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The purpose of this paper is to examine the effects of political orientation on corporate social (ir)responsibility. In specific, it investigates CEO political liberalism, and its moderation with government political liberalism on corporate social responsibility (CSR) and corporate social irresponsibility (CSIR).

Panel regression analysis was conducted using 3,136 firm-year observations of 751 CEOs in the USA.

Results show that the effects of CEO liberalism are positive on CSR and negative on CSIR. During the reign of a democrat president, however, CEO political liberalism shows different impacts on CSR and CSIR. Interactions between the same political orientations are negatively associated with CSR, but not significantly associated with CSIR.

The primary contribution of this paper is in presenting the interactive effects of external environment and CEO attributions on CSIR.

This article aims to examine the influence of chief executive officer (CEO) internal political beliefs on labor relations. Prior research has paid little attention to channels through which the internal personal value system of managers enhances or deteriorates firm value. The authors provide evidence consistent with CEOs adopting labor policies impacting incumbent management–labor relationships based upon their political ideologies.

The research design tests the impact of CEO political ideology on labor relation using an individual CEO’s personal information and firm affiliation, employee lawsuit information, financial contributions to candidates and committees, and firm financial information. The authors compiled a sample of 4,354 unique CEOs from 2,558 US firms that are covered by ExecuComp and used 18,404 firm-year observations for the study’s analysis. A Heckman two-stage estimation process is used to address a potential sample selection bias and match the requirements of exclusion and relevance criteria.

Findings indicate that firms led by Republican-leaning CEOs are more likely to be sued by their employees, especially for violating union rights. Moreover, the findings of the study uncovered that Republican-leaning CEOs have fewer cases dismissed or withdrawn compared to Democrat-leaning CEOs and are also less likely to settle court cases prior to trial. Results indicate that Republican-leaning CEOs are associated with more substantial decreases in firm value compared to Democrat-leaning CEOs when facing labor allegations. The authors further show that firm value is lower for all firms facing litigation, with the magnitude of the decrease being more pronounced for firms with Republican CEOs.

Firm affiliations are identified using ExecuComp, employee lawsuit information from the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), financial contributions to candidates and committees from the Federal Election Committee (FEC) website, and financial information from Compustat. To the extent that these websites are inaccurate, such as financial contributions being underreported, the findings reported here may understate the relationships reported in this article.

The authors capture CEO political ideology using political contributions. There may be other means, such as physical space and personal effort, by which one could also estimate the party and intensity of CEO political ideology. This information is unavailable.

While presidential politics has four-year cycles, managerial finance is a daily activity. While political affiliation is most clearly measurable through monetary contributions, one can see implications of manager political leaning through their relationship with labor throughout the election cycle.

The analyses of this study indicate that labor unions are more likely to sponsor lawsuits and stronger allegations in firms with Republican CEOs and show that withdrawal, settlement or dismissal rates are lower when firms are managed by Republican managers, resulting in higher subsequent legal costs and potentially damaged employee morale. Also, this paper investigates whether lawsuits have a greater negative consequence on firm value when the firm is run by a Republican CEO. The authors find that lawsuits significantly lower Tobin's Q for Republican-led firms compared to companies with Democratic and apolitical CEOs. The authors further show that firm value is lower for all firms facing litigation, with the magnitude of the decrease being more pronounced for firms with Republican CEOs.

The authors examine the role of CEO political ideology in the credit rating process.

This study adopts a quantitative method with panel data regressions using a sample of 5,211 observations from S&P 500 firms from 2001 to 2012.

The authors find that firms run by Republican-leaning CEOs, who tend to have conservative political ideologies, enjoy more favorable credit ratings than firms run by Democratic-leaning CEOs. In addition, the association between CEO political ideology and credit ratings is more pronounced for firms with high operating uncertainty, low capital intensity, high growth potential, weak corporate governance and low financial reporting quality. Finally, the authors find that CEO political ideology affects a firm's cost of debt incremental to credit ratings, consistent with debt investors incorporating CEO political ideology in their pricing decisions.

Leveraging CEO political ideology, the authors document that credit rating agencies incorporate managerial conservatism in their credit rating decisions. This finding suggests that CEO political ideology serves as a meaningful signal for managerial conservatism.

The study suggests that credit rating agencies incorporate CEO political ideology in their credit rating process. Other capital market participants such as auditors and retail investors can also use CEO political ideology as a proxy for managerial conservatism when evaluating firms.

