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This paper aims to examine the effect of chief executive officers (CEOs’) global experience (GE) on the Chinese firms’ outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) and provides new insights on how CEOs’ foreign study and education experiences may affect firms’ OFDI. Further, this paper examines whether CEO power and state ownership have a positive moderating effect on the relationship between CEOs’ GE and firms’ OFDI.

This study used panel data of Chinese manufacturing companies in 2007-2016 to examine different hypotheses. The authors tested them using a zero-inflated negative binomial regression model to shed light on the effect of CEOs’ GE on the firms’ OFDI.

This study found that CEOs’ GE generally promotes Chinese firms’ OFDI. CEOs’ foreign study experience has a stronger effect than foreign education experience. Further, CEO power and state ownership have a positive moderating effect on the relationship between CEOs’ GE and firms’ OFDI.

The findings have two important implications for managers and policy-makers. First, globally experienced CEOs are vital for firms to succeed in today’s highly competitive global environment. Second, CEO power is important in firms’ OFDI decision-making.

The authors use path dependency and upper echelons theories to show that GE, particularly foreign study experience, enables CEOs to take advantage of available resources in the market and institutional environment to create a path for the firm to expand globally.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate how disclosure quality affects the relation between chief executive officer (CEO) power and the variability of firm performance. Moreover, it also examines the impacts of ownership structure and disclosure quality on the relationship between CEO power and performance variability.

Empirical research was carried out.

It was found that: first, firms whose CEOs have more power will exhibit higher performance, but display more variability in firm performance. Second, disclosure quality can affect the relationship between CEO power and the variability of firm performance and more specifically, increase in disclosure quality reduces the performance variability caused by CEO power. Third, the effects of CEO power on the variability of firm performance are higher in state‐owned firms than in non‐state‐owned firms. Moreover, the effect of higher disclosure quality for lowering the variability of firm performance is stronger in state‐owned firms than in non‐state‐owned firms.

First, the authors find that when evaluating corporate governance practices, both firm performance and the variability of firm performance should be taken into account. Second, this paper fills the void in the extant literatures by demonstrating that CEO power, as well as disclosure quality, can affect firms' operational risk. Third, for firm owners, when firms are facing large uncertainty from institutional environment, a great trade‐off between firm performance and operational risk, when determining the degree of CEO power, will play an important role in corporate governance.

This paper complements the extant literatures by examining the impacts of CEO power to firm output from the dimensions of both firm performance and operational risk; and by examining the impacts of ownership structure and disclosure quality on the relationship between CEO power and performance variability.

This study investigates the moderating effect of CEO power on the relationship between labor productivity and financial performance in the Tehran Stock Exchange (TSE).

In this study, the power of the CEO variable was measured using the power index method and its effect on the relationship between labor productivity and financial performance was tested using a multivariate regression. The study sample consisted of 1,040 observations and 130 firms listed on the TSE over an eight-year period between 2012 and 2019. Panel data and appropriate statistical techniques were applied to estimate models. In this study, Tobin’s Q and return on assets (ROA) are the two variables used to measure financial performance.

The results of the hypotheses show that the link between labor productivity and financial performance based on Tobin’s Q and ROA strengthens with increasing CEO power. Thus, the stewardship theory is approved on the TSE. In addition, CEO power and labor productivity have a positive impact on firm performance.

To the best of the author’s knowledge, this is the first study to examine the moderating impact of CEO power on the relationship between labor productivity and firms' financial performance in emerging capital markets. Therefore, the results of this study can be used by investors, board of directors, policymakers and regulations.

Taking into consideration the sanctions on Iran's economy during the study period and to increase the productivity and financial performance of the company, the results of this study can provide a practical guide for the board of directors to consider the characteristics of CEO power and how to choose it in the emerging capital market. Additionally, the study results show that investors should choose companies with strong CEO to invest in the Iranian capital market.

The current study is the first study conducted in an emerging economy to examine the moderating impact of CEO power on the link between labor productivity and financial performance.

The purpose of this study is to establish the relationship between chief executive officer (CEO) power, audit committee effectiveness and earnings quality in regulated firms in Uganda.

The authors employed cross-sectional and correlational research designs, based on a sample of 136 regulated firms in Uganda. Data were collected using a questionnaire survey from Chief Finance Officers and Chief Audit Executives. Data were analyzed using a Statistical Package for Social Sciences and Partial Least Squares Structural Equation Modeling.

Results indicate that CEO power causes negative variances in earnings quality. The results also reveal that audit committee effectiveness positively relates relatively similarly with earnings quality. In addition, CEO power and audit committee effectiveness are negative and significantly related. The results further indicate that CEO power and earnings quality are mediated by audit committee effectiveness.

CEO power creates an opaque accounting environment which may leave the stakeholders unable to evaluate the true economic reality of the firm. Audit committee effectiveness is an important enabler for reporting high-quality earnings even in the presence of a powerful CEO.

This study contributes toward a methodological stance of using perceptions to understand earnings quality in regulated firms in Uganda. This is probably the first study that has specifically explored earnings quality using only the fundamental qualitative characteristics of accounting information (as proxies) as enshrined in the Conceptual Framework for Financial Reporting 2018 particularly in Uganda since Her adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards in 1998. Second, the indirect effect of audit committee effectiveness and CEO power is tested.

