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The purpose of this study is to examine the association between the combined roles of chief executive officer (CEO)-chairman titles (CEO duality) and investment efficiency, defined as a lower deviation from expected investment for targeted S-curve firms used to propel an innovation-driven economy. This study also aims to investigate the moderating effect of financial reporting quality on this association.

This paper focuses on the ten targeted S-curve industries – under the definition of the Thailand 4.0 model – listed on the Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET) from 2000 to 2019. Data related to CEO/chairman titles and investment supports were manually collected from the annual reports, the SET market analysis and reporting tool database and the company websites. Financial data used to estimate investment behaviors and discretionary accruals were extracted from 1999. The study analyzes unbalanced panel data using fixed-effects regressions. Additional tests embrace replacing the sample with nontargeted firms, partitioning into granted and nongranted firms, adding CEOs’ demographic moderators, using alternative variable measures and analyzing for lagged independent variables.

The main findings show that CEO duality reduces overinvestment but worsens underinvestment in targeted firms. Financial reporting quality (FRQ) appears to strengthen CEO duality in mitigating extreme spending but has no impact on the association between CEO duality and underinvestment. Additional results, for example, conclude that CEO duality has no association with both over- and underinvesting at nontargeted firms, but its effect becomes positively significant on overinvestment when financial reporting quality is high. The negative association between CEO duality and overinvestment is found only in government-granted and targeted firms. FRQ encourages CEO duality in lowering overinvestment among targeted firms without grants. CEOs’ female and serviced early years appear to elevate those main findings.

These findings assist innovative corporations in choosing a proper leadership structure to cope with investment inefficiency. The research gives the government and regulatory bodies an insight into the qualifications of the leadership structure and financial information that helps them put forward effective policies.

To the best of the author’s knowledge, this study is among the first to establish the association between CEO duality and investment efficiency for innovation-driven firms in a transforming economy. The study fills the gap in the literature on management, accounting and finance by unveiling the interplay between dual leadership and financial reporting in affecting the efficiency of investments.

This study aims to analyze whether chief executive officer (CEO) duality and financial expertise are associated with earnings management to exceed thresholds. It also investigates to what extent and in what direction this association evolves when family ownership is introduced as a moderator variable.

Based on balanced panel data related to companies listed on the Tunis Stock Exchange, this study uses the logistic random-effect model to test research hypotheses during the period spanning from 2016 to 2021.

The results show that CEOs with financial expertise are less inclined to engage in earnings management to avoid reporting losses and earnings decline. The authors also provide evidence that CEO duality allows top management to be more powerful and, therefore, manage earnings to report positive profits and sustain recent performance. Furthermore, the authors find that family ownership moderates the association between CEO financial expertise, CEO duality and earnings management to exceed thresholds.

The findings suggest to regulators involved in corporate governance and earnings management issues a reflection on CEO duality power, board effectiveness and family control. The study results are also of interest to auditors and board members as they provide a more in-depth understanding of the impact of CEOs' attributes and family control on financial reporting decisions.

This study extends past literature by providing new insights into the effect of CEO attributes and family control on earnings management practices in weak investor protection countries such as Tunisia.

The purpose of this study is to examine the moderating effect of an exogenous corporate governance shock that curbs Chief Executive Officers’ (CEOs) power on the relationship between CEO narcissism and earnings management practices.

The authors performed a quasi-experiment using a differences-in-differences approach to examine Brazil’s duality split regulatory change on 101 Brazilian public firms during the period 2010–2022.

The main findings indicate that the introduction of duality split curtails the positive influence of CEO narcissism on earnings management, suggesting that this corporate governance regulation may act as a complementary corporate governance mechanism in mitigating the negative consequences of powerful narcissistic CEOs. Further robustness checks indicate that the results remain consistent after using entropy balancing and alternative measures of CEO narcissism.

In emerging markets, where governance systems are frequently perceived as less than optimal, policymakers and regulatory authorities can draw insights from this enforcement to shape governance systems, reducing CEO power and, consequently, improving the quality of financial reporting.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first study to examine whether a duality split mitigates the influence of CEO narcissism on earnings management. Thus, this study contributes to the corporate governance literature that calls for research on the effectiveness of external corporate governance mechanisms in emerging markets as well as the CEO narcissism literature that calls for research on moderating factors that could curtail negative consequences of narcissistic CEO behavior.