The paper carries practical implications for practitioners, firm executives and regulators. The results on the association between CEO political ideology and credit ratings suggest that other financial institutions could also incorporate CEO political ideology in their evaluation in their evaluation of firms. For example, when evaluating audit risk and determining audit pricing, auditors may add CEO political ideology as a risk factor. For firms, especially those that have Democratic-leaning CEOs, the authors suggest that they could reduce the unfavorable effect of CEO political ideology on credit ratings by improving their corporate governance and financial reporting quality, as demonstrated in the cross-sectional analyses. Finally, this study shows that CEO political ideology, as measured by CEOs' political contributions, is closely related to a firm's credit ratings. This finding may inform regulators that greater transparency for CEOs' political contributions is needed as information on contributions could help capital market participants perform risk analyses for firms.

Credit rating agencies release their research methodologies for determining corporate credit ratings and identify managerial conservatism as an important factor that affects their risk assessments. The extant literature, however, has not empirically investigated the relation between credit ratings and managerial conservatism, which, according to behavioral consistency theory, can be proxied by CEO political ideology. This study provides novel empirical evidence that identifies CEO political ideology as an important input factor in the credit rating process.

This paper examines the relationship between chief executive officer (CEO) international experience (IE) and firm performance. The authors also examine the symmetry of this relationship, whereby home and host countries would be interchangeable without any significant change in the impact of each cultural dimension on firm performance.

For a sample of CEOs from Fortune's list of Global 500 companies, firm performance was measured as average net margin for the first four years of CEO tenure. IE was the difference between home country culture and that where CEO experience was gained, based on the GLOBE cultural dimensions. Regression then tested the IE/firm performance relationship. For symmetry, distance direction was coded as either positive or negative, depending on whether home country score on a given dimension was higher or lower than that of the host. Moderator regression then tested for whether distance direction impacted the relationship between IE and firm performance.

Results show that overall distance between home and host cultures in aggregate does not have a significant effect on firm performance. However, for specific dimensions, greater distances between the CEO's countries of experience and that of the parent company on in-group collectiveness and performance orientation are associated with higher firm performance, and greater distances on power distance and assertiveness are associated with lower performance. The authors further find asymmetric patterns in the IE–performance relationship, attributable primarily to the fact that, when scores on performance orientation are greater for the home than host country, organizational performance is significantly enhanced.

This study's hypotheses are grounded in theory, combining the human capital perspective with cultural paradox theory. In addition, the authors offer a unique approach for measuring the dimensional distance of culture.

The authors extend the recent research using the risk component of human resource’s (HR’s) compensation plans to examine the effects of risk components on two strategic outcomes: within-firm temporal change, or strategic variation, and firm strategic divergence from the industry, or strategic deviation. In addition, the authors examine the role of previous financial performance as a boundary moderator condition of the effects of risk components in the compensation plan and firm strategic outcomes.

To examine the effects of low- and high-risk components of executive compensation on strategic variation and deviation over time, the authors collected data from 2,510 companies listed in the Standard and Poor’s 500 index in a panel data format of a 12-year period. The authors gathered financial and other firm-level data from COMPUSTAT, and executive compensation and executive-level data from ExecuComp.

The findings support the main effects of risk components on strategic change, while both high- and low-risk components act on strategic deviation contingent on the moderating role of total shareholder return (TSR). In the theoretical framework, the authors test the moderating role of total shareholder return (TSR) as a boundary condition of the effects of risk components in the compensation plan. In doing so, the authors provide a fine-grained understanding of the influence of compensation plan risk components on outcomes proximal to executives, such as the maintenance of the status quo and the search for financial gains.

New studies can explore a three-way moderating effect on performance indicators, such as TSR, Tobin’s Q and return on asset. The authors addressed this limitation and did a comparative analysis, but the authors did not include additional moderating mechanisms in these interactive effects.

By disaggregating the executive’s compensation based on the risk components, boards of directors can mitigate any possible unwanted biases in the relationship between principal and agent.

By considering the influence of both low- and high-risk components of compensation plans on strategic outcomes –instead of firm performance – this study expands strategy literature supporting the influence of compensation schema on a firm’s outcomes. This path is new because it offers a moderating perspective to understand the strategic deviations and changes that chief executive officers imprint in their firms.

Los autores amplían la investigación reciente usando el componente de riesgo de los planes de compensación de RH para examinar los efectos de los componentes de riesgo en dos resultados estratégicos: cambio temporal dentro de la empresa, o variación estratégica, y divergencia estratégica de la empresa de la industria, o desviación estratégica. Además, examinamos el papel del desempeño financiero anterior como una condición moderadora límite de los efectos de los componentes de riesgo en el plan de compensación y los resultados estratégicos de la empresa.

