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The purpose of this paper is to investigate the contrasting moderating effect of a firm’s exploration on the relationship between the two types of long-term incentives (stock options/stock ownership) for the chief executive officers and a firm’s long-term performance. Even though the two types of incentives are designed to improve long-term performance, the degrees of impact on long-term performance differ. Based on behavioral agency theory, this study theoretically and empirically examines the role of a firm’s exploration on the above relationship.

This study used three archival sources to obtain data on stock options, stock ownership, patents and exploration, financial measures, and others. Based on a sample of 1,963 firms in various industries from 1995 to 2006, this study tested the moderating effect of a firm’s exploration on the relationship between stock options/ownership and a firm’s performance.

This study reveals the contrasting moderating effect of a firm’s exploration on the relationship between stock options/ownership and a firm’s long-term performance: a positive moderating effect on the relationship between stock options and performance and a negative moderating effect on the relationship between stock ownership and performance. In addition, empirical evidence was added on the inverted U-shaped relationship between stock ownership and a firm’s long-term performance.

There is little research on a firm’s internal characteristics that strengthen or weaken the effects of stock options and stock ownership on firm performance. This study demonstrates the differential moderating effects of exploration on the relationship between stock options/stock ownership and long-term performance. Such effects of exploration come from the different risk features of stock options and stock ownership. The key implication is that stock options could be more effective than stock ownership to enhance a firm’s long-term performance when a firm has a strong exploration orientation.

The main purpose of this paper is to examine the relationships among chief executive officer (CEO) compensation, ownership and firm value. In addition, the determining factors of CEO compensation are examined.

This model is applied to data of the Taiwan stock market for 1995‐2004. The paper applies a two‐stage least squares regression for the panel data model and implements an F‐test, LM test and Hausman test to determine the best statistical method (that is, ordinary least squares method, fix effects model or random effects method).

The results offer some important insights that show CEO compensation, CEO ownership and firm value are interdependent. Firm size, board size, firm value, institution ownership and CEO ownership are positively associated with CEO compensation while firm age, research and development expenditure rates and firm risk are negatively associated with CEO compensation.

The on‐going expansion in the scale of the firm depends on managers having specialized knowledge. In particular, managers are responsible for the firm's entire operational conditions and future investment strategy. Providing an incentive compensation package can reduce agency costs between managers and shareholders. These findings also provide Taiwanese listed companies with a lesson, which suggests that the existence of the monitoring system can reduce the need for incentive alignment.

The study relies on data from publicly traded Taiwan firms, covering a ten‐year period. This study uses a simultaneous equation estimation procedure to investigate the relations among CEO compensation, CEO ownership and firm value. Two proxies for effective monitoring – board size and institutional ownership – are used. The paper attempts to discuss the influence on CEO compensation from the existence of the monitoring system.

The purpose of this study is to explicitly focus on the roles of ownership concentration, ownership by the board, the chief executive officer (CEO) and the chairperson in the involvement and capabilities of chairpersons and other governors in their work.

In this study, the authors investigate the impact of the concentration of ownership, the ownership of the board, the CEO and the chairperson on the chairperson’s activity when the roles of the chairperson and the CEO are separated The empirical analysis of this study is based on a survey sent to Nordic listed firms.

The results show that the ownership characteristics of a company are important in determining the chairperson’s working hours, the chairperson’s communication with the CEO and the performance of governance activity. In addition, the authors found that while the ownership of the chairperson and the board of directors and ownership concentration improve governance activity, CEO ownership may undermine governance activity.

The primary implication of the study is that both ownership by internal governors and ownership concentration play an important role in determining the involvement of internal corporate governors.

The study provides unique evidence that ownership by the chairperson, concentrated ownership and ownership by the board can potentially mitigate the costs of separating the roles of the chairperson and the CEO.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effect of ownership concentration on CEO compensation and firm performance relationship in New Zealand.

The paper applies regression analysis to data from New Zealand listed companies from 2001 to 2005.

The study finds a non‐linear effect of ownership concentration on CEO compensation‐firm performance relationship, that is CEO compensation is negatively (positively) related to firm performance in firms with high (low) concentrated ownership structure respectively.

Results provide evidence for the proposition that ownership concentration at a high level in New Zealand does not constrain excessive management power, but exacerbates agency problems associated with executive pay. A highly concentrated ownership structure provides potential explanation for the misalignment between CEO compensation and firm performance in New Zealand. The positive effect of a low ownership concentration level on CEO compensation‐firm performance relationship suggests that monitoring the efficiency of large shareholders works better at a low ownership concentration level.

By exploring the non‐linear interaction between two governance mechanisms – CEO compensation and ownership concentration – the findings of the study make contributions to the current compensation and ownership literature mainly in two ways: although the non‐linearity between ownership concentration and firm value has attracted extensive research interest, little attention is given to the non‐linear effect of large shareholding on the CEO compensation contract in prior studies; and, in the context of a developed country with a small financial market, there are low regulatory “drag” and virtual absence of a litigation threat to organisations, as in New Zealand. This study suggests concentrated ownership as an underlying explanation for the misalignment between CEO compensation and firm performance.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effect of long horizon institutional ownership on CEO career concerns to meet the short-term earnings benchmark.

Using a sample of 10,565 firm-year observations in the USA, the paper examines the extent to which long horizon institutional investors mitigate the positive relation between CEO turnover and missing the quarterly consensus analyst forecast.

After controlling for the general performance-turnover relation, this paper finds that long horizon institutional investors mitigate the positive relation between CEO turnover and missing the quarterly consensus analyst forecast. This finding is stronger when CEOs focus on long-term value creation and do not sacrifice long-term value to boost current earnings and is stronger when the monitoring intensity by long horizon institutional investors is greater.