Adopting insights from the upper echelons theory, this study aims to investigate the relationship between entrepreneurial orientation (EO) and firm performance under the contingent influence of chief executive officer (CEO) power.

Data were collected from a sample of large publicly-traded Indian software firms using the Prowess Database of Center for Monitoring Indian Economy (CMIE). Panel data regression analysis was used to test the study's hypotheses.

The results indicate that EO has an inverted U-shaped relation with firm performance. Strong support is also found for a negative moderating influence of CEO power on the inverted U-shaped relationship between EO and firm financial performance, suggesting that powerful CEOs eventually harm entrepreneurial firms.

The study encourages firms to have entrepreneurship orientation, but at a moderate level, to get the maximum benefit of EO. The study also explains to managers to what extent CEO power drives EO.

The study contributes to the intersection of corporate entrepreneurship and upper echelons theory. The study shows that CEO power negatively affects the EO and firm's performance relationship. This study holds important insights for managers of entrepreneurial firms, especially in international contexts and emerging markets.

The purpose of this paper is to explore how the tension between a firm’s CEO power features and externally observable hubris attributes may determine the likelihood of financial misreporting.

The analyses are based on a sample of 16 Canadian firms for which there were formal accusations of financial reporting fraud filed by securities regulators, assorted with regulatory sanctions; as well as 16 firms matched on industry and size with no evidence of financial misreporting.

The findings suggest that firms accused of financial misreporting exhibit features of strong CEO power and hubris as reflected in their relations with the self, others and the world. Governance mechanisms do not seem to be effective in detecting or preventing financial misreporting, with independent boards of directors proving especially ineffectual.

The findings suggest that formal governance processes may get coopted by a CEO with hubristic tendencies.

While the tentative model is more explanatory than predictive, it opens up a new research area as it brings the concept of hubris into accounting research.

The purpose of this study was to examine the extent to which chief executive officers (CEOs) deserve the pay they receive both in terms of over and underpayment.

Rather than using the traditional normal distribution view in which CEO performance clusters around the mean with relatively little variance, the authors adopt a novel power law approach. They studied 22 industries and N = 4,158 CEO-firm combinations for analyses based on Tobin’s Q and N = 5,091 for analyses based on return on assets. Regarding compensation, they measured the CEO distribution based on total compensation and three components of CEO total pay: salary, bonus, and value of options exercised.

In total, 86 percent of CEO performance and 91 percent of CEO pay distributions fit a power law better than a normal distribution, indicating that a minority of CEOs are producing top value for their firms (i.e. CEO performance) and a minority of CEOs are appropriating top value for themselves (i.e. CEO pay). But, the authors also found little overlap between CEOs who are the top performers and CEOs who are the top earners.

The findings shed new light on CEO pay deservingness by using a novel conceptual and methodological lens that highlights systematic over and underpayment. Results suggest a violation of distributive justice and offer little support for agency theory’s efficient contracting hypothesis, which have important implications for agency theory, equity theory, justice theory, and agent risk sharing and agent risk bearing theories.

Results highlight erroneous practices when trying to benchmark CEO pay based on average levels of performance in an industry because the typical approach to CEO compensation based on averages significantly underpays stars and overpays average performers.

Results offer new insights on the extent of over and underpayment. The findings uncover an extremely large non-overlap between the top earning and top performing CEOs and to an extent far greater in magnitude than previously suggested.

Objetivo – El objetivo de nuestro estudio fue examinar si los directores ejecutivos (CEOs) merecen la remuneración monetaria que reciben.

Metodología – En lugar de utilizar el enfoque tradicional que asume que la distribución del rendimiento de CEOs sigue la curva normal (con la mayoría de CEOs agrupados en torno a la media y relativamente poca variación), adoptamos un enfoque diferente basado en la ley de potencia. Incluimos 22 industrias y N = 4.158 combinaciones de CEO-firma para análisis basados en Tobin’s Q y N = 5.091 para análisis basado en la rentabilidad de los activos. En cuanto a la remuneracion, medimos distribuciones basadas en la remuneración total y tres componentes del pago completo a los CEOs: salario, bonos, y el valor de las opciones ejercitadas.

Resultados – 86% de las distribuciones de rendimiento de CEOs y el 91% de las distribuciones de pago de los CEO se aproximan mejor a una distribución de ley de potencia que a una distribución normal. Esto indica que una minoría de los CEOs produce un valor muy superior para sus empresas (es decir, el rendimiento CEO) y una minoría de los CEOs apropia valor superior para sí mismos (es decir, pago de los CEO). Sin embargo, encontramos muy poco solapamiento entre aquellos CEOs que se desempeñan mejor y los CEOs que ganan más.

Implicaciones – Nuestros hallazgos usando una conceptualización y metodología novedosas ponen en relieve que a muchos CEOs se les paga demasiado y que a muchos no se les paga suficiente (en comparación con su desempeño). Los resultados sugieren una violación de los principios de justicia distributiva y no apoyan la hipótesis de “contratación eficiente,” y tienen implicaciones para para la teoría de la agencia, de la equidad, de la justicia, y de la distribución de riesgos.