In the past few years, researchers across the world have been attracted to corporate governance (CG) and sustainability studies in the banking space. However, inconsistencies remain, which have created a lack of alignment in existing research. To address this problem, this paper aims to re-examines the CG–bank sustainability relationship using a qualitative design, which has been underused in the field, to generate in-depth, useful and novel analysis and insights that may hide behind the numbers.

A qualitative inquiry was conducted using key informants in Ghana’s banking industry. This study made use of purposive and snowball sampling techniques, an interview guide and the thematic approach to qualitative data analysis.

Firstly, this research finds that while larger boards do not promote bank sustainability, those who are independent and have diversified expertise and experiences do. Secondly, CEO duality can boost bank sustainability only if the CEO is actively engaged and performing. Thirdly, this study finds that foreign-owned and managed banks make more profits only if they have good knowledge of the local market.

This research makes the call that upcoming researchers should replicate this research in other banking settings worldwide to validate the results.

Practical lessons for local and foreign-owned banks and their shareholders are discussed to advance the United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goal 8.

This research shares novel insights that offer clarity to the literature and move the CG and sustainability fields forward.

This paper aims to investigate the impact of retrenchment strategy on firm performance in the context of Pakistani firms while considering the moderating role of chief executive officer (CEO) power. By examining the influence of CEO duality and CEO share ownership on the relationship, this study contributes to strategic management and corporate governance knowledge within the Pakistani business environment.

A quantitative approach was used to analyze the relationship using data from annual financial statements. The sample consisted of 76 companies from the KSE-100 index from the year 2015 to 2020. Random effects regression models were used, along with hierarchical regression to explore the moderating effect of CEO power.

The findings demonstrate that the implementation of a retrenchment strategy positively impacts firm performance in Pakistani firms. The study also reveals that CEO power plays a crucial role in strengthening the relationship between retrenchment strategy and firm performance. Moreover, the study highlights the importance of considering the temporal sequence, size and age of firms when examining the impact of CEO power and retrenchment strategy on firm performance.

The study enhances the understanding of the contingent nature of retrenchment strategies and the influence of CEO power in the Pakistani business context. Practically, the research contributes to strategic management and corporate governance dynamics, facilitating the development of strategies that enhance firm performance and sustainability in Pakistan.

This research provides original insights by specifically focusing on the Pakistani context and analyzing the interplay between retrenchment strategy, CEO power and firm performance. The study adds to the limited literature on the relationship between retrenchment and performance in the Pakistani business environment. Additionally, it highlights the significance of CEO power as a critical factor in determining the success of retrenchment.

This paper examines how board structure influences real earnings management and the interaction effect of CEO narcissism on board structure-real earnings management relationship.

The authors used panel data derived from secondary sources from publicly listed firms in Kenya during 2002–2017. Hierarchical regression analysis was used to test the hypotheses.

The results indicate that board independence, board tenure and size have significant negative effect on real earnings management, while CEO duality positively affects real earnings management. Further, the interaction results show that CEO narcissism moderates the relationship between CEO duality and real earnings management.

The results suggest that real earnings management reduces when boards are independent, large and comprising of long-tenured members. However, when the CEO plays dual role of a chairman, real earnings management increases. The authors also find that when CEOs are narcissists, the monitoring role of the board is compromised.

The study adds value to the understanding of how board structure and CEO narcissism influence the monitoring role of the board among firms listed at Nairobi Securities Exchange.

This study aims to explore the effect of chief executive officer education on firms’ action timing and acquisition performance in industry merger waves. In addition, this study investigated the moderating influence of CEO duality and firm cash flow on the relationship between education and entry timing.

Following the methodology for determining merger waves in previous studies, the authors identified 16 industry merger waves of Chinese listed firms from 2008 to 2019. Multiple linear regression was employed to examine the hypotheses.

The results showed that higher CEO education was associated with early participation in merger waves. CEO duality negatively moderated the education-entry timing relation. The effect of CEO education on entry timing was more pronounced when firms had higher cash flow. Moreover, more educated CEOs materially enhanced acquisition performance in merger waves.

