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This paper aims to investigate the impact of retrenchment strategy on firm performance in the context of Pakistani firms while considering the moderating role of chief executive officer (CEO) power. By examining the influence of CEO duality and CEO share ownership on the relationship, this study contributes to strategic management and corporate governance knowledge within the Pakistani business environment.

A quantitative approach was used to analyze the relationship using data from annual financial statements. The sample consisted of 76 companies from the KSE-100 index from the year 2015 to 2020. Random effects regression models were used, along with hierarchical regression to explore the moderating effect of CEO power.

The findings demonstrate that the implementation of a retrenchment strategy positively impacts firm performance in Pakistani firms. The study also reveals that CEO power plays a crucial role in strengthening the relationship between retrenchment strategy and firm performance. Moreover, the study highlights the importance of considering the temporal sequence, size and age of firms when examining the impact of CEO power and retrenchment strategy on firm performance.

The study enhances the understanding of the contingent nature of retrenchment strategies and the influence of CEO power in the Pakistani business context. Practically, the research contributes to strategic management and corporate governance dynamics, facilitating the development of strategies that enhance firm performance and sustainability in Pakistan.

This research provides original insights by specifically focusing on the Pakistani context and analyzing the interplay between retrenchment strategy, CEO power and firm performance. The study adds to the limited literature on the relationship between retrenchment and performance in the Pakistani business environment. Additionally, it highlights the significance of CEO power as a critical factor in determining the success of retrenchment.

The purpose of this paper is to examine how chief executive officers’ (CEOs) narcissism impacts firm performance and how this, in turn, affects a CEO’s positive rhetorical tone.

The narcissism score is measured by using an analytical composite score for each CEO based on eight factors. The paper uses textual analysis on a sample of 848 CEO letters of US firms over the period 2010–2019. WarpPLS software, version 7.0 was used to conduct structural equation modeling through the partial least squares because a non-linear algorithm exists between CEO narcissism, firm performance and positive tone, and the values of path coefficients moved from non-significant to significant.

The results suggest that performance partially mediates the relationship between CEO narcissism and positive tone. This indicates that not all the positivity expressed by narcissistic CEOs is opportunism; some of it is indeed driven by better performance. The reported findings indicate that firm performance explains one-quarter of a CEO’s positive words, whereas some three-quarters of the positivity is driven by a narcissistic CEO (i.e. opportunism). A comparison of letters signed by highly narcissistic and less narcissistic leaders reveals that among those letters signed by highly narcissistic leaders, firm performance plays a significant mediating role between narcissistic tendencies and positive tone. However, among those with less narcissistic score, there is no evidence that performance mediates the tone and narcissism. Interestingly, both highly narcissistic and less narcissistic CEOs use positive words and optimistic expressions even when their firms perform poorly or negatively.

The results help shareholders be aware that CEOs may opportunistically use their personal characteristics and language to manipulate them. Data limitations about women CEOs were one of the reasons behind the small proportion of women CEOs in this study, making it low in generalizability.

A comprehensive review showed that none of previous studies examined the more ambiguous relationship between a CEO’s narcissist tendency, the firm’s performance, and CEO rhetorical tone. As one set of studies focused on Narcissism → Performance, and the other one on Performance → Tone, this current study completes the picture with Narcissism → Performance → Tone.

This paper aims to investigate how a US firm’s political landscape affects the integration of environmental, social and governance (hereafter ESG) measures in CEO compensation contracts, thereby affecting the firm’s ESG performance and credit rating.

Based on the results of state senatorial and presidential elections and the location of a US firm’s headquarters, the authors categorize whether a firm has a political environment that is predominantly Democratic (blue) or Republican (red). The empirical analyses are based on a sample of US firms in the period 2014–2021.

The authors find that firms in blue states are more likely to link CEO compensation to ESG performance measures. Further, the results show that firms in blue states with ESG-linked compensation contracts have better ESG performance. Lastly, the authors find evidence that a firm’s ESG performance has a positive impact on its credit rating, but the impact is weakened if firms in red states link ESG performance to executive compensation.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first research that explores how a firm’s political environment affects the use of ESG performance measures in CEO compensation contracts. Furthermore, the authors contribute to the literature by showing evidence that the political environment interacts with the impact of ESG-linked compensation incentives on the firm’s ESG performance and, thus, its credit rating.

This paper aims to investigate the effect of governance mechanisms and firm performance on chief executive officer (CEO) compensation in relation to the Jordanian business environment. This study also examines the moderating role of gender diversity.

The sample is drawn from the annual reports of 68 Jordanian firms between 2015 and 2019. This paper uses the ordinary least square regression. It also uses the generalised method of moments approach to control any endogeneity issue and analyses the data in depth. In addition, it uses a dynamic model to address concerns regarding causality in the study’s models.

