapter is to investigate the relationship between the uses of budgets with financial performance in start-ups’ business environment. For this reason, an empirical survey was carried out, using a questionnaire in 134 start-up companies, which are based in 10 different European countries. Results show that there is a positive association between the use of budgets for planning, resource allocation and performance evaluation with financial performance. The CEO’s business educational background, as well as CEO’s beliefs about planning, has a strong influence in the use of budgets in start-up firms. We also concluded that there is a positive association between perceived environmental uncertainty (PEU) and the use of budgets for planning and resource allocation and a negative association between PEU and the use of budgets for performance evaluation.
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Ahmet C. Kurt and Nancy Chun Feng
Many argue that the design of compensation contracts for public company chief executive officers (CEOs) is often not guided by a goal of value maximization. Yet, there is limited…
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Many argue that the design of compensation contracts for public company chief executive officers (CEOs) is often not guided by a goal of value maximization. Yet, there is limited direct empirical evidence on the negative consequences of the proposed inefficient contracting between shareholders and CEOs. Using data on CEO bonus contracts of the S&P 500 firms, we investigate potential firm performance implications of the use of qualitative criteria such as leadership and mentoring in those contracts. We maintain that unlike quantitative criteria, qualitative criteria are difficult to define and measure on an objective basis, possibly resulting in an inefficient and biased incentive structure. Twenty-five percent of the sample observations have CEO bonus contracts that include a qualitative criterion for bonus payment determination. Our results show that employee productivity, asset productivity, capital expenditures, and future abnormal stock returns are lower for firms that use a qualitative criterion in CEO bonus contracts than those that do not. Further, contrary to the argument in prior literature that earnings management decreases with the use of subjective performance indicators in incentive contracts, we find that income-increasing accruals are actually higher when the CEO bonus contract includes a qualitative criterion. We recommend that compensation committees set concrete, measurable performance goals for CEOs, providing CEOs with better guidance and helping improve their corporate decision making.
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Atreya Chakraborty and Shahbaz Sheikh
This study investigates the impact of corporate governance mechanisms on performance related turnover. Our results indicate that smaller boards and institutional block holders are…
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This study investigates the impact of corporate governance mechanisms on performance related turnover. Our results indicate that smaller boards and institutional block holders are positively related to the likelihood of performance related turnover. CEOs that also hold the position of the chairman of the board or belong to a founding family face lower likelihood of turnover. CEO stock ownership is negatively related to turnover and CEOs who own 3 percent or more of their company stock face a significantly lower likelihood of performance related turnover. Moreover, protection from external control market has no effect either on the likelihood of turnover.