The results suggest that long horizon institutional investors serve a monitoring role in alleviating CEO career concerns to meet the short-term earnings benchmark.

This paper contributes to the literature on the relation between long horizon institutional ownership and attenuated managerial short-termism. The literature is silent about why long horizon institutional investors alleviate managerial short-termism. This paper fills this void in the literature by documenting that long horizon institutional investors mitigate CEO career concerns for managerial short-termism. Moreover, this paper contributes to the literature on the monitoring role of institutional investors by documenting the incremental effect of institutional ownership on CEO career concerns to meet the short-term earnings benchmark.

This paper seeks to investigate the holding of non‐executive directorships by CEOs in a sample of 387 large UK companies. The main objective of the paper is to ascertain whether the holding of additional directorships by CEOs is influenced by the governance and ownership characteristics of their companies.

The approach takes the form of an empirical analysis of the holding of non‐executive directorships by 387 CEOs of large UK companies.

The study finds that 101 CEOs (26 per cent) hold at least one non‐executive directorship but the most any single CEO holds is three with the vast majority holding one other directorship. CEOs who also serve as chairman are more likely to hold non‐executive directorships while CEOs in companies with greater concentration of external ownership are less likely to hold other directorships. The study finds no evidence that either non‐executive representation or managerial ownership (including CEO ownership) influences the holding of additional directorships. The holding of additional directorships is positively related to company size, suggesting that the more complex environment in which CEOs of large companies operate leads to the offer of additional directorships.

The findings are important as they key into an ongoing debate on whether the holding of additional directorships by CEOs is consistent with good governance practice. The evidence presented here provides mixed information for governance regulators. While a significant majority of CEOs do not hold additional directorships, there is evidence that weaker board and external ownership monitoring is associated with a greater likelihood that CEOs will sit on other boards.

Purpose – This paper aims at re-examining the predictions of agency theory with regard to the negative association between CEO duality (i.e. the Chief Executive Officer, CEO, serves also as the board chairman) and corporate performance. It also examines the role of other corporate governance mechanisms (board size, top managerial ownership and institutional ownership) as moderating variables in the relationship between CEO duality and corporate performance.

Methodology/approach – This paper uses the financial statements for the year 2006 of most actively traded Egyptian companies to examine these predictions of agency theory. Moderated Regression Analysis is used to analyse the empirical data.

Findings – The findings indicated that the hypothesized relationships between CEO duality, the moderating variables and corporate performance have changed. For companies characterized by large boards and low top management ownership, corporate performance is negatively affected by CEO duality and positively impacted by institutional ownership.

Research limitations/implications – A limitation of this study is the use of accounting-based performance measures because of the expected earnings management behaviours by CEOs.

Practical implications – The Egyptian Capital Market Authority should adopt a reform programme to encourage Egyptian listed companies to modify their governance structures by increasing top management ownership and reducing board sizes before incorporating the new governance rules into the listing requirements.

Originality/value of paper – The paper contributes to the literature on corporate governance and corporate performance by introducing a framework for identifying and analysing moderating variables that affect the relationship between CEO duality and corporate performance.

This study aims to investigate the relationship between chief executive officer (CEO) power and the level of tax avoidance of Tunisian listed companies. It also examines the moderating role of institutional ownership in this association.

The sample comprises 306 firm-year observations of companies listed on the Tunis Stock Exchange during the 2013–2020 period.

The results indicate that CEO power reduces tax avoidance levels. Moreover, the relationship between CEO power and tax avoidance is more pronounced in the presence of institutional ownership, suggesting that CEOs act less opportunistically when monitored by institutional investors, which results in a reduction in tax avoidance.

This study suggests that CEO power and institutional shareholders’ influence are important factors in determining firms’ avoidance behavior. This study has significant implications for shareholders and regulatory bodies. Indeed, shareholders apprehend the impact of appointing a powerful CEO on tax avoidance practices. This study may also provide regulators with new insights into the influence of CEO power dimensions and institutional ownership on tax aggressiveness.

This study fills the gap in the accounting literature by investigating how CEO power may impact tax avoidance behavior and provides empirical evidence on the moderating impact of institutional ownership on this relationship in an emerging economy context characterized by a weakly protected investor setting.

Deregulation shifts the responsibility for mitigation of agency problems from the regulatory parties to the firms' shareholders. We investigate whether and how governance structure changes in response to the dynamics of the new business environment after the Regulatory Reform Act of 1994 for the US trucking industry. We show that deregulation increases market competition in the trucking industry. The deregulated trucking firms not only adjust internal governance structure but also alter antitakeover provisions to adapt themselves to the competitive status of business environment after deregulation.

This study aims to investigate the impact of equity ownership structure (i.e. CEO ownership, board chair ownership and institutional ownership) on internationalization of firms. The moderating role of international experience of board chairs is also examined.

This study uses Compustat-Capital IQ data from Standard &Poor’s. The sample of this study includes 309 US multinational corporations representing different sectors. The parameters were estimated by using the ordinary least squares regression with the SPSS statistical package.

The finding of this study suggests that CEO ownership and board chair ownership have a significant, positive impact on the degree of internationalization of firms, whereas institutional ownership has a negative impact. The predicted moderating role of international experience of board chairs has found mixed results.

This study contributes to the literature by taking a holistic approach to examine the impact of equity ownership types (i.e. CEO ownership, board chair ownership and institutional ownership) on firms’ degree of internationalization. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this research is also the first to investigate the impact of independent board chairs’ equity ownership and international experience on internationalization.