The results show that governance mechanisms and firm performance have an impact on CEO compensation. Furthermore, the outcomes indicate that gender diversity significantly and positively moderates the association between firm performance and CEO compensation. These findings enhance and support agency theory in the context of Jordan.

The study’s results have significant implications for policymakers, shareholders, investors, academicians and the public in the developing Jordanian market. The findings also support more monitoring and inspection to prevent the occurrence of opportunistic management behaviour and ensure that CEO remuneration packages are appropriately designed.

This study provides a unique understanding by explaining the impact of governance and performance on CEO compensation in a developing country such as Jordan. Besides that, the current study extends prior studies in Jordan significantly.

This study examines the impact of institutional ownership (IO) on firm performance. It also investigates whether powerful CEOs using a “CEO score index” moderate IO and firm performance nexus by drawing on insights from the agency and resource dependency theories.

Data were obtained from annual reports of companies listed on the Palestine Security Exchange from 2009 to 2019. Panel data regressions were conducted based on 528 observations. In addition, this study repeated the analysis using a one-step generalized method of moments (GMM) and two-stage least squares analysis to deal with the endogeneity issue.

Results show that IO and CEO power is positively associated with firm performance. Besides, it has been established that CEO power strengthens the relationship between IO and performance. Thus, this can be summarized that IO improves firm performance; however, with the powerful CEO intervention, the performance will improve even more.

Studying IO is timely given since the type of ownership is paramount to identify which form of a high degree of ownership affects the performance negatively, especially, in the Palestine environment which is dominated by institutional investors. This is of great importance to the investors as it will enable them to identify the type of firms to which they can commit their funds, and which firm excels through the CEO power. Besides, the inconsistency results in previous literature on IO, and firm performance indicates that there is an indirect effect that needs alternative explanations.

The authors examine if CEO education level and quality impacts firm's corporate social performance (CSP). Additionally, the authors investigate whether other CEO characteristics such as age, busyness, compensation and firm's governance quality moderate the relationship between CEO education and CSP.

The authors use panel regression framework amid set of controls for their analysis. The authors additionally use two-stage least squares regression (2SLS) for robustness tests.

The authors show that CEOs with a post-graduate business degree (PGBUS) impact firm's CSP positively, whereas other educational degree directly do not influence CSP. However, CEO's age, busyness, compensation and firm's governance quality are found negatively moderating such relationship. The results survive set of robustness tests, and results are consistent the roles of upper echelons in Indian firms' strategic behaviors.

The results seek for an integration of more ethics and social responsibility discussions in the different education levels including undergraduate degree in India to help engender a stronger sense of moral consciousness toward firms' stakeholders as the Indian economy continues to develop.

The authors study and compare the effects of three CEO compensation restricting policies issued by the Chinese government in 2009, 2012 and 2015. This paper aims to shed light on the conditions under which CEO compenstation can be effectively regulated without negatively affecting firm performance.

These policies targeted state-owned enterprises (SOEs), especially central state-owned enterprises (CSOEs). Using these policies as natural experiments, the authors investigate how their effects differ on CEO compensation, firm performance and two known performance-decreasing mechanisms: perk consumption and tunneling activities.

The authors show that restricting CEO pay does not necessarily backfire in terms of deteriorating firm performance. This non-decreasing firm performance can be achieved by restricting perk consumption and tunneling activities while introducing CEO pay regulations.

The authors exploit a powerful experimental setting in the context of China. The evidence contributes to the literature on CEO pay regulations and is relevant to the managerial decisions of policy makers and boards of directors.

This study examines whether CEO power influences the book-based and market-based performance of Russian companies when it is restricted by the presence of essential shareholders, namely, state and influential businessmen.

Managerial power is divided into structural, ownership, expert and prestige. The proposed power metrics include not only CEOs but also the board of directors' characteristics that may restrict or enhance CEO power. The empirical analysis is based on the sample of 90 large traded Russian firms, which shares are included in the Moscow Stock Exchange Broad Market Index (MICEX BMI), observed from 2012 to 2019.

Panel data analysis suggests that higher board ownership and tenure may restrict CEO power, which in turn would be beneficial for corporate performance. the authors also see that in companies owned by influential businessmen, CEO power influence on M/B value is more negative, while state ownership does not moderate it. CEO power metrics, based on political experience and tenure, affect corporate performance differently in companies affiliated with extractive industries.