Para examinar los efectos de los componentes de alto y bajo riesgo de la compensación ejecutiva en la variación y desviación estratégica a lo largo del tiempo, recopilamos datos de 2510 empresas que figuran en el índice Standard & Poor's 500 en un formato de datos de panel de un período de 12 años. Los autores recopilaron datos financieros y de otro tipo a nivel de empresa de COMPUSTAT, y compensación de ejecutivos, y datos a nivel ejecutivo de EXECUCOMP.

Nuestros hallazgos respaldan los efectos principales de los componentes de riesgo en el cambio estratégico, mientras que los componentes de alto y bajo riesgo actúan sobre la desviación estratégica dependiendo del papel moderador del rendimiento total del accionista. En el marco teórico, los autores prueban el papel moderador del Retorno Total del Accionista como condición límite de los efectos de los componentes de riesgo en el plan de compensación. Al hacerlo, brindamos una comprensión detallada de la influencia de los componentes de riesgo del plan de compensación en los resultados próximos a los ejecutivos, como el mantenimiento del statu quo y la búsqueda de ganancias financieras.

al considerar la influencia de los componentes de bajo y alto riesgo de los planes de compensación en los resultados estratégicos, en lugar del desempeño de la empresa, este estudio amplía la literatura de estrategia que respalda la influencia del esquema de compensación en los resultados de una empresa. Este camino es nuevo porque ofrece una perspectiva moderadora para entender las desviaciones y cambios estratégicos que los CEOs imprimen en sus firmas.

los nuevos estudios pueden explorar un efecto moderador de tres vías en los indicadores de rendimiento, como TSR, Tobin's Q y ROA. Abordamos esta limitación e hicimos un análisis comparativo, pero no incluimos mecanismos moderadores adicionales en estos efectos interactivos.

al desagregar la compensación del ejecutivo en función de los componentes de riesgo, las juntas directivas pueden mitigar cualquier posible sesgo no deseado en la relación entre el principal y el agente.

Os autores estendem a pesquisa recente usando o componente de risco dos planos de remuneração de RH para examinar os efeitos dos componentes de risco em dois resultados estratégicos: mudança temporal dentro da empresa, ou variação estratégica, e divergência estratégica da empresa do setor, ou desvio estratégico. Além disso, examinamos o papel do desempenho financeiro anterior como uma condição moderadora dos efeitos dos componentes de risco no plano de remuneração e nos resultados estratégicos da empresa.

Para examinar os efeitos dos componentes de baixo e alto risco da remuneração executiva na variação e desvio estratégico ao longo do tempo, coletamos dados de 2.510 empresas listadas no índice Standard & Poor's 500 em um formato de dados de painel de um período de 12 anos. Os autores coletaram dados financeiros e de outros níveis da empresa da COMPUSTAT, remuneração executiva e dados de nível executivo da EXECUCOMP.

Nossos resultados suportam os principais efeitos dos componentes de risco na mudança estratégica, enquanto os componentes de alto e baixo risco atuam no desvio estratégico contingente ao papel moderador do Retorno Total ao Acionista. No referencial teórico, os autores testam o papel moderador do Total Shareholder Return como condição limite dos efeitos dos componentes de risco no plano de remuneração. Ao fazer isso, fornecemos uma compreensão refinada da influência dos componentes de risco do plano de remuneração nos resultados próximos aos executivos, como a manutenção do status quo e a busca por ganhos financeiros.

ao considerar a influência dos componentes de baixo e alto risco dos planos de remuneração nos resultados estratégicos -em vez do desempenho da empresa- este estudo expande a literatura de estratégia que apoia a influência do esquema de remuneração nos resultados de uma empresa. Esse caminho é novo porque oferece uma perspectiva moderadora para entender os desvios e mudanças estratégicas que os CEOs imprimem em suas empresas.

Novos estudos podem explorar um efeito moderador de três vias em indicadores de desempenho, como TSR, Q de Tobin e ROA. Abordamos essa limitação e fizemos uma análise comparativa, mas não incluímos mecanismos moderadores adicionais nesses efeitos interativos.

Ao desagregar a remuneração do executivo com base nos componentes de risco, os conselhos de administração podem mitigar possíveis vieses indesejados na relação entre principal e agente.

The purpose of this study is to examine whether and how independent director-CEO friendliness has an impact on the enterprise's sustainable growth capability and further explore how corporate social responsibility (CSR) and executive compensation affect the relationship in the Chinese context.

Using a sample of Chinese-listed companies from 2010 to 2020, the study adopts fixed effects models to empirically analyze the effect of independent director-CEO friendliness on the enterprise's sustainable growth capability and the roles of CSR and executive compensation.

This study finds that independent director-CEO friendliness is significantly positively correlated with the sustainable growth capability of an enterprise, and this effect is enhanced with the improvement of the degree of CSR fulfillment. What is more, the positive relationship between independent director-CEO friendliness and the enterprise's sustainable growth capability becomes stronger with higher executive compensation.

Given that the existing research on sustainable growth capability mainly focused on the macroeconomic field, this study is of great theoretical significance in exploring the relationship between independent director-CEO friendliness and the enterprise's sustainable growth capability from the micro-level, contributing to the research on the enterprise's sustainable growth capability. In addition, this study considers the boundary conditions of CSR and executive compensation from internal and external perspectives, respectively, as it is innovative to elucidate organizational development from the perspective of internal and external balance.

This paper seeks to explore the personal motives of subsidiary CEOs in taking initiatives in multinational corporations. In essence, the paper proposes that subsidiary initiative‐taking is strongly driven by the socio‐political positioning of subsidiary CEOs, which consists of specific “social aspects” that account for the basic orientation that subsidiary CEOs maintain in initiative‐taking, as well as “political aspects” that affect the ability of subsidiary CEOs to strategize and the ways they do it in the highly politicized processes of initiative‐taking.

The paper is based on four exploratory case studies undertaken in German subsidiaries in France. Applying a matched pair approach it compares two subsidiaries run by parent country nationals (PCNs) with two subsidiaries run by host country nationals (HCNs).

The paper demonstrates that the nationality of the subsidiary CEO alone does not explain subsidiary CEOs initiative‐taking behaviour. Other factors that make up the socio‐political positioning of subsidiary CEOs, such as career aspiration, career orientation, access to resources and specific skills to form internal and local coalitions, as well as “external” coalitions with the headquarters, need to be considered as well.

Given the qualitative research design and exploratory nature of the study there are limits to how far the findings can be generalized and applied elsewhere. More in‐depth research is needed to further develop the socio‐political perspective put forward here, especially to more closely analyze the interplay of actors' (CEOs') socio‐political positioning approaches within different contexts of subsidiary initiative‐taking.

The socio‐political perspective proposed here goes beyond and extends existing IRHM approaches, which narrowly focus on the overarching impact of nationality as a predictor of differences in the behaviour of subsidiary CEOs.

Acknowledging the importance of work–family practices that extend beyond what is legally mandated and that cover the needs of a diverse workforce, this paper offers a conceptual model that explores the factors that can influence the provision and inclusiveness of work–family policies in organizations.

The conceptual model is based on a thorough literature review of relevant articles in the fields of management and political science.

In line with the upper echelons perspective, chief executive officers’ (CEOs') political ideology is a multidimensional concept, comprising two main dimensions (financial and social) that can influence the provision and inclusiveness of work–family practices. Moreover, the proposed conceptual model considers other important factors, such as the centrality of the CEO's political ideology, as potential moderating factors, as well as the conditional role of institutional pressures. Finally, the proposed model takes into account the important role of line managers/supervisors in the implementation of work–family policies and shows the importance of the provision and inclusiveness of work–family practices for critical organizational outcomes (organizational attraction and turnover).

The proposed conceptual model offers a more in-depth understanding of the factors that influence the provision and inclusiveness of work–family policies.

In this study, I explore the link between workforce downsizing and the predominance of a corporate governance model that espouses a shareholder value maximization principle. Specifically, I examine how top managers’ shareholder value orientation affects the adoption of a downsizing strategy among large, publicly traded corporations in the United States. An analysis of CEOs’ letters to shareholders indicates that firms with CEOs who use language that espouses the shareholder value principle tend to have a higher rate of layoffs, after controlling for various indicators of the firm’s adherence to the shareholder value principle. The finding suggests that corporate governance models, particularly those advocated by powerful organizational elites, have a significant impact on workers by shaping corporate strategies toward the workforce. The key actors in this process were top managers who embraced the new management ideology and implemented corporate strategy to pursue shareholder value maximization.

This paper relies on a “trinity of menetypes” of group knowing which captures the essential decision‐making dynamics of board membership. Formal, corporate decision‐making processes require higher commitments of time and cognitive energy of directors – certainly, the requirement is of non‐executive directors to make more formal contributions to the “political” process that determines corporate commitment to appropriate courses of action. There is a fundamental shift from “managerialism” to “politicism” in the corporate dynamics of organization – a shift in “menetype” driving governance dynamics. This wholesale shift in orientation has accentuated personal and group values as key determinants of corporate efficacy. The paper proposes structural reforms to corporate/agency governance conventions, including a greater focus on performance and strategy, greater independence of more effective and extensive audit processes and a greater transparency in the nomination and remuneration of top‐executive appointments.