Implicaciones prácticas – Los resultados destacan las prácticas erróneas con respecto a la distribución de compensación a CEOs que se basan en los niveles medios de rendimiento en una industria. Estas prácticas llevan a no pagar suficiente a los directivos “estrella” y pagar demasiado a los directivos con desempeño medio.

Originalidad/valor – Los resultados ofrecen nuevas perspectivas sobre la relación entre desempeño y compensación de CEOs y que los que se desempeñan mejor no son los que reciben más pago, y viceversa. Estas diferencias son mucho más grandes de que lo que se creía anteriormente.

Objetivo – O objetivo do nosso estudo foi examinar se os CEOs merecem a compensação monetária que recebem.

Metodologia – Em vez de utilizar a abordagem tradicional que assume que a distribuição do desempenho do CEO segue a curva normal (com a maioria dos CEOs agrupados em torno da média e relativamente pouca variação), adotamos uma abordagem diferente com base num enfoque inovador da lei de potência. Incluímos 22 indústrias e N = 4.158 combinações de CEO-empresa para análise baseada no Q de Tobin e N = 5091 para análise baseado na rentabilidade dos ativos. Em relação à compensação, medimos as distribuições de CEO com base no total de compensação e três componentes do pagamento total dos CEOs: salário, bônus e o valor das opções exercidas.

Resultados – 86% do desempenho do CEO e 91% das distribuições de pagamento do CEO correspondem a uma lei de potência melhor do que uma distribuição normal, indicando que uma minoria de CEOs está produzindo valor superior para suas empresas (ou seja, desempenho do CEO) e uma minoria de CEOs se apropriando do valor superior para si próprios (isto é, o salário do CEO). Mas, também encontramos pouca sobreposição entre CEOs que tem os melhores desempenhos e os CEOs que tem as maiores ganancias.

Implicações – Nossas descobertas lançam nova luz sobre o merecimento do pagamento do CEO, usando uma nova lente conceitual e metodológica que destaca o excessivo e o baixo pagamento sistemático. Os resultados sugerem uma violação da justiça distributiva e não apoiam a hipótese da contratação eficiente, e tem implicações para a teoria da agência, teoria da igualdade, teoria da justiça e distribuição de riscos.

Implicações práticas – Os resultados destacam práticas errôneas quando se tenta benchmark de remuneração do CEO baseado em níveis médios de desempenho em uma indústria, porque essas práticas levam a não pagar o suficiente aos CEOs “estrela” e pagar em excesso CEOs com desempenho médio.

Originalidade/valor – Os resultados oferecem novas perspectivas sobre a relação entre desempenho e retribuição dos CEOs e que os que desempenham melhor não são os que recebem um pagamento maior, e vice-versa. Estas diferenças são muito maiores do que se pensava anteriormente.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of chief executive officer (CEO) power on corporate social responsibility (CSR) performance.

The authors use regression analysis to investigate the research question.

Using a 23-year panel sample with 1,574 unique US firms and 8,575 firm-year observations, the authors find a significant and negative relation between CEO power and CSR, suggesting that firms with more powerful CEOs engage in less CSR activities.

The results reveal that more powerful CEOs become less responsive to the needs of stakeholder groups, confirming the validity of the stakeholder theory of CSR.

Many factors like CEO (“the chief executive officer”) decision can influence efficiency and productivity in insurance firms. This paper seeks to address this issue.

To test the effect of CEO power on the efficiency and the productivity of the European insurance industries, the authors use the flexible Fourier cost function and they decompose the total factor productivity growth.

The result shows that after the integration of the CEO power score, not only efficiency scores in each country have changed, but also the order of non‐life insurance systems. Also, the CEO power influences the growth of productivity and an optimal power of the CEO can allow the insurance firm to be more productive and more efficient.

In this paper the authors model a new cost function in which they include the CEO power score; they also decompose the total factor of productivity in which they include the effect of the growth in the CEO power score.

This study examines the impact of chief executive officer (CEO) power, institutional investors and their interaction on green financing provided by Bangladeshi financial institutions and the moderating effect of government policy and CEO political connections on these relations.

We employ ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions and interaction terms among variables of interest for the empirical analysis.

Green financing decreases with CEO power, implying that CEOs of this country’s financial institutions are averse to green loans, whereas institutional investors increase green financing extended by these institutions. The government policy, which includes financial incentives for complying financial institutions, strengthens institutional investors' positive impact on green financing, but it does not change CEOs' aversion to green loans. Institutional investors have a positive moderating effect on the relationship between green finance (GF) and CEO power, but this positive moderating effect is negated in banks where the government owns a stake, possibly because CEOs of state-owned financial institutions are politically connected, which reduces institutional investors’ influence over them.

This study is unique in that it is the first to examine how the interaction among different stakeholders affects green financing in a unique setting. As the literature is almost silent on this topic, the findings of this paper are expected to raise policymakers’ awareness of the obstacles that hamper the efforts of developing countries to go green.