First, the authors consider two channels through which a company in emerging markets may get additional resources: CEOs and influential owners. Second, the authors develop power metrics based on Finkelstein's managerial power classification (1992) and the idea of relative power proposed by Bebchuk et al. (2011). It allows identifying whether the board of directors' may constrain or enhance CEO power to raise corporate performance. Third, the authors analyze developing Russian markets that represent a good ground for testing the question, whereas empirical research on Russia is relatively scarce (Grosman and Leiponen, 2018). Fourth, the authors pay particular attention to the CEO power in the extractive industry, strategically important for the Russian economy.

本研究擬探討行政總裁的權力，若因有不可或缺的股東 - 即國家和具影響力的實業家 - 的存在而受到約束時，其權力會否影響俄羅斯公司以賬簿為基礎和以市場為基礎的表現

管理權分為結構性的、所有權的、專家的和聲望的。提出的權力指標不但包括行政總裁，也涵蓋或會限制或增加行政總裁權力的董事會特徵。本研究的實證分析法是基於90間股份被納入莫斯科股票交易廣泛市場指數的大型俄羅斯上市公司樣本，觀察期由2012年至2019年

面板數據分析顯示、較高的董事會所有權和較長的任期或會限制行政總裁的權力，這因此有利於提升企業績效。我們亦看到，在具影響力的企業家擁有的公司裡，行政總裁權力對市價淨值的影響是較負面的，而國有制沒有把它減低。就隸屬採掘業的公司而言，基於政治經驗和任期的行政總裁權力指標，會對企業績效帶來不同的影響

(一) 我們考慮在新興市場公司可取得額外資源的兩個途徑：行政總裁和具影響力的所有者。(二) 我們基於芬克爾斯坦 (Finkelstein, 1992) 的管理權分類，以及 Bebchuk et al. (2011) 所提出相對功率的學說，建立了權力指標。憑著這權力指標，我們可鑑定董事會會限制、抑或增強行政總裁提升企業績效的權力。(三) 我們分析發展中的俄羅斯市場，其為測試我們問題的良好地方，而探討俄羅斯的實證研究較為稀有 (Grosman and Leiponen, 2018) 。(四) 我們特別關注在採掘業的行政總裁權力，而採掘業對俄羅斯經濟來說、是具有重要戰略意義的

Given the serious question raised by the subprime of the 2008 global financial crisis over the rising practices of excessive rewarding of executives in the USA and European firms, the executive pay-performance nexus has emerged as a popular topic of debate in the contemporary corporate finance research. Conducted mostly on the Anglo-Saxon contexts, research outcomes have been inconclusive and dichotomous. Considering this backdrop, this study aims to investigate the endogenous relationship between executive compensation and risk taking in the context of the USA.

Using a large sample of non-financial firms from 2010 to 2020 based on panel data and two-stage least square regression. In this study, the riskier corporate decision is measured as book leverage and ratio of R&D expense to total assets. Chief executive officers’ (CEO) experience and age are used as instrumental variables, and these are expected to influence compensation incentives and, hence, affect firm riskiness indirectly. Firm size, return on assets and CEO turnover are reported to affect compensation and corporate decisions, therefore, included as control variables. Given that higher executive compensation is related to riskier corporate decision in firms, this study incorporates total wealth (i.e. accumulated equity related compensation) as an additional proxy of compensation, and this selection is justifiable by the perfect contracting notion of the agency theory.

The results of this study show a significant positive and increasing nexus among compensation and riskier corporate decisions. Besides, the compensation level proxied through the percentage of each form of compensation in total compensation is very important as greater equity and greater salary diminishes risk taking.

The outcomes of this study have useful implications for firm stakeholders and policymakers.

The level of pay measured by the percentage of each type of compensation in total compensation is of utmost importance as it can increase or decrease risk taking in corporate decisions.

The purpose of the study is to examine the relation between board structure and firm performance variability in an international setting. The authors further explore the effect of national culture in shaping such relations.

The authors’ international sample contains 4,911 firms across 49 countries over the 2002–2017 period. The authors use national culture values on individualism and power distance developed by Hofstede (1980, 2001, 2011). The authors focus on within-firm, over-time variability of firm performance and estimate multivariate linear regressions with fixed effects. The authors address the endogeneity concern using the instrumental variable approach, and the authors’ results are robust to alternative measures of variables and different subsamples.

The authors find that firms with larger board size, greater board independence and less powerful CEOs have less variable performance. Individualism has a magnifying effect while power distance has a mitigating effect in shaping such relations.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this study is among the first to answer the call of Adams, Hermalin and Weisbach (2010) for research on corporate boards in an international setting. It is also one of the few studies which examine the variability of firm performance, while the majority of existing literature focuses on the level of firm performance. Most importantly, to the best of the authors’ knowledge, this study is the first to explore the role of national culture in shaping boardroom interactions that affect the decision-making process of corporate boards, which, in turn, affects firm performance variability.