Entry timing in industry merger waves has important implications, as early movers establish competitive advantages and achieve higher acquisition performance. However, the managerial characteristics determining entry timing have not received adequate attention. Meanwhile, studies examining the effect of CEO education on acquisitions are limited. This study explored the effect of CEO education on firms’ entry timing and acquisition performance in merger waves, thereby contributing to the literature on merger waves and managerial characteristics. This study’s findings regarding the moderators of the education-entry timing relation enrich the literature on corporate governance and agency theory.

In today's competitive business environment, understanding how leadership traits shape outcomes is critical. Chief executive officer (CEO) narcissism, an intriguing and debated trait, raises questions about its impact on organisational behaviour, particularly regarding entrepreneurial orientation (EO). This study aims to examine how CEO narcissism affects EO, both as aggregate and specific measures, encompassing internal and external growth. It also considers the organisational context by examining how factors such as capital intensity, firm ownership and CEO duality moderate this relationship.

To test the hypotheses, the authors used a sample of firms drawn from China's ChiNext database (2008–2017). After an initial screening, the final sample consists of 251 CEOs from 239 companies. Data on CEO narcissism are collected from the firm's official website and major online sources, whilst additional data are extracted from the WIND daabase. The authors use multiple regression and ordinary least squares (OLS) for data analysis.

The results show that CEO narcissism leads to external asset growth investments but not internal research and development (R&D). There is a positive relationship between CEO narcissism and EO as an aggregate measure and also different managerial discretions play varying roles in the relationship. Specifically, capital intensity weakens this relationship, but state ownership strengthens it.

This study helps to clarify the relationship between CEO narcissism and EO and advances the literature by showing that firms' EO actions may take various forms of innovation and venturing as new entry initiations of EO. The study findings have important implications for firms to capitalise on narcissistic CEOs' entrepreneurial tendencies, balance internal R&D and external asset growth and leverage various managerial discretions.

This study aims to examine the effect of corporate cash holdings on financial performance. Additionally, it investigates the moderating effect of corporate governance and family ownership on the link between corporate cash holdings and financial performance.

This study uses secondary data regarding the sample of 81 firms listed in the Karachi Stock Exchange (KSE) 100 index from 2011 to 2020. The present study applies the system generalized method of moments (GMM) to estimate the dynamic financial performance models.

The findings reveal that corporate cash holding is significantly positively linked with financial performance. Further, the findings indicate that the board size and chief executive officer (CEO) duality strengthen the association between cash holdings and financial performance, whereas CEO gender and family ownership weaken the positive effect of cash holdings on financial performance. Furthermore, the findings suggest that Covid-19 significantly negatively affected the financial performance of Pakistani firms.

The findings have several policy implications. First, policymakers need to increase the board of directors' role in observing the firms' cash-holding behaviour. Policymakers may also formulate policies providing stronger protection for minority shareholders from majority shareholders.

To the best of the authors' knowledge, this study is the first to examine how corporate governance and family ownership influence the link between corporate cash holdings and financial performance in the context of Pakistan.

This study aims to examine the effects of local tournament incentives on environmental, social and governance (ESG) disclosure and the quality of such disclosures among Chinese A-share listed companies. Furthermore, it seeks to investigate the moderating roles of CEO duality, institutional investors’ shareholding and product market competition in this relationship.

This study uses a quantitative approach, and data from A-share listed companies in China spanning from 2012 to 2021. To test the proposed hypotheses, the authors conduct hierarchical regression analysis along with a series of robustness tests to ensure the validity of our findings.

The findings of this study indicate that local tournament incentives have a positive impact on companies’ propensity to disclose ESG information, yet they negatively influence the quality of these disclosures. Additionally, the presence of CEO duality and product market competition attenuate this relationship, whereas the shareholding of institutional investors serves to strengthen it.

This study’s findings can aid policymakers and regulators in China and other emerging economies in policies that promote high-quality ESG information disclosure, taking into account local tournament incentives. Furthermore, the study underscores the importance of maintaining robust corporate governance structures within firms to ensure that CEOs’ self-serving motivations do not undermine ESG disclosure.

This study adds to the ongoing discourse on the significance of ESG disclosure in emerging economies by analyzing the influence of executive promotion incentives on ESG disclosure from an external labor market standpoint. By exploring the potential self-serving motivations of CEOs in promoting ESG values and practices within organizations, this paper addresses a gap in the